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



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Lord Leigh.





HERMES:

OR, A

Philosophical Inquiry

Concerning LANGUAGE

AND

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

— εἰσιέναι θαρρύντας, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεός.

Inf. p. 7, 8.

By J. H.

L O N D O N:

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in the *Strand*.

M. DCC. LI.



To the Right Honourable
PHILIP *Lord* HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of *Great*
Britain.

My Lord,

AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself ; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes

A 2 of

of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant.

Salisbury, Oct. 1,
1751.

James Harris.

P R E F A C E.

THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation,) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, 'tis the internal vigour, and virtue of

the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous, (whom he has mentioned already,) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.——

For

P R E F A C E.

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For tho' he hopes, he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

*From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say, (according to the vulgar phrase,) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that " it was the hasty
" fruits of a few idle hours; written
" merely for private amusement;
" never revised; published against
" consent, at the importunity of
" friends, copies (God knows how)
" having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask*

A 4

such

such Prefacers, If what they allege be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities ?

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral ; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now a-days are but little studied ; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries
of

P R E F A C E.

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of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No-
emonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that no body knows; what usage, what quarter can be have reason to expect?—Should the Author of these speculations have done this, (and 'tis to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose

suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments, as the view of ancient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the SAME REASON has at all times prevailed; how there is ONE
TRUTH,

P R E F A C E.

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TRUTH, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

'Tis perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies
are

are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think perfection with ourselves, and that 'tis superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

P R E F A C E.

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A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. 'Tis hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. 'Tis thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here,

here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is ; since MIND, like other Powers, can be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place ; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle.

For

P R E F A C E.

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For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of

of Science ; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature ; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern ; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem ; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confest already, 'twould be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably depart to those destined regions, where the productions of modern Wit are every day departing,

———*in vicum vendeatam tus et odores.*

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HERMES:

OR, A

Philosophical Inquiry

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I.
for Solitude, they had never felt an
Impulse to converse one with another. And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recogniz'd the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is the
B joint

Ch. I. joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties (*a*), (that is to say, of our *Reason* and our *social Affection*) being withal our *peculiar* Ornament and Distinction, as *Men*; those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how SPEECH may be naturally *resolved*; or how, when resolved, it may be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold SPEECH, as divided into *its constituent Parts*, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter* and *Form*, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analyzings* or *Resolutions* constitute what we call PHILOSOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

WHEN,

(*a*) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292; and Note xix. p. 296. of the same Volume.

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus Ch. I.
analyzed, we may then consider it, as *compounded*. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (*b*) *Syntbesis*, which by combining *simple Terms* produces a *Truth*; then by combining *two Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Syntbesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to

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conduct

(*b*) *Aristotle* says — τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἔστιν ἢ τε ἀληθὲς ἢ τε ψευδὲς εἶναι· οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λεῦκος, τρέχει, νικᾷ—*Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth.* Cat. C. 4. So again in the Beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδὲς τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and false are seen in Composition and Division. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.*

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, constitutes the
 Art of LOGIC.

AFTER this we may turn to those
 (c) *inferior* Compositions, which are pro-
 ductive

(c) *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatise
 Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, p. 53. gives the following Extract
 from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length,
 as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because
 it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτῆς γὰρ ὕψους τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθὰ διώρεσεν
 ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΤΣ
 ἈΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς
 ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πι-
 σσαι προσῖθται τὰς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν ἐν τὴν σχέ-
 σιν αὐτῶ τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΤΣ ἈΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καλῶ-
 γίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέ-
 γεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ
 καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλ-
 λήλοις, ὥς τε διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον
 σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ιδεῶν, ἔτι τε
 μακρολογίας καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων πα-
 ραλαμβάνομένων, οἶσαί τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπληξαι,
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν πειθὴ χειρωθέντα ἔχειν· τῆς δέ γε ΠΡΟΣ
 ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος
 προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεῦδος διελύχων,
 καὶ

BOOK THE FIRST.

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ductive of the *Pathetick*, and the *Plea-Ch. I.*
sant in all their kinds. These latter Com-
 positions

καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύει. *The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.*

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magna pro munere dedit Sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quæ ab oratione solæcismos & barbarismos expellit. Secunda Dialectica, quæ in Sermonis veritate versatur. Tertia Rhetorica, quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirat. Min. l. 1.

Ch. I. positions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*, become from their different heightnings either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart. We may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deem'd Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

At

BOOK THE FIRST.

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AT present we shall postpone the whole Ch. I.
synthetical Part, (that is to say, *Logic* and *Rhetoric*) and confine ourselves to the
analytical, that is to say UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR. In this we shall follow the
Order, that we have above laid down,
first dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE into its
CONSTITUENT PARTS; then resolving it,
as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and
FORM; two Methods of Analysis very dif-
ferent in their kind, and which lead to a
variety of very different Speculations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the
course of our Inquiry we sometimes de-
scend to things, which appear trivial and
low; let him look upon the Effects, to
which those things contribute, then from
the Dignity of the Consequences, let him
honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not impro-
perly be here inserted. "When the Fame

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" of

Ch. I. " of *Heracitus* was celebrated through-
 " out *Greece*, there were certain persons,
 " that had a curiosity to see so great a
 " Man. They came, and, as it happen'd,
 " found him warming himself in a
 " Kitchen. The Meanness of the place
 " occasioned them to stop, upon which
 " the Philosopher thus accosted them —
 " ENTER (says he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
 " TOO THERE ARE GODS (*d*)."

WE shall only add, that as there is no
 part of Nature too mean for the Divine
 Presence; so there is no kind of Subject,
 having its foundation in Nature, that is
 below the Dignity of a philosophical In-
 quiry.

(*d*) See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. i. c. 5.


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CHAP. II.

*Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its
smallest Parts.*

THOSE things, which are *first to Na-* Ch. II.
ture, are not *first to Man*. *Nature* 
begins from *Causes*, and thence descends
to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* first open
upon *Effects*, and thence by slow degrees
ascend to *Causes*. Often had Mankind
seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew
its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition;
much oftner had they seen those unceasing
Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of
Day and Night, before they knew the
Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).
Even

(a) This Distinction of *prior to Man*, and *prior to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's* Comment on the same, *Poster. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and *human* Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical

tween Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. GOD may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* thro' *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in *Aristotle*: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν κυκλιδῶν ὁμαλία πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μὲν ἡμέραν, ἔτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things*, Metaph. l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise — Ἀγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἐτελεστέων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλῆστερα καὶ τελειότερα προΐεναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνίθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα. "Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶσαι μὲν λόγον, καὶ ἱκεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἶδε· τούτων δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κακίονα εἰς σοιχειῖα, ἐκέτι. *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh;*

BOOK THE FIRST.

II

tical Observers, the rest look no higher Ch. II.
than to the *Practice* and meer *Work*, know-
ing nothing of those *Principles*, on which
the whole depends.

THUS in SPEECH for example—Al-
men, even the lowest, can speak their
Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this
multitude can neither write, nor even
read? How many of those, who are thus
far literate, know nothing of that Gram-
mar, which respects the Genius of their
own Language? How few then must be
those, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL;
that Grammar, which without regarding
the several Idioms of particular Languages,
only respects those Principles, that are
essential to them all?

THIS our present Design to inquire about
this Grammar; in doing which we shall
follow

walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun
and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables
into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in
Com. de Prædic. p. 28.

Ch. II. follow the Order consonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

WE shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that Combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as, if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons —*

Or

* Merchant of Venice.

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Or in *Milton**,

Ch. II.

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble
feet,
Hasting this way—*

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning and in rain ?*

this, 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of *Banquo*,

*—Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry bence ! —*

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

* P. L. IV. 866.

Ch. II. *WHEN Milton says in the character of*
 his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
 Jest and youthful Jollity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.


WHEN in the beginning of the Paradise Lost we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
 Before all temples th' upright heart, and
 pure,*

Instruct me, for thou know'st —

this is not to be call'd an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precativè* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in
 their

their stamp and character? Are they no Ch. II.
 way reducible to certain definite Classes? 
 If not, they can be no objects of *rational*
 comprehension.—Let us however try.

'TIS a phrase often apply'd to a man,
 when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*;
 as much as to say, that his Speech or Dis-
 course is *a publishing of some Energie or*
Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in every
 one that speaks, excepting alone the Dis-
 sembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far
 as possible, affects the appearance.

NOW the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over
 and above the meer nutritive) may be in-
 cluded all of them in those of PERCEPTION,
 and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of
 PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the
Intellect; by the Powers of VOLITION, I
 mean in an extended sense, not only the
Will, but the several *Passions* and *Appetites*;
 in short, *all that moves to Action, whether*
rational or irrational.

IF

Ch. II. If then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

If we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to *publish some Perception, either of the Senses or the Intellect*?

AGEN, if we *interrogate*, if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish* (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative*) what do we but publish so many different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that *questions*? He that has a *Desire* to be inform'd.—Who is it that *commands*? He that has a *Will*, which he would have obey'd.—What are those Beings, who either
wish

wish or pray? Those, who feel certain Ch. II.
wants either for themselves, or others.

IF then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the two above mention'd, and it be true that *all Speech is a publication of these Powers*, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE

(b) Ῥητέον ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διττὰς ἐχούσας δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὀρεκτικὰς λεγομένας· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν· ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν αγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δακνόντων, οἷον βύλησιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τέτταρα εἶδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸ ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ ἀπειριωμένης (τὸν συμβαλλίσθαι δοκῶντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἥτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῇ

C

ζητήσεως,

Ch. II. THE Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the

ζητήσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΠΤΥΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ καὶ ἙΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ καλυμένῳ λόγῳ, ἢ πράγματι καὶ εἰ πράγμα, ἥτοι αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ τυχεῖν ἐπιειμένης, πρὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΤ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ πράξεως καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΥΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χειρότερος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίῳ καλυμένῳ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἔστι τῷ ἐξαγγελτικῷ τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῷ δεκτικῷ ἐστὶν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἕθεν. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in the Text, we take its translation from the *Latin Interpreter*. *Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, & vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur; quæ vero cognitionis est, vis est, quæ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, quæ bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiuntur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum, id quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab*

The *Æneid* to an Epigram of *Martial*. But Ch. II.
 The *longest Extension*, with which Grammar
 has to do, is the Extension here consider'd,
 that is to say a SENTENCE. The greater
 Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs,
 Sections, and complete Works) belong not
 to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order;
 not to mention that all of them are but
 Sentences repeated.

Now a SENTENCE (c) may be sketch'd
 in the following description—a compound

C 2

Quantity

*exquirat, ut in oratione, quam Percunctantem,
 aut Interrogantem vocant: vel rem: sique rem, vel
 eum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in op-
 tante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in
 hac, vel ut a præstantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel
 ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nomina-
 tur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate
 proficiscitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ
 in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hæc
 sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla.*
 Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Λόγος δὲ φωνῇ συνθετὴν σημαίνου, ἥ ἐστι
 μέρη καὶ ἀλλὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See
 also de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. *Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.*

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of Sound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*.]

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts agen other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be perfued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as *a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant*. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) WORD. For thus, though the Words
[*Sun*]

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντική, — ἥς μέρος ἕδω ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2. & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows

[*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Meaning, Ch. II.
 Yet is there certainly no Meaning in any
 Of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of
 The one, nor in the Letters of the other.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in
 prose or verse, every Whole, every Sec-
 tion, every Paragraph, every Sentence, im-
 ply a certain *Meaning, divisible into other*
Meanings, but WORDS imply a *Meaning,*
which is not so divisible; it follows that
 WORDS will be the *smallest parts of speech*,
 In as much as nothing less has any Mean-
 ing at all.

C 3

To

Notes—*Diētio est pars minima orationis constructæ, id est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, nequis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio.* To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. *Introductio Grammaticæ. l. 4.* Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See *Cratylus*, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

Ch. II. *To know therefore the species of Words*
must needs contribute *to the knowledge of*
Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its
minuteſt Parts.

THIS therefore must become our next
Inquiry.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

*Concerning the species of Words, the smallest
Parts of Speech.*

LET us first search for the *Species* of Ch. III.
Words among those Parts of Speech,
commonly receiv'd by Grammarians. For
example, in one of the passages above
cited.—

*The Man, that bath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE ; —
[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*]
[*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS,
some Substantive, and some Adjective —
[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS —
[*Bath*] and [*is*] are VERBS — [*moved*] a PAR-
TICIPLE — [*Not*] an ADVERB — [*And*] a
CONJUNCTION — [*In*] [*with*] and [*For*] are

Ch. III. PREPOSITIONS. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

The Man that bath no musc, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Haſt*,
4
Had,

Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweetest; Ch. III.
Fit into Fitter and Fittest. On the con-
trary the Words, *The, In, And*, and some
others, remain as they are, and *cannot be*
altered.

AND yet it may be question'd, how far
this Difference is essential. For in the first
place, there are Variations, which can be
hardly call'd necessary, because only some
Languages have them, and others have
them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual*
Variation, which is unknown both to the
Moderns and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus
the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives
by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case,
and Number; whereas the *English* never
vary them in any of those ways, but thro'
all kinds of Concord preserve them still
the same. Nay even those very Variations,
which appear most necessary, may have
their places supplied by other methods;
some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or
Brute

Ch. III. *Bruto* we say of *Brutus*, to *Brutus*; some by meer *Position*, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassias*, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning* (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And, The, With, &c.*) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now

Now it should seem that this Distinc-^{Ch.III.}
tion, if any, was essential. For if all Words
are significant, or else they wou'd not be
Words ; and if every thing not *absolute*, is
of course *relative* ; then will all Words
be significant either *absolutely* or *relatively*.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinc-
tion, the first sort of Words may be call'd
significant by themselves ; the latter may be
call'd *significant by relation* ; or if we like
it better, the first sort may be call'd *Prin-*
cipals, the latter *Accessories*. The first are
like those stones in the basis of an Arch,
which are able to support themselves, even
when the Arch is destroyed ; the latter are
like those stones in its Summit or Curve,
which can no longer stand, than while the
whole subsists (e).

§ THIS

(e) *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acutest
Authors that ever wrote on the subject of Gram-
mar) illustrates the different power of Words, by
the

Ch. III. § THIS Distinction being admitted, v
thus pursue our Speculations. All thin
wha

the different power of Letters. "Εἰ, δὲ τῶν τρόπων τ
στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἰσι Φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ Φω
ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν Φωνηέν
ἐκ ἔχει ῥήτην τὴν ἐκφώνησιν· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ
ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ πὶ τῶν λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τῶν
τινῶν τῶν Φωνηέντων, ῥηταί εἰσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημ
των, ὀνομάτων, αὐλωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρήμάτων· — αἱ
ὥσπερ εἰ σύμφωνα, ἀναμένονσι τὰ Φωνήεντα, ἃ δυνάμε
καὶ ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι· — καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσει
τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ τ
μορίων συσσημαίνει. In the same manner, as of t
Elements or Letters some are Vowels, which of the
selves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, whi
without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality,
likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words.
Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressiv
as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and A
verbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowe
being unable to become expressive by their own prop
strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, a
Conjunctions; for those parts of Speech are always Co
significant, that is, are only significant, when associat
to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. I. C.
Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN & VERB

whatever either exist as the *Energies*, or *Aff-* Ch. III.
fections of some other thing, or without be-
 ing the *Energies* or *Affections* of some other
 thing. If they exist as the *Energies* or *Aff-*
fections of something else, then are they cal-
 led **ATTRIBUTES**. Thus *to think* is the
 attribute of a Man; *to be white*, of a
 Swan; *to fly*, of an Eagle; *to be four-*
footed, of a Horse. If they exist not after
 this manner, then are they call'd **SUB-**
STANCES. Thus *Man*, *Swan*, *Eagle* and
Horse are none of them Attributes, but all
 Substances, because however they may
 exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these,
 nor of any thing else do they exist as *Ener-*
gies or *Affections*.

AND

TUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cætera
 vero, ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quo-
 modo navium partes sunt tabulæ & trabes, cætera au-
 tem (id est, cera, stuppa, & clavi & similia) vincula
 & conglutinationes partium navis, (hoc est, tabularum
 & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. L. IX.
 913.

Ch. III. AND thus all things whatsoever being either (f) *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, *which are significant as Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES.*

AGEN, as to Words, which are not significant as *Accessories*, they acquire Signification either from being associated *one Word*, or else *to many*. If *to one Word alone*, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, th

m

(f) This division of things into *Substance* : *Accident* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See *Categor.* c. *Metaphys.* L. VII. C. 1. *De Cælo*, L. III. C. 1.

may justly for that reason be call'd DE-^{Ch. III.}
FINITIVES. If *to many Words at once*,
then as they serve to no other purpose than
to connect, they are call'd for that reason
by the name of CONNECTIVES.

AND thus it is that all WORDS whatever
are either *Principals* or *Accessories*; or under
other Names, either *significant from
themselves*, or *significant by relation*. — If
significant from themselves, they are either
Substantives or *Attributives*; if *significant by
relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Con-
nectives*. So that under one of these four
Species, SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES,
DEFINITIVES and CONNECTIVES, are ALL
WORDS, however different, in a manner
included.

IF any of these Names seem new and
unusual, we may introduce others more
usual, by calling the *Substantives*, NOUNS;
the *Attributives*, VERBS; the *Definitives*,
ARTICLES;

**Ch. III. ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, CON-
JUNCTIONS.**

SHOU'D it be ask'd; what then are become of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepositions*, and *Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * *Sophist* mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. *Aristotle* mentions no more, where he treats of † *Propositions*. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dialectic*

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Ch. III. Speech as contain'd in these two, because *these alone* combin'd make a perfect *assertive* Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore

(g) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duæ, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συλλαβογενήματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabuntur.* Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. *Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis & Nominibus componatur. — Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the Noun and Verb, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quæst. Platon. p. 1009.*

Ch. III. fore *Aristotle* in his * *treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more variegated speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those establish'd in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics* (b).

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative*, and *Proper*. Others increas'd the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from

* Poet. Cap. 20.

(b) For this we have the authority of *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

from the Conjunction. The *Latin Gram-* Ch. III.
marians went farther, and detach'd the
Interjection from the Adverb, within which,
 by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a
 Species.

WE are told indeed by (i) *Dionysius* of
Halicarnassus and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*,
 with *Theodektes*, and the more early wri-
 ters, held but *three Parts* of speech, the
Noun, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This
 it must be own'd accords with the oriental
 Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (k) told)
 admit

(i) See the places quoted in the note immediately
 preceding.

(k) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes fa-*
ciebant. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia — Hebræi
quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desine-
rent, artem eam demum scribere cœperunt, quod ante
arabos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam
hæc in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes. — Immo vero
trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ re-
tiuent. Dubium, utrum ed in re Orientales imitati
 sunt

Ch. III. admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have
 his own authority to assert the contrary,
 who not only enumerates the *four* Species
 which we have adopted, but ascertains
 them each by a proper Definition *.

To conclude—the Subject of the fol-
 lowing Chapters will be a distinct and se-
 parate consideration of the NOUN, the
 VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNC-
 TION, which four, the better (as we appre-
 hend) to express their respective natures,
 we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRI-
 BUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CONNEC-
 TIVES.

*sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orien-
 talium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres
 tantum partes agnovisse, non solum autor est Dionysius,
 &c. Voss. de Analog. l. I. c. I. See also Sanctii
 Miner. l. I. c. 2.*

* Sup. p. 34.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

SUBSTANTIVES are *all those principal* Ch. IV.
Words, which are significant of Sub-
stances, considered as Substances.

THE first sort of *Substances* are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Substances of *our own making*. Thus by giving a Figure *not natural* to *natural* Materials we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGEN, by a *more refin'd operation* of our *Mind alone*, we *abstract any Attribute* from its necessary subject, and consider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence. For example,

D 3

from

Ch. IV. from Body we abstract *to Fly*; from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul, *the being Temperate*.

AND thus 'tis we convert even *Attributes into Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight, Whiteness, Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion, Colour, Virtue*. These we call ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES; the second sort we call ARTIFICIAL.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example in *natural Substances*, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial Substances*, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abstract Substances*, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight or that Flight* are Individuals.

As

As therefore every (a) GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' ONE, is multiply'd into MANY; and every Species, tho' ONE, is also multiply'd into MANY, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then *no Individual has any such Subordinates*, it can never in strictness be con-

D 4

sidered

(a) This is what *Plato* seems to have express'd in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μίαν ιδέαν δια πολλῶν, ἐπὶ ἐκάστῃ κειμένη χωρὶς, πάντῃ διατεταμένη—καὶ πολλὰς, ἐτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένηας*. *Sophist.* p. 253. *Edit. Serrani*. For the common definition of Genus and Species see the *Ilagoge* or Introduction of *Porphyry* to *Aristotle's Logic*.

Ch.IV. sidered as MANY, and so is truly an IN-
 DIVIDUAL as well in *Nature* as in *Name*.

FROM these Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things*, such *Substantives* admit of NUMBER as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which denote (*b*) *Individuals*, in strictness admit it not.

BESIDES

(*b*) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the causes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude even in the smallest nation, that 'twould be difficult to invent a new *Name* for every new born *Individual*. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and *many* call'd *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their *Plurals*, *Marci*, and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthonies*. Now the *Plurals* of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because 'tis merely by chance that the *Names* coincide.

There seems more reason for such *Plurals*, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelbams*, and *Montagues*; because

BESIDES *Number*, another characteristic, Ch. IV. visible in Substances, is that of SEX. Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female*; or *both Male and Female*; or *neither one nor the other*. So that with respect to *Sexes* and their *Negation*, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this *fourfold* consideration.

Now

because a *Race* or Family is like a *smaller sort of Species*, so that the *family Name* extends to the *Kindred*, as the *specific Name* extends to the *Individuals*.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one Individual, whose *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all those, who had pretensions to merit the same way. Thus every great *Critic* was call'd an *Aristarchus*; every great *Warrior* an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *Helen*, &c.

A Daniel come to Judgment! yea a Daniel,
cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verse,

Sint Mætenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.

Ch. IV. Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites* being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers *Words denoting Substances* to be either MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER.

As to our own Species and all those animal Species, which *have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

IN the *English* Tongue it seems a ge-^{Ch.IV.}
neral rule (except only when infringed by
a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is
Masculine, but what denotes a *Male ani-
mal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what
denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and
that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the
Substantive is always *Neuter*.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and
many of the *modern* Tongues. These all
of them have Words, some masculine,
some feminine (and those too in great mul-
titudes) which have reference to Substan-
ces, where Sex never had existence. To
give one instance for many. *MIND* is
surely neither male, nor female; yet is
ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, masculine, and *MENS*,
in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

Ch.IV. IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the meer casual structure of the Word itself: 'Tis of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns even *in things without Sex* a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World*.

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered, as MASCULINE, which were “ conspicuous
 “ for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature
 “ active, strong, and efficacious, and that
 “ indiscriminately whether to good or to
 “ bad; or which had claim to Eminence,
 “ either laudable or otherwise.”

THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch. IV.

“ such, as were conspicuous for the At-
“ tributes either of receiving, of contain-
“ ing, or of producing and bringing forth ;
“ or which had more of the passive in
“ their nature, than of the active ; or
“ which were peculiarly beautiful and
“ amiable ; or which had respect to such
“ Excesses, as were rather Feminine, than
“ Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater
Luminaries were considered one as Mas-
culine, the other as Feminine ; the SUN
(ἥλιος, *Sol*) as *Masculine*, from commu-
nicating Light, which was native and ori-
ginal, as well as from the vigorous warmth
and efficacy of his Rays ; the MOON (Σελήνη, *Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the
Receptacle only of another's Light, and
from shining with Rays more delicate and
soft.

THUS

Ch. IV. *THUS Milton,*

*First in HIS East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'ns high road:
the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the
Moon
But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
His mirrour, with full face borrowing HER
Light
From HIM; for other light SHE needed none.*

P. L. VII. 370.

By *Virgil* they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

*Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere LUNA.
G. I. 396.*

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and *Latin Masculine*, as being the source of those

those showers, which impregnate the Earth. Ch. IV.
 The EARTH on the contrary is universally
Feminine, from being the grand *Receiver*,
 the grand *Container*, but above all from
 being the *Mother* (either mediately or im-
 mediately) of every sublunary Substance,
 whether animal or vegetable.

THUS *Virgil*,

Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS *fœcundis im-*
bribus ÆTHER

CONJUGIS *in gremium* LÆTÆ *descendit,*
 & omnes

Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus.

G. II. 325.

THUS *Shakespear*,

— COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*,

Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite
Breast

Teems and feeds all— Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER,
yields.

P. L. V.

So

Ch.IV. So *Virgil*,

*Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, vireſque
miniſtrat (c). ÆN. XI. 71.*

AMONG *artificial* Substances the SHIP (*Naũs, Navis*) is *feminine*, as being ſo eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Proviſions, Goods, &c. Hence ſailors, ſpeaking of their Veſſel, ſay always, “ SHE *rides at anchor*,” “ SHE *is under ſail*.”

A CITY (*Πόλις, Civitas*) and a COUNTRY (*Πατρίς, Patria*) are *feminine* alſo, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurſes* of their reſpective Inhabitants.

THUS

(c) — διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν Γῆς φύσιν, ὡς ΘῆΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζουσιν ὈΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ἭΛΙΟΝ, καὶ εἰ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύουσι. *Arist. de Gener. Anim.*
I. I. C. 2.

THUS *Virgil*,

Ch.IV.

Sæve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, *Satur-*
nia Tellus,

MAGNA VIRUM— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those
brave *Greeks*, who fell at *Chæroneæ*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλῆϊα κα-
μόντων

Σώματα —

Their PARENT COUNTRY in *HER bosom*
bolds

Their wearied bodies.— *

So *Milton*,

The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of
the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being
the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the
Container

* Demosth. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch. IV. *Container* and *Productress* of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boisterous Nature* have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very Sound of *Homer's*

—μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (Χρόνος) from his mighty *Efficacy* upon every thing around us, is by the *Greeks* and *English* justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old-Man,

Ὁ γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἐκαμψε, νικτῶν ἔσφοδός,
Ἄπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέστερα*.

*Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE
That surely makes, whate'er he handles,
worse.*

So

* Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of Ch.IV.
TIME, }

Orl. *Whom doth HE gallop withal?*

Ros. *With a thief to the gallows.—*

As you like it.

THE Greek *Θάνατος* or *Ἄϊδος*, and the English DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few Examples of the masculine Death.

E 2

Calli-

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by Custom; that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch.IV. *Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his
Friend *Heracitus* —

‘Αἰ ᾗ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀήδονες, ἥσιν ὁ πάντων
‘Αεπᾶκτηρ Ἀΐδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH
His band e’re lay, tho’ Ravager of all.

IN the *Alceſtis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alceſtis* from his hands.

’Tis well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. ’Twas to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A
Friend

Friend asked him, "*How he did?*"——Ch. IV.

"SLEEP (replied the old Man) *is just upon*
delivering me over to the care of his
 "BROTHER (e)."

THUS *Shakespear*, speaking of Life,
 — *merely Thou art Death's Fool;*
For HIM Thou labour'st by thy flight to
shun,
And yet run'st tow'rds HIM still.
 Meaf. for Meaf.

So *Milton*,
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;
Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS
dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike —
 . P. L. XI. 489 (f).

THE

(e) Ἦδη με ὁ ὕπνος ἀρχεται παρακατατί-
 θεσθαι Τ' ἈΔΕΛΦΩ Ι. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we intro-
 duce a female *Death*; suppose we read,

Ch.IV. THE supreme Being (GOD, Θεός, *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen*, *DEITY* (which last we *English* join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as GOD is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male for

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart
Shook, &c.*

What a falling off? How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened?

for example is co-ordinate with Female, Ch. IV.
 Right with Left, &c. &c. (g).

VIRTUE ('Αρετή, *Virtus*) as well as most
 of its Species are all *Feminine*, perhaps
 from their Beauty and amiable Appearance,
 which are not without effect even upon
 the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4 . — *abafh'd*

(g) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject
 — ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ
 μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ
 τις ἢ ἀρρενωπὸν, ἢ θυληπρεπῆ (lege θυλυπρεπῆ) δια-
 μόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τὸτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄρ-
 ρειν τὸ θῆλυ σύσσειχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΘΙ
 Ἀπλῶς Ἀιτίῳι σύσσειχον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ
 δεῖται ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς]
 τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τῷ ὑφειμένῳ προτιμῶντες, ὥτως
 αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo
 etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integu-
 mentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ
 specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum
 enim mari fœmininum est. CAUSÆ autem omnino
 ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum.
 Immo vero cum DEUM masculino genere appellamus,
 ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submisso at-
 que humili præferentes. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr.
 n. 20. h.

Ch. IV.

—— abasht'd the Devil stood,
 And felt, how awful Goodness is, and saw
 VIRTUE in her shape how lovely; saw—
 and pin'd
 His loss ——— P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Kaxia*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, in the *συνοχία* or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (*b*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character, that was Male: but taken together they make a very natural

(*b*) They are both represented as *Females* by *Xenophon*, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. C. 1. As to the *συνοχία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*.—*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. I. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. Verse 24.

tural Female, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces. Ch.IV.

*Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

Talibus Aleſto diſtis exarſit in iras.

*At Juveni oranti ſubitus tremor occupat
artus :*

*Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnys ſibilat Hy-
driſ,*

*Tantaque ſe facies aperit : tum flammea
torquens*

Lumina

Ch. IV. *Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere
plura*

*Reppulit, & geminos erexit crinibus an-
gues,*

*Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc ad-
didit ore :*

En ! Ego victa situ, &c.

Æn. VII. 445 (i).

HE,

(i) The Words above mentioned, *Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c.* in *Greek, Latin, French,* and most modern Languages, tho' they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender, which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say *ἡ ἀρετὴ* or *ὁ ἀρετὴ*, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus, la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and so of the rest. But 'tis otherwise in *English*. We in our language say, *Virtue is its own Reward*, or *Virtue is her own Reward*; *Time maintains its wonted Pace*, or *Time maintains his wonted Pace*.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical Stile*, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as *Neuters*, we speak of them

as

HE, that would see more on this Sub-Ch. IV. }
ject, may consult *Ammonius* the Peripate-
tic

as they are, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

— *The Thunder*

*Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath spent HIS shafts—* P. Lost. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

*Should intermitted Vengeance arm again
His red right hand—* P. L. II. 173.

In this Place *His* Hand is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to God himself the Avenger.

Ch. IV. tic in his Commentary on the Treatise *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the *Greek* Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received with

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
Each to HIS place : they heard his voice and went
Obsequious : Heav'n HIS wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flourets Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

Here all things are personified ; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said — *Each Hill 'retir'd to ITS Place — Heaven renewed ITS wonted Face* — how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared ; how detrimental to the *Prosopopeia*, which he was aiming to establish ? In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity ; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. 'Twere to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.

with candour, rather than scrutinized Ch. IV.
 with rigour. Varro's words on a Sub-
 ject near akin are for their aptness and
 elegance well worth attending. *Non me-
 diocres enim tenebræ in silvâ, ubi hæc cap-
 tanda; neque eò, quò pervenire volumus,
 semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramtibus quæ-
 dam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt* *.

To conclude this Chapter. We may
 collect, from what has been said, that
 both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to
 WORDS, because in the first place they
 appertain to THINGS; that is to say, be-
 cause Substances are Many, and have either
 Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have
 Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or
 Neuter. There is however this diffe-
 rence between the two Attributes: NUM-
 BER in strictness descends no lower, than
 to


* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch.IV. to *the last Rank of Species (k)* : GENDER on
the contrary stops not here, but descends to
every Individual, however diversified. And
so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY
SO CALLED.

(*k*) The reason, why *Number* goes no lower, is,
that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*;
the cause of which see before, p. 39.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

WE are now to proceed to a SECON-^{Ch. V.}
DARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, 
a Race quite different from any already
mentioned, and whose Nature may be ex-
plained in the following manner.

EVERY Object, which presents itself to
the Senses or the Intellect, is either then
perceived for the *first time*, or else is re-
cognized, as having been perceived *before*.
In the former case 'tis called an Object
ἡ πρώτη γνῶσις, of the *first knowledge* or
acquaintance (a); in the latter 'tis called
an

(a) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. i. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2.
c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian* — *Interest autem inter*
demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio,
interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit;
Quis

Ch. V. an Object τ δευτέρως γνώσεως, of the second
 knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τ πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, *till that instant unacquainted with each other*. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δείξις, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language were not
 content

Quis fecit? Ego : *relatio vero* Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. *Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.*

Content with this. They invented a Race Ch. V.
 Of Words to supply this Pointing; which
 Words, as they always stood for Substan-
 tives or Nouns, were characterized by the
 Name of *Ἀντωνυμίας*, or PRONOUNS (b).
 These also they distinguished into three
 several sorts, calling them *Pronouns* of the
First, the *Second*, and the *Third Person*,
 with a view to certain distinctions, which
 may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be
 wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor
 Countenance on either side known, and
 the

(b) *Ἐκείνο ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἀναφορᾶς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ.* Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of *any* Noun, but that of the *proper* Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal* Power, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun, I*. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person*.

AGEN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun, THOU*. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person*.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but *some third Object, different*

ferent from both. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, HE, SHE, or IT, which in distinction to the two former was called *the Pronoun of the Third Person*. Ch. III.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS (c).

As

(c) The Description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres, prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem.* L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the same distinctions. Πρώτον (πρόσωπον sc.) ὃ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ὃ περὶ τῷ, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος· τρίτον, ὃ περὶ ἑτέρου. *Gaz. Gram.* L. IV. p. 152.

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the Party *address*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the *Speaker*, the other the Party *address*; yet till they become *subjects of the discourse*,

Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each
 Person has it : (I) has the plural (WE),
 because

discourse, they have no existence. Agen as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character, which it *shares in common* with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the *second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he *addresses*, the immediate subject of his *Discourse*.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address'd) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen every where, because the *Speaker* every where is himself the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

— *quæque ipse miserrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui —

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second Persons by being introduced as
present

Because there may be many Speakers at Ch.V.
 Once of the same Sentiment; as well as
 One, who, including himself, speaks the
 Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the
 plural (YOU), because a Speech may be
 spoken to many, as well as to one. (HE)
 has the plural (THEY) because the Sub-
 ject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have *Num-*
ber, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or
Latin, or any modern Language, that those
 of the first and second Person carry the di-

F 3 distinctions

present. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never
 once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*,
 we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second* in any part
 of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither
 Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may
 always view the Writer and his Reader) can possi-
 bly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor
 indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity,
 which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by an-
 other.

Ch. V. distinctions of Sex. The reason seems to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have mark'd a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (*d*) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (*e*) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE

(*d*) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit*, Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax*. L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

(*e*) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words — *He caused*
him

HENCE too we see the reason why *a* Ch.V.
single Pronoun (f) to each Person, an I

F 4

to

him to destroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander, Thais, and Persopolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are no such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that SHE caused HIM to destroy IT. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not; that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentibus inter se sunt, & demonstrativæ; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.*

Ch. V. to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But 'tis not so with respect to the *Third* Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He, This, That, Other, Any, Some, &c.*

IT must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, *THIS is Virtue*, or *δεικτικῶς, Give me THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, *THIS Habit is Virtue*; or *δεικτικῶς, THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a

4

Noun,

Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, Ch. V.

They fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a near relation between *Pronouns* and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine PRONOUN *always stands by itself*, assuming the *Power* of a Noun, and supplying its *place*—The genuine ARTICLE *never stands by itself*, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributives* or (*g*) *Adjectives*.

As

(*g*) Τὸ Ἄρθρον μετὰ ὀνόματι, καὶ ἡ Ἀντωνυμία ἀντὶ ὀνόματι. THE ARTICLE *stands with a Noun*; but THE PRONOUN *stands for a Noun*. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀλλὰ ὅτι τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτήσεως ἀποσώματα, εἰς τὴν ὑποταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass

Ch.V. As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Agen — "Όταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματι παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσῃται δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματι ἢ προεκτεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ἢ ἐγγινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματι δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματι παρελήφθη. *When the Article is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power assumed for one.* Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. *Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut QUIS, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur.* Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows : ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS ea ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, & ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c. Prisc. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking

Second will either of them by them-^{Ch.V.}
 selves coalesce with the Third, but not
 with each other. For example, 'tis good
 sense, as well as good Grammar, to say
 in any Language — I AM HE — THOU
 ART HE — but we cannot say — I AM
 THOU — nor THOU ART I. The reason
 is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to
 be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as
 when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person*
address'd; as when we say, *Thou art He*.
 But for the same Person, in the same cir-
 cumstances, to be at once the Speaker,
 and

speaking of *Quisque* and *Hic*, calls them both AR-
 TICLES, the first *indefinite*, the second *definite*. *De*
Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also *L. IX. p. 132.* *Vof-*
fius indeed in his *Analogy (L. I. c. 1.)* opposes this
 Doctrine, because *Hic* has not the same power with
 the *Greek Article, ὁ*. But he did not enough at-
 tend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who
 considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which *being*
associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place)
served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their
Signification.

Ch. V. and the Party addrest, this is impossible;
 and so therefore is the Coalescence of the
 First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough
 of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ
 from other Substantives. The others are
Primary, these are their *Substitutes*; a
 kind of secondary Race, which were taken
 in aid, when for reasons already (*b*) men-
 tioned the others could not be used. 'Tis
 moreover

(*b*) See for these reasons at the beginning of this
 chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that
 "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own
 "Presence. 'Tis therefore to ascertain such Pre-
 "sence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and
 "hence 'tis it becomes equivalent to $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, that
 "is, to *Pointing or Indication by the Finger*." 'Tis
 worth remarking in that Verse of *Persius*,

Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier,
 HIC EST,

how the $\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, and the *Pronoun* are introduced to-
 gether, and made to co-operate to the same end.

It

moreover by means of these, and of Ar-Ch.V. articles, which are nearly allied to them, that "LANGUAGE, tho' in itself only significant of *general Ideas*, is brought down to denote *that infinitude of Particulars*, which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter in a Proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, tho' the Parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τὰς μὲν τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ εἶναι διόξουσιν, τὰς δὲ τῆς νοῦ, *that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental.* De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

Ch. V. ference to any thing previous. But besides those there is ANOTHER PRONOUN (in Greek $\delta\varsigma$, $\delta\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ (*i*); in Latin, *Qui*; in English, *Who, Which, That*) a Pronoun, having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say — LIGHT *is a Body*, LIGHT *moves with great celerity*.—

These

(*i*) The Greeks it must be confessed call this Pronoun $\text{ὁποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον}$, the *subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. *Apollonius*, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, *'tis wholly different*. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. *Theodore Gaza* acknowledges the same, and therefore adds — $\text{ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὡς χωρὶς αὐτοῦ εἰν ἄρθρον ταυτί}$ —for these reasons this (meaning the *Subjunctive*) cannot properly be an *Article*. And just before he says, $\text{χωρὶς γεμὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν}$ —however properly speaking 'tis the *Prepositive* is the *Article*. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

These would apparently be two distinct Ch. V. Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, LIGHT, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, IT, and say—*LIGHT is a Body; IT moves with great celerity*—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an AND) saying—*LIGHT is a Body, AND it moves with great celerity*—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now 'tis in the united Powers of a *Connective*, and another Pronoun, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of AND IT, we substitute THAT, or WHICH, saying *LIGHT is a Body, WHICH moves with great celerity*—the Sentence still retains its *Unity* and *Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason

... which is previous (k).

(k) Hence we see why the
tioned is always *necessarily* the
Sentence, which Sentence co
or understood, *two* Verbs, a
Thus in that Verse of *Horace*

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi

Ille non erit liber—is one Sent
vit—is another. *Ille* and *Qu*
tives; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the *two*
other instances.

The following passage from
somewhat corrupt in more p
serve to shew, whence the ab
taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον
συνδεσμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V.
like the other Pronouns, is universal. It

may

τὸ ὅμμα τὸ προειρημένον, ὁρίσασθαι δὲ ἕτερον μέρος
πάντος καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρενέχοντες, καὶ εἰς τὸ
ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ
ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τῷ (for
τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ
ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article, (that*
is, the Pronoun here mentioned), is applied to a Verb of
its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent
Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple
Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I
mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and
that which respects the Article or Relator. The same
too follows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copula-
ture assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of
being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a
new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also.
And hence 'tis that the Words—the Grammarian came,
who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sen-
tence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came,
and discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p.
92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called
Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunc-
tive, seem to have well represented its compound Na-
ture of part Pronoun, and part Connective, in form-
Vol. III: G ing

Ch. V. may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal, Which, &c.* the *Man, Whom, &c.* the *Ship, Which, &c.* *Alexander, Who, &c.* *Bucephalus, That, &c.* *Virtue, Which, &c. &c.*

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, *who who now read, have near finished this Chapter*; THOU, *who now readeſt*; HE, *who now readeth, &c. &c.*

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Substitution*, there being no Substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is *essentially distinguished* from the other Pronouns

ing their QUI & QUIS from QUE and IS, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KAI and 'O. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

nouns, by this peculiar, that 'tis not only Ch. V.
a *Substitute*, but withal a *Connective* (1).

AND

(1) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu* are implied in the very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω, γράφεις, scribo, scribis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*, unless it be to mark a *Contradistinction*; such as in *Virgil*,

*Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbræ
Formosam resonare doces &c.*

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus rectus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added, because tho' we see the *EGO* in *Amo*, and the *TU* in *Amas*, we see not the *TE* or *ME* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different manner, according as they mark *Contradistinction*, or not. If they *contradistinguish*, then are they commonly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive. Thus *Virgil*,

— *Quid Thesea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? Et MI genus ab Jove summo.*

Ch.V. AND now to conclude what we have
 said concerning Substantives. All SUB-
 STANTIVES

Thus Homer,

ῥμῖν μὲν τοῖς δοῖεν —
 Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην — Ιλ. Α.

where the ῥμῖν and the Μοι stand, as contra-distin-
 guished, and both have precedence of their respec-
 tive Verbs, the ῥμῖν even leading the whole Sen-
 tence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly
 take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen
 in examples every where obvious. The Greek Lan-
 guage went farther still. When the oblique Cases
 of these Pronouns happened to contradict distinguish,
 they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which
 gave them the name of ὀρθοτονμένας, or *Pronouns*
uprightly accented. When they marked no such op-
 position, they not only took their place behind the
 Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were)
 inclined themselves upon it. And hence they ac-
 quired the name of Εγκλιτικά, that is, *Leaning or*
Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in the
 first person Ἐγώ, Ἐμοί, Ἐμέ for *Contradistinctives*,
 and Μῦ, Μοί, Μι for *Enclitics*. And hence 'twas
 that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above
 quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παῖδα δ'
 ἘΜΟΙ, for παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ, on account of the Contra-
 distinction,

STANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Se-Ch.V.*
Condary, that is to say, according to a Lan-
 guage more familiar and known, are either
 NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS de-
 note *Substances*, and those either *Natural*,
Artificial, or *Abstract* *. They moreover
 denote Things either *General*, or *Special*,
 or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS, their
 Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Sub-*
junctive. THE PREPOSITIVE is distin-
 guished into *three* Orders, called the *First*,
 the *Second*, and the *Third* Person. THE
 SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers of

G 3

all

distinction, which there occurs between the *Gre-*
cians and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi* L. I. c. 3.
 P. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pro-
 nouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to
 the *English* Tongue. When we say, *Give me Con-*
tent, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic.
 But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him*
his thousands, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no longer
 Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume
 an Accent of their own, and so become the true
 ἰσοτονυμένα.

* See before p. 37, 38.

HAVING done with SUBS:
now proceed to ATTRIBUT:

CHAP. VI.

Concerning Attributives.

ATTIBUTIVES are all those *princi-* Ch. VI.
pal Words, that denote Attributes,
considered as Attributes. Such for exam-
ple are the Words, *Black, White, Great,*
Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote,
Writing, &c (a).

HOWEVER

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles*, in as much as *all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance.* Hence 'tis, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.*) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract *de Interpretatione* calls λευκός a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν Φωνὴν, κακηγορούμενον ὅρον ἐν προτάσει ποιῶσαν, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, *that every Sound articulate, that forms the Predicate in a Proposition, is called a*

Ch. VI. HOWEVER previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST, before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as an universal Genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referr'd.—The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *express*, or by *implication*; express, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by implication

VERB. p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, tho' made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio, sed proprietates excutienda est significationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo destinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed uti ipsius significationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.

Implication, as when we say, *The Sun rises*, Ch. VI. which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising* (b).

THE Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Eß, Fit*, ἔσθι, ἐστὶ, αἰσθάνομαι, γίνεσθαι, are all of them used to express this general Genus. The Latins have called them *Verba substantiva, Verbs substantive*, but the Greeks ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικά, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Substance. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall here particularly consider, is the Verb, ἔσθι, *Eß, Is*.

NOW all EXISTENCE is either absolute or qualified — *absolute*, as when we say, *B IS*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B IS AN ANIMAL*; *B IS BLACK, IS ROUND, &c.*

WITH

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.*

Ch. VI. WITH respect to this difference, the Verb (IS) can by itself express *absolute Existence*, but never the *qualified*, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (IS) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of a *mere Assertion*. 'Tis under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, *Riseth* means, *is rising*; *Writeth*, *is writing*.

AGEN—As to EXISTENCE in general it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellection and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions of present,

sent, past, and future. But *immutable Ob-* Ch. VI.
jects know no such Distinctions, but rather *stand opposed to all things temporary.*

AND hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (is) according as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable Being*.

FOR example, if we say, *This Orange is ripe*, (is) meaneth, *that it existeth so now at this present*, in opposition to *past time*, when it was green, and to *future time*, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side*, we do not intend by (is) that it is incommensurable *now*, having been *formerly* commensurable, or being to become so *hereafter*; on the contrary we intend that *Perfection of Existence*, to which *Time* and *its Distinctions* are utterly unknown. 'Tis under

Ch. VI. under the same meaning we employ the Verb, when we say, TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of Time proper to other Times, but of necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever. And so much for Verbs of Existence, commonly called Verbs substantive.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as *black*, *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. So by being joined to a proper Substantive

m

(c) Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non tam mus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DEUS EST, ad nullam dici substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quod cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præstare significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. Interpret. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. & Serrani.

~~make~~ without farther help, a perfect ~~asser-~~ Ch. VI.
~~tive~~ Sentence; while the rest, tho' other-
 wise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an *Affertion*, to show that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Affertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying, *Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (*writeth*), and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Affertion likewise. Hence 'tis they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into, *Is* and *Walking*.

Now all these Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute

Ch. VI. Attribute and an Assertion, make that
 { Species of Words, which Grammarians
 call VERBS. If we resolve this complex
 Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the*
Attribute alone without the Assertion, then
 have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attri-
 butives, besides the two Species before,
 are included together in the general Name
 of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus is it, that ALL ATTRIBU-
 TIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or
 ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES the Distinctions above men-
 tioned, there are others, which deserve
 notice. Some Attributes have their Es-
 sence in *Motion*; such are *to walk, to fly,*
to strike, to live. Others have it in the
privation of Motion; such are *to stop, to*
rest, to cease, to die. And lastly, others
 have it in subjects, *which have nothing to*
do with either Motion or its Privation;

such are the Attributes of, *Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish,* and in a word the several *Quantities*, and *Qualities* of all Things. Now these last are ADJECTIVES; those which denote *Motions*, or their *Privation*, are either VERBS OR PARTICIPLES.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explain'd as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore where-ever it exists implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place for one Instant* only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one Place for more than one Instant*, that is to say, *during an Extension between two Instants*, and this of course gives us the Idea of TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation*

Ch. VI. *Privation* imply *Time* as their Concomitant, so *VERBS*, which denote them, come to denote *TIME* also (*d*). And hence the Origin and Use of *TENSES*, "which are" "for many different Forms, assigned to" "each Verb, to shew, without altering" "its principal Meaning, the various *TIMES*" "in which such Meaning may exist." Thus *Scribit*, *Scripsit*, *Scripserat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD

(*d*) The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb — πῆμα δὲ ἐστὶν τοῖς προσηγορίαις ἔχον, a Verb is something, which signifies *Time*, OVER AND ABOVE (for *super* is the force of the Proposition, Πῆμα.). If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered *over and above its principal Signification*, which is to denote some *moving* and *energizing* Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret.* c. 3, together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* it-Ch. VI.
self may not become upon occasion the
Verb's *principal* Signification; 'tis answer-
ed, No. And this appears, because *the*
same Time may be denoted by different
Verbs (as in the Words, *writeth* and *speake-
th*) and *different Times* by the same Verb
(as in the Words, *writeth* and *wrote*) nei-
ther of which could happen, were *Time*
any thing more, than a meer *Concomi-
tant*. Add to this, that when Words de-
note Time, not collaterally, but princi-
pally, they cease to be Verbs, and become
either Adjectives, or Substantives. Of the
Adjective kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*, *Dayly*,
Hourly, &c. of the Substantive kind are
Time, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c.

THE most obvious Division of TIME is
into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any
Language complete, whose Verbs have
not TENSES, to mark these Distinctions.

H

But

Ch. VI. But we may go still farther. Time past and future are both *infinitely* extended. Hence 'tis that in *universal Time past* we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these Differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given Line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the Reason, which first introduced into Language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but 'twas necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all Languages

BOOK THE FIRST.

99

Languages are found to abound, and with-
out which it would be difficult to ascertain
our Ideas. Ch. VI.

HOWEVER as the Knowledge of TENSES
depends on the Theory of TIME, and
this is a subject of no mean Speculation,
we shall reserve it by itself for the fol-
lowing Chapter.

H 2

CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

C.VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the Extension of *Space*, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extension of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the Parts of Space exist *at once* and *together*, while those of Time only exist *in Transition* or *Succession* (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of TIME, by considering it under the
 notion

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλον ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ Νῦν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει· TIME doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in single Now or INSTANT; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.

notion of *a transient Continuity*. Hence C.VII. also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transition* go, Time is *different* from Space; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly *co-incide*.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may assume any where *a Point*, and therefore in every given *Line* there may be assumed infinite *Points*. So in every given TIME we may assume any where *a Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given *Time* there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.


FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite *Line*; and A NOW or INSTANT, of every finite *Time*. But altho' they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor the *Now* or *Instant* of any *Time*. If this appear strange, we may remember, that

C.VII. the *Parts* of any thing *extended* are necessarily *extended* also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their *Whole*. But if a *Point* or *Now* were *extended*, each of them would contain within it self *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, 'tis evident, would be absurd and impossible.

THESE Assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts* (b), it will follow,

(b) —Φανερόν ὅτι ἡδὲ μέρος τὸ Νῦν τῷ χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ ἡδὲ αἱ εἰρημαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ διὰ τῆς μίας μόριας. 'Tis evident that a *Now* or *Instant* is no more a part of *Time*, than *POINTS* are of a *Line*. The *Parts* indeed of one *Line* are two other *Lines*. Natur. Aufc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before.—Τὸ δὲ Νῦν ἢ μέρος· μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἢ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν Νῦν. A *Now* is no *Part* of *Time*; for a *Part* is able to measure its *Whole*, and the *Whole* is necessarily made up of its *Parts*; but *TIME* doth not appear to be made up of *Nows*. Ibid. c. 14.

follow, that in the same manner as *the same* C. VII. *Point* may be the *End* of one Line, and the *Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or *Instant* may be the *End* of one Time, and the *Beginning* of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, A B, B C.



I say that the Point B, is the End of the Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time, B C. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as

C.VII. being *subsequent*. As therefore every Now or INSTANT always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole (c).*

FROM the above Speculations, there follow some Conclusions, which may be perhaps called Paradoxes, till they have been

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλήχθη· συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέρας χρόνον ἐστίν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχή, τῷ δὲ πλευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its Boundary, as being the Beginning of one Time and the Ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Function or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

been attentively considered. In the first C.VII. place *there cannot* (strictly speaking) *be any such thing as Time present*. For if all Time be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its Continuity were to be present *at once*, it would so far quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time* no longer. But if no Portion of its Continuity can be thus present, how can *Time* possibly be *present*, to which such Continuity is essential?

FARTHER than this—If there be no such thing as *Time Present*, there can be *no Sensation of Time* by any one of the Senses. FOR ALL SENSATION *is of the Present only*, the Past being preserved not by *Sense* but by *Memory*, and the Future being anticipated by *Prudence* only and wise *Forefight*.

BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the object of *any Sensation*; farther, if the Present

C. VII. sent *never* exist ; if the Past be *no more* ;
 { if the Future be not *as yet* ; and if these
 are all the Parts, out of which TIME is
 compounded : how strange and shadowy
 a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap-
 proaching to a perfect Non-entity (*d*) ? Let
 us try however, since the Senses fail us, if
 we have not Faculties of higher power, to
 seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a va-
 riety of Things, but it appears to resem-
 ble no one more, than some moving Spec-
 tacle

(*d*) "Οτι μὲν οὐ ὅλως ἔστιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς,
 ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις αὖ υποπτέυσει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γέγονε,
 καὶ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι· ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ
 ὁ ἀπειρὸς καὶ ὁ αἰεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύκειται·
 τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συκείμενον, ἀδύνατον αὖ δοξεῖν κατέ-
 χειν ποτὲ ὕστας. *That therefore TIME exists not at
 all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one
 may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is
 no more ; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet ; and
 out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to
 be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which
 is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem
 was impossible ever to participate of Entity. Natural.*
 Aufc. L. IV. c. 14.

tacle (such as a Procession or a Triumph) **C.VII.**
that abounds in every part with splendid
Objects, some of which are still departing,
as fast as others make their appearance.
The Senses look on, while the sight passes,
perceiving as much as is *immediately present*,
which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to
the Soul's superior Powers. Having done
this, they have done their duty, being con-
cerned with nothing, save what is present
and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to
the Imagination, and above all to the *Intel-*
lect, the several *Novos* or *Instants* are not lost,
as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made
Objects of *steady* comprehension, however in
their own nature they may be *transitory* and
passing. "Now 'tis from contemplating two
 " or more of these *Instants* under one view,
 " together with that *Interval* of Continuity,
 " which subsists between them, that we
 " acquire insensibly the Idea of **TIME** (e)."

For

(e) Τότε Φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, όταν τῷ προτέρῳ
 ὃ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὁρίζομεν
 δι

C.VII. For example: *The Sun rises*; this
 { member; *it rises again*; this too I re

δι τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ με
 αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τῷ μέσῳ
 μιν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ΝΤΝ, τὸ μὲν π
 τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τὺτο φημὲν εἶναι ΧΡΟ
 'Tis then we say there has been TIME, when we
 quire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in .
 But we distinguish and settle these two, by con
 one first, then the other, together with an inter
 tween them different from both. For as often
 conceive the Extremes to be different from the
 and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior a
 other subsequent, then 'tis we say there is TIME, a
 'tis we call TIME. Natural. Aufcult. L. IV.
 Themistius's Comment upon this passage is
 same purpose. "Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νῦν ἀναμνησθεὶς τ
 ὃ χθὲς εἶπεν, ἕτερον πάλιν εἶπῃ τὸ τήμερον,
 χρόνον ἐνθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο Νῦν ὀριζόμεν
 ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν· καὶ ἄτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι ποι
 πεντεκάδεκα ὥρων, ἢ ἑκκάδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου
 μῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενῳ. For
 the Mind, remembring the Now, which it ta
 yesterday, talks agen of another Now to-day, th
 it immediately has an idea of TIME, termina
 those two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and the
 enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen,
 sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's
 from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist
 edit. Aldi, p. 45. b.

ber. These Events are not together ; there **C. VII.**
is an *Extension* between them—not how-
ever of *Space*, for we may suppose the Place
of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no
sensible difference. Yet still we recognize
some Extension between them. Now what
is this Extension, *but a natural Day* ? And
what is that, but pure *Time* ? 'Tis after the
same manner, by recognizing two new
Moons, and the Extension between these ;
two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension
between these ; that we gain Ideas of other
Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are
all so many Intervals, described as above ;
that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity*
between two Instants viewed together.

AND thus 'tis THE MIND acquires the
Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be
remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is
always the *first* Species, that occurs to the
human Intellect. How then do we ac-
quire the Idea of TIME FUTURE ? The
answer is, we acquire it *by Anticipation.*
Should

C.VII. Should it be demanded still farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this case 'tis a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from Successions of Events, that are past already, to similar Successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar Succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of Days and Nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical Returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified Succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural* Periods, but even

even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. C. VII.
For example: Having observed in many *past* instances how Health hath succeeded to Exercise, and Sicknes to Sloath; we anticipate *future* Health to those, who, being *now* sickly, use exercise; and *future* Sicknes to those, who, being *now* healthy, are sloathful. 'Tis a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical* Wisdom. If they respect the human Body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other Subjects. All these several Characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them *the barren prospect* of Futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of Men) but shews withal those Events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables

C. VII. ables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those, who have had diviner assistances) we may justly say, as was said of old,

He's the best Prophet, who conjectures well (f).

FROM

(f) Μάντις ὁ ἄριστος, ὅστις ἐικάζει καλῶς. There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as *the Future* does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of *the Past*. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) it *actually was*, yet was it then something *Present*, and not something *Past*. As *Past*, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called *Past*. 'Twas this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, *whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time*, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ὕστερ ψυχῆς ἦν αὖν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 20. *Themistius*, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐν-εργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ ἔκ αὖν ὑποστάτη, μὴ ὄντος τῆ ἀριθμή-
σεντος

FROM what has been reasoned it appears, that Knowledge of *the Future* comes from Knowledge of *the Past*; as does Knowledge of *the Past* from Knowledge of *the Present*, so that their Order to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE. C. VII.

OF these Species of Knowledge, that of *the Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in Perception*, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all *animal Beings*, and reaching even to *Zoophytes*, as far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge of *the Past* comes next, which is superior to the *former*, as being confined to those *Animals*, that have *Memory* as well as *Senses*. Knowledge of *the Future* comes last,

σοφίας μῆτε δύναμις, μῆτε ἐνεργεία, φανερόν ὡς οὐκ
 ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος εἶναι, μὴ ὥστε ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48.
 Edit. Aldi.

C. VII. last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse *.


AND now having seen, how we acquire the Knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example = in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

AGEN

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

AGEN, the *present Now* may so far be- C. VII.
 long to *Time* of either sort, as to be the
End of the past, and the *Beginning* of the
 future; but it cannot be included *within*
 the limits of either. For if it were possible,
 let us suppose C the *present Now* included




within the limits of the *past Time* A D.
 In such case C D, part of the past Time
 A D, will be subsequent to C the *present*
Now; and so of course be *future*. But
 by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will
 be both Past and Future at once, which is
 absurd. In the same manner we prove
 that C cannot be included within the li-
 mits of a *future Time*, such as B E.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*,
 as *this Day, this Month, this Year, this*

as has been proved in
 we allow them to be
present Now, which
 so that from the *Present*
these also present, tho'
 them has infinite parts
 so, and in conformity to
 such *Times present*, as pr
 Years, and Centuries,
 fity be *a compound of the*
 divided from each other
 Now or Instant, and *join*
while that Now remains
 suppose for example the

f . . . X A B C

let us call a Day, or a Century; and let C. VII. the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. 

I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, *Time present*. The same holds, if we

suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y.

When the present Now exists at Y, then

s the whole XY *Time past*, and still

more so, when the Now gets to g, or

nwards. In like manner before the Pre-

sent Now entered X, as for example when

was at f, then was the whole XY

Time future; 'twas the same, when the

resent Now was at X. When it had past

hat, then XY became *Time present*. And

thus 'tis that TIME is PRESENT, while pas-

ing, in its PRESENT NOW or INSTANT.

Tis the same indeed here, as it is in *Space*.

A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being

for that reason present to it, is only present

to that Plane in a *single Point at once*,

while

ceive that ALL TIME

(g) PLACE, according
mediate, or immediate.
Europe, because I am in
cause in *Wiltshire*; in *Wilt*
in *Salisbury*, because in
house, because in *my study*.
PLACE. And what is m
'Tis the internal Bound of t
ever it be) which co-incide
of my own Body. Τὸ περι
περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Ne
is included within the limit
'tis from this relation that
are called each of them *my*
among them so far exceed
ply this to TIME. The *P*
the present Year; that, in the
the present Day; that, in the

tion, is divisible and extended. But if so, **C. VII.**
 then whenever we suppose a definite Time,
 even though it be a Time present, it must
 needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an
 End. And so much for TIME.

Now from the above Doctrine of TIME,
 we propose by way of Hypothesis the fol-
 lowing Theorie of TENSES.

THE TENSES are used to mark Pre-
 sent, Past, and Future Time, either in-
 I 4 definitely

Throughout all, even the largest of Times, which
 are found to include it within their respective limits.
Nicephorus Blemmides speaks much to the same pur-
 pose. 'Ενεσ-ώς ὃν χρόνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρα-
 χείμενος τῷ κυρίως ΝΥΝ· χρόνος μερικός, ἐκ παρε-
 ληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεσ-ώς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς
 τὸ κυρίως ΝΥΝ γειννίασιν, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος καὶ
 αὐτός. PRESENT TIME therefore is that which ad-
 joins to the REAL NOW or INSTANT on either side,
 being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and
 from its vicinity to that REAL NOW said to be NOW
 also itself. 'Επίλ. Φυσικῆς ΚεΦ. θ'. See also *Arist.*
Physic. L. IV. c. 6. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C. VII. *definitely* without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else *definitely* in reference to such distinctions.

If *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three, to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

AND thus 'tis, that the TENSES in their natural Number appear to be TWELVE.

εβree to denote *Time absolute*, and *nine* to *C. VII.*
denote it *under its respective distinctions.*

Aorist of the Present.

- Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aorist of the Past.

Ἐγραψα. *Scriptsi.* I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam.* I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μίλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I am
going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens*
sum. I am writing.

Completive Present.

Ἐγραφα. *Scriptsi.* I have written.

Inceptive Past.

Ἐμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I
was beginning to write.

Middle

C. VII.

Middle or extended Past.

*Ἐγέγραφον or ἐτύχων γράφων. *Scribebam.* I was writing.

*Completive Past.

*Ἐγεγράφαν. *Scripteram.* I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

*Ἔσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I shall be writing.

Completive Future.

*Ἔσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripturo.* I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with Tenses, as with other Affections of Speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect.

perfect, much must be left, in defiance of C. VII
all Analogy, to the harsh laws of mere
Authority and Chance.

It may not however be improper to
inquire, what traces may be discovered
in favour of this System, either in Lan-
guages themselves, or in those authors
who have written upon this part of
Grammar, or lastly in the nature and rea-
son of things.

In the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists*
are usually by Grammarians referred to the
Past; such are ἔλθον, *I went*; ἔπεισον, *I*
sell, &c. We seldom hear of them in the
Future, and more rarely still in the *Present*.
Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that where-
ever Time is signified without any farther
circumscription, than that of Simple present
Past or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.

THUS

*Unseen, both when we
we sleep.*

Here the Verb (WALK
they were walking at th
Adam spoke, but αοεῖσα
any instant whatever.

Author calls *Hypocrisy*,

—— *the only Evil*.

Invisible, except to G

the Verb (WALKS) ha
tical or indefinite applic
may be said in general c
the *Gnomologic* kind, su

Ad pœnitendum PRO

ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS C. VII.
OF THE PRESENT.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine
pœnæ.* Hor.

So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou SHALT not kill, Thou SHALT not steal, &c.* for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future (b.)

WE

(b) The *Latin* Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar Form even for an *Aorist of the Past*; and therefore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus 'tis that *FECI* means (as the same author

C. VII. WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEP-
TIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by Verbs auxiliar. ME'ΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus* SUM. I AM GOING *to write*. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a Species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, *I am warm*, comes *Calesco*, *I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo*, *I swell*, comes *Tumescō*, *I begin to swell*. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and therefore have

author informs us) both *πρωείναι* and *ἰπρίναι*, *I have done it*, and *I did it*; *VIDI* both *ἰδέναι* and *εἶδεν*, *I have just seen it*, and, *I saw it once*. *Pris. Gram.* L. VIII. p. 814, 838. *Edit. Rutsch.*

Have neither Perfectum, Plus quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in *Greek* Ἐφετιχὰ, in *Latin* *Desiderativa*, the *Desideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek* and *Latin* have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμῶ, *Bellaturio*, I have a desire to make war; βρωῶ, *Efurio*, I long to eat (i). And so much for THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) THE MIDDLE TENSES (which express Time as *extended* and

(i) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the *Greek* ones from a future Verb, the *Latin* from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμῶ and βρωῶ; from *Bellaturus* and *Efurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Efurio*.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.

. VII. and *passing*) and the PERFECT or COM-
 PLETIVE, which expresses its *Completion* or
End.

Now for these the Authorities are
 many. They have been acknowledged
 already in the ingenious Accidence of
 Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed
 by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational Edition
 of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either
 of these, we find the same Scheme in
Scaliger, and by him (*l*) ascribed to *Gro-*
cinus, as its Author. The learned *Gaza*

(who

(*l*) *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tem-*
pore divisisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim consti-
tuit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam secat, Perfectum &
Imperfectum: sic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam
Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè sanè. E
Præsens imperfectum, Amo. Rectè hætenus; conti-
nuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At Præsens per-
fectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem
ut non malè sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum
inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero
Non malè, inquam: significat enim Amavero, amorem
futurum & absolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam
indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

◀ who was himself a Greek, and one of the C. VII.
 — ablest restorers of that language in the
 — western world) characterizes the Tenses
 in nearly the same manner (m). What
 Apollonius hints, is exactly consonant (n).

Priscian

(m) The PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεστώμενον καὶ ἀτελές, *that which is now instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐτελές τῷ ἐνεστώτι, *that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατελειαιμένου καὶ ἀτελές τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *the extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and THE PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, καὶ ἐτελές τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum.* Gram. L. IV.

(n) Ἐπεὶ οὖν δεῖ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι ἡ παρακειμένη συνήθεια σημαίνει ὁ παρακειμένος, τὴν γὰρ μὴν ἐνεστώσαν — Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION. Apollon. L. III. c. 6. The Reason which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle αὖ, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would afford (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses,
 K but

peculiar attachment to
naturally led them to
these *Grammatical* Spec

but never with this PERFECT
plied such a *complete* and *im*
never to be qualified into the

(o) By these Philosophers
Tense was called THE IMPERFECT
the vulgar Præteritum, THE FUTURE
than which nothing can be more perfect in
system that we favour. But
from whom we learn these facts
PUS *proprie dicitur, cujus præteritum præ-*
futura est. Cum enim Tempus
volvatur cursu, vix punctum
senti, hoc est, in instanti. M
(sicut dictum est) vel præteritum
STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRÆ-
FECTUM vocabant (ut dicitur

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a C. VII. few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the Hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the Verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, is

K 2

DEAD ;

Deest extrema pars, præsentis utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur — Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum. — And soon after speaking of the Latin Perfectum, he says, — sciendum tamen, quod Romani PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completâ utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus qui apud Græcos παρατετέλεστος vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίσῃ accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, &c.

C. VII. DEAD ; FUIT, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS
 NO MORE. 'Twas in this sense that *Cicero*
 addressed the People of *Rome*, when he
 had put to death the leaders in the *Cata-*
linarian Conspiracy. He appeared in the
 Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,
 VIXERUNT. So *Virgil*,

—FUIMUS *Troes*, FUIT *Ilium* &
ingens

Gloria Dardanidum ——— Æn. II.


And again,

—Locus *Ardea quondam*

Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,

Sed fortuna FUIT ——— Æn. VII.

THE reason of these Significations is de-
 rived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of
 the Tense here mentioned. We see that the
 periods of Nature, and of human affairs
 are maintained by the reciprocal succes-
 sion of *Contraries*. 'Tis thus with Tem-
 pest and Calm; with Day and Night —
 with

with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory C. VII.
 and Ignominy; with Life and Death. 
 Hence then, in the instances above, the
 completion of one contrary is put for the
 commencement of the other, and to say,
 HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the
 same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO
 MORE.

It is remarkable in *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same Sentence this complete and perfect Present with the extended and passing Present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same Species of Time, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
 Scorpions, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*
 G. I.

— *Si brachia forte remisit,
 Atque illum in præceps prono rapit abæus
 amni.*

Ibid.

K 3

Terra

- C. VII. *Terra tremit; fugere fera — G. I.*
Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia
ventus. G. II.
—Tardis ingens ubi flexibus errat
Mincius, & tenerâ prætexit arundine
ripas. G. III.
—illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & partu se condidit
altq. Æn. V.

IN the same manner he joins the same two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that is to say, the *complete* and *perfect* Past with the *extended* and *passing*.

—Inruerant *Danai, & tectum omne*
tenebant. Æn. II.

Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosæ
Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis
austri,

Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-
tumque

Miscebant

Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus C. VII.
 iras (p). Æn. VIII. }

As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and

(p) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into *Englsh*.

—Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
 Scorpis, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.

For thee the Scorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING his claws, and HATH ALREADY LEFT thee more than a just portion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the Scorpion so desirous of admitting *Augustus* among the heavenly signs, that though he *has already made* him more than room enough, yet he *still continues* to be making him more. Here then we have two Acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the Use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *reliquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuscript.

—Illa noto citius, volucrique saggitâ
 Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and IS HID within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high

*customary, must be some
been frequently repeated
been frequently repeated
quire an Extension of Time
we fall insensibly into
mentioned,*

AGEN, we are told by
authority likewise is con
Gems and Marbles still

Land. Hence the Vessel, im
it, was *completely hid* from th
had gone out to see the Ship
still continue sailing towards th

—Inruerant Danai, & 186.

ancient Painters and Sculptors, when they C. VII.

fixed their names to their works, did it

pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of In-

scription, and employed for that purpose

the Tense here mentioned. 'Twas 'Απελ-

λῆς ἐποίησεν, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλετος

ἐποίησεν, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίη-

σεν or *fecit*. By this they imagined that

they avoided the shew of arrogance, and

had in case of censure an apology (as it

were) prepared, since it appeared from


the work itself, that *it was once indeed in*

hand, but no pretension that it was ever

finished (q).

IT is remarkable that the very manner,
in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses
from

(q) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the ancient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

C. VII.  from one another, shews a plain reference to the System here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past and Future. *Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero.* And so in all instances, even when the Verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero*.

WE shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our Perceptions, in the recognition of Time according to what we have explained already (r). Hence it is, that the *Present Tense*

(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant. — *Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam naturae eorum. Quod enim praeteriit, prius est, quam quod est itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quo primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primae speciem.*

Tense stands first; then *the Past Tenses*; C. VII. and lastly *the Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it *definitely*, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleitive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which 'twill be necessary to deduce from other Principles.

Species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita sunt. Futuram verò etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 13.

C.VIII. **W**E have observed the Soul's leading of *Perception* and those words we have taken in prehensive acceptation. also, that *all Speech or* *lishing* or exhibiting some either a certain *Perception*. Hence then, exhibit it either in a *different manner*, Variety of *MODES* or *MOODS*

(a) See Chapter II.

If we simply *declare* or *indicate* some-**C.VIII.**
thing to be or not to be (whether a Per-
ception or Volition, 'tis equally the same)
this constitutes that Mode, called the DE-
CLARATIVE or INDICATIVE.

A Perception.

— *Nosco crinis, incanaque menta*
Regis Romani — Virg. *Æn.* VI.

A Volition.

In nova **FERT** **ANIMUS** *mutatas dicere*
formas
Corpora — Ovid. *Metam.* I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of some-
thing absolute and certain, but as of some-
thing

Sound articulate. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this
 is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs,
 hence 'tis *Apollonius* observes — τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρέ-
 τως παρ᾽ ἑστῆται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις; — *the Soul's Disposi-*
tion is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. De Synt.
 L. III. c. 13. Thus too *Priscian.* *Modi sunt di-*
verse INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequi-
tur DECLINATIO VERBI. L. VIII. p. 821.

ing Mode of the Sente

Sed tacitus pasci si

BERET

Plus dapis, &c.

YET sometimes 'tis
Mode, but only *subjoin*
tive. In such case, it
express the *End*, or *fi*
End, as in human Life
tingent, and may never
in despite of all our Fo
fore express most natur
here mentioned. For e

*Ut JUGULENT homines
latrones.*

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* C.VIII. in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE.

BUT it so happens, in the Constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely *to declare* ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our Inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, 'tis the INTERROGATIVE MODE; if we *require*, 'tis the REQUISITIVE. Even the

OPTATIVE.

AND thus have we
MODES; the INDIC
TIVE, to assert what
POTENTIAL, for the
we think Contingent
TIVE, when we are a
Information; and T
assist us in the gratific
The Requisite too
distinct Species, eith
TIVE to inferiors, or
periors (c).

(c) The Species of Modes

As therefore all these several Modes **C.VIII.**
 have their foundation in nature, so have }
 certain

in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*,
 L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too
 with reason) considered all these additional Sen-
 tences as included within those, which they them-
 selves acknowledged, and which they made to be five
 in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the In-
 terrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive. There
 is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be
 supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indi-
 cative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called
 the εἶδος κλητικόν, but the Stoics more properly
 προσαγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form
 of Address in point of names, titles, and epithets,
 with which we apply ourselves one to another. As
 therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it
 could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode.
Ammonius and *Boethius*, the one a *Greek* Peripatetic,
 the other a *Latin*, have illustrated the Species of
 Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the follow-
 ing manner.

Ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πάντε ἐιδῶν, τὸ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΝ, ὡς τὸ,

ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδῃ —

καὶ τὸ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΝ, ὡς τὸ,

Βάσκι' ὦσι, Ἴρι ταχεῖα —

C.VIII. certain marks or signs of them been introduced into Languages, that we may be enabled

τὸ τῷ ἙΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟῦ, ὡς τὸ,
Τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; —

τὸ τῷ ΕΥΚΤΙΚΟῦ, ὡς τὸ,
*Αἰ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ —

τὸ ἐπὶ τέτοκ, τῷ ἈΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟῦ, καθ' ὃν ἀπο-
φαινόμεθα περὶ ὁτουῦν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον

— Θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα ἴσασιν —

ἢ περὶ παντός, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vera
Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

*Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.*

IMPERATIVA, ut,

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

Dic mihi, Damata, cujus pecus? —

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque aeterna potestas.

ENUNTIATIVA, in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur,
ut,

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

enabled by our discourse to signify them, C.VIII.
 one to another. And hence those various
 MODES or MOODS, of which we find in
 common Grammars so prolix a detail, and
 which are in fact no more than "so many
 " *literal* Forms, intended to express these
 " *natural* Distinctions" (d).

ALL

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as
 follows. THE PRECATIVE,

— *Universal Lord! be bounteous still*

To give us nought but Good —

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

*W*hence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE,

— *Adam, earth's bellow'd Mold,*

Of God inspir'd —

THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNTIATIVE,

*Th*o conquer'd also and enslav'd by war

*Sh*all, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most
 elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,

C.VIII. ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives 'tis so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar*, *sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May* and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, *I am writing*,

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their C.VIII.
Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part,
as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODE are distinguished from the Indicative and Potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a *Response* or *Return*, the two others at all times necessarily demand one.

THE Return to the *Requisitive* Mode is sometimes made in *Words*, and sometimes in *Deeds*. When *Homer* for example invoked his Muse —

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μῦσα —

Tell me, O Muse, the Man —

L 3

the

writing, I *have* written ; sometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *should have* written ; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preserved. But these Peculiarities are perhaps foreign to our Design, which is rather to inquire concerning Grammar Universal.

C.VIII. the Return, suitable to this Request, could be a Return *only of Words*, to wit, the informing him, by virtue of her divine Knowledge, in the History of *Ulysses*, whom he was about to celebrate. But when the unfortunate Chief, in beggary and blindness, was compelled to cry — *dote obolum Belisario*—not Words alone were a suitable Return here, but rather some kind and charitable *Act*.

THIS is true of the *Requisitive Mode*; but with respect to the *Interrogative*, the Return is never made in any thing but in *Words*, that is to say, it necessarily calls for some *definitive assertive Sentence*. For example — Let the Interrogation be — *Whose Verses are these?* — the Return is a Sentence — *These are Verses of Homer, How many Books constitute the Eneid?* — *Twelve Books constitute the Eneid. Was Brutus a brave and worthy Man?* — *Brutus was a brave and worthy Man.* And hence the

The near affinity of this *Interrogative Mode* C.VIII. with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (*e*), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small Particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the Words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*).

BUT

(*e*) Ἦγε ἢ προκειμένη ὀριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τῷ καλεῖσθαι ὀριστικὴ — ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποσέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὀριστικὴ. *The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(*f*) It may be observed of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Response may be made in almost the

C.VIII. BUT to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative* Mode and the *Requisitive*.

THE

same Words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses, *Yes*, for all the affirmative; *No*, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—we cannot then respond after the manner above-mentioned. The Reason is, that no *Interrogation* can be answered by a simple *Yes*, or a simple *No*, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible Answers to admit only one. Now the least complex *Interrogation* will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex *Interrogation* cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may
be

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language **C.VIII.**
OF Grammarians) has all *Persons* of both
Numbers.

be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance—*Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's?* (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither.* The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's,* and so on, either way to infinity. How then should we learn from a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Custom hath consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the short monosyllable, *Two*—whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.*

The

C.VIII. Numbers. The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no *first Person* of the *singular*, and that from this plain reason, that 'tis equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request* or *give commands to himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become the *subject of his own address* *.

AGEN, we may *interrogate* as to all *Times*, both *Present*, *Past*, and *Future*. *Who WAS Founder of Rome? Who IS King of China? Who WILL DISCOVER the Longitude?* — But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the *Essence* of the *Requisitive Mode*) have a necessary respect to

The Antients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called *Ἑρώτημα*, *Interrogatio*; the complex, *πύσμα*, *Percontatio*. *Ammonius* calls the first of these *Ἑρώτησις διαλεκτική*; the other, *Ἑρώτησις πνευματική*. See *Am. in Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.

to the Future (g) only. For indeed what C.VIII.
have they to do with the present or the
past,

(g) Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγυῖσιν ἡ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγυῖσιν, ἐπιτηδεύοντα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἶναι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ Εἰσι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says — Ἀπαντα τὰ προσακτικὰ ἐκκειμένῃ ἔχει τὴν τῷ μέλλοντι διαθεσιν — χεῖδὲν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῃ εἰς τὸ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνον ἔννοιαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσακτικόν, τὸ δὲ ὀριστικόν. All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE FUTURE—— with regard therefore to TIME, 'tis the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONoured, or, HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONoured; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But

C.VIII. past, the natures of which are immutable
and necessary?

'Tis

But if we attend, we shall find his *Present* to be nothing else than an *immediate Future*, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentis statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futura.* Lib. VIII. p. 806.

'Tis true the *Greeks* in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) *done*, in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English* Imperative, *BE GONE*, and those others of, *Go*, or, *BE GOING*. The first (if we please) may be stiled *the Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands; the others may be stiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

'Tis thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between *σκαπίέτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, *Go to digging the Vines*, and *σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, *Get the Vines dug*. The first is spoken (as he calls it)


εἰς

'TIS from this connection of *Futurity* C.VIII. *With Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, YOU SHALL DO THIS, has often the same Force with the *Imperative*, DO THIS. So in the Decalogue—THOU SHALT NOT KILL—THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS—
which

εις παράτασιν, by way of *Extension*, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εις συντελείωσιν, with a view to immediate *Completion*. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σκάπτει and Σκάψον, he says of the last, εἰ μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον προσάσκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, 'twould be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΨΕ, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 24.*

C.VIII. which denote (we know) the strictest and
 most authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Affertion*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *'Tis true*, or *'Tis false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *'tis true* or *'tis false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the *Potential* does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural* Assertion, whereas that of the

Indicative is absolute, and without re-**C.VIII**
serve. 

THIS therefore (the **INDICATIVE I**
mean) is the Mode, which as in all Gram-
mars 'tis the first in order, so is it truly
first both in Dignity and Use. 'Tis this,
which publishes our sublimest Perceptions;
which exhibits the Soul in her purest
Energies, superior to the Imperfection of
Desires and Wants; which includes the
whole of *Time*, and its minutest Distinc-
tions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses,
is employed by History, to preserve to us
the Remembrance of former Events; in
its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in de-
fault of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct
and forewarn us, as to that which is com-
ing; but above all in its *Present* Tense
serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by
just Demonstrations to establish *necessary*
Truth; **THAT TRUTH**, which from its
nature

C.VIII. nature *only exists in the Present*; wh
 knows no distinctions either of Past
 of Future, but is every where and alw
 invariably one (*b*).

THROU

(*b*) See the quotation, Note (*c*), Chapter
 Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non*
dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quot
 was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by
 gion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Plat
 and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they spr
 from the same Source, were in the latter ages
 antiquity commonly adopted by the same Pers
 such as *Themistius*, *Porphry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammen*
 and others. There were no Sects of Philosop
 that lay greater Strefs on the distinction betw
 things existing *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the t
 above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Perip
 tics on this Subject (since 'tis these that *Boeth*
 here follows) may be partly understood from
 following Sketch.

“ THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN. TIM
 “ are *those whose Existence Time can measure*. I
 “ if their Existence may be measured by Tir
 “ then there may be assumed a Time greater th
 “ the Existence of any one of them, as there is
 “ be assumed a number greater than the great
 multitu

THROUGH all the above Modes, with C.VIII.
 their respective Tenses, the Verb being
 considered

multitude, that is capable of being numbred.
 And hence 'tis that *things temporary* have their
 Existence, as it were *limited* by Time; that they
 are confined within it, as within some bound; and
 that in some degree or other they *all submit to its*
power, according to those common Phrases, that
Time is a destroyer; that things decay thro' Time;
that men forget in Time, and lose their abilities,
 and seldom that they improve, or grow young,
 or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time always*
attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Mo-
 tion is to *put something, which now is, out of that*
state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to
 destroy that State.

“ The reverse of all this holds with THINGS
 THAT EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist *not in*
Time, because Time is so far from being able to
 measure their Existence, that *no Time can be*
assumed, which their Existence doth not surpass.
 To which we may add, that they *feel none of*
its effects, being no way obnoxious either to
 damage or dissolution.

“ To instance in examples of either kind of Be-
 ing. There are such things at this instant, as

M

“ *Stonhenge*

C.VIII. considered as denoting an ATTRIBUT~~E~~,
 has always reference to some Person, ~~O~~ ~~I~~
 SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, ~~or~~,
Go, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gon*~~e~~,
 we must add a Person or Substance, t~~o~~
 make the Sentence complete. *Cicero went* ~~=~~ ;
Cæsar might have gone ; *whither goeth th*~~e~~
Wind? *Go!* *Thou Traitor!* But there i~~s~~
 a Mode or Form, under which Verb~~s~~
 sometimes appear, where they have no re-
 ference at all to Persons or Substances.
 For example — *To eat is pleasant* ; but *to*
fast

“ *Stonhenge* and the *Pyramids*. 'Tis likewise true
 “ at this instant, that the *Diameter of the Square* is
 “ *incommensurable with its side*. What then shall
 “ we say? Was there ever a Time, when it was
 “ *not incommensurable*, as 'tis certain there was a
 “ Time, when there was no *Stonhenge*, or *Pyra-*
 “ *mids*? or is it *daily* growing *less incommensurable*,
 “ as we are assured of *Decays* in both those massie
 “ *Structures*? ” From these unchangeable Truths,
 we may pass to their Place, or Region ; to the un-
 ceasing Intellection of the universal Mind, ever per-
 fect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors,
 &c. See *Nat. Aufc.* L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV.
 c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. Ist. p. 262.
 Note VII.

fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, *To eat*, C.VIII. and, *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, *INFINITIVES*. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of *Ἀναρμ-
-ματα*, from the same reason of their not discovering either Person or Number.

THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*. Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria MORI.

SCIRE tuum nihil est —

C.VIII. Ὁυ καταναεῖν γὰρ δαυὸν, ἀλλ' αἰσχροῖς
 θανεῖν (i).

THE *Stoics* in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they

(i) 'Tis from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes Ὀνομα ῥηματικόν, A VERBAL NOUN; sometimes Ὀνομα ῥηματοῦς, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῇ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in *English*. Thus *Spencer*,

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake

Could save the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain* ἕνεκα τῷ πλετεῖν, ἕνεκα τῷ κέρδους — in *French*, *pour s'enrichir*. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH*, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐλέγομαι, ἢ πλετεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILO-*
 SOPHY

they held this alone to be the genuine C.VIII. PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained *simple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the *Infinitives*, Περιπατεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *simply* that Energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this Energy, *superadd* certain *Affections*, which respect Persons and Circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*.

M 3

And

SOPHY rather than RICHES, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐλόμαι, ἢ περὶ τὸν πλῆτον. Thus too *Priscian*, speaking of *Infinitives* — CURRERE enim est CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut *Persius*,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. Lib. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza Gram.* L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφalon, ὀνομά ἐστὶ ῥήματος κ. τ. λ.

ΠΙ. And hence they are all of them resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, together with some Sentence or Word, expressive of their proper Character. *Ambulo, I walk*; that is, *Indico me ambulare, I declare myself to walk*. *Ambula, Walk Thou*; that is, *Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk*; and so with the Modes of every other Species. Take away therefore the Assertion, the Command, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as Priscian says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum* (k).

THE

(k) See Apollon. L. III 13. καθόλη πᾶν παρῆγ-
 μένου ἀπό τινος, κ. τ. λ. See also Gaza, in the
 note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei
 Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem)
 habere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem
 in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.— Ita-
 que omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, tran-
 sumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131.*
 From these Principles Apollonius calls the Infinitive
 ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, and Priscian, *Verbum generale*.

THE Application of this Infinitive is C.VIII. somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendency, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus 'tis Sense as well as Syntax, to say *βούμαι ζῆν*, *Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say *ἔσθιω ζῆν*, *Edo vivere*, or even in English, *I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of, *I eat for to live*; as we say *πίνω τε ζῆν*, or *pour vivre*. The Reason is, that though different Actions may unite in the same Subject, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But 'tis not so with respect to *Volitions*, and *Actions*. Here the Coalescence is often so intimate, that the *Volition* is un-intelligible, till the *Action* be express. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero* — *I desire, I am willing, I want* — What? —

C.VIII. The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by *Infinitives*, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in Sentiment, as in Syntax (1).

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. Were we to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent Characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary Truth, and every demonstrative Syllogism (which last is no more than a Combination of such Truths) must always be expressed under positive Assertions, and as positive

(1) *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in Greek Προαισθητικά. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy.

sitive Assertions only belong to the *Indi-* C.VIII.
cative, we may denominate it for that rea-
 son the **MODE OF SCIENCE** (*m*). Agen,
 as the *Potential* is only conversant about
Contingents, of which we cannot say with
 certainty that they will happen or not, we
 may call this Mode, **THE MODE OF CON-**
JECTURE. Agen, as those that are ig-
 norant and would be informed, must ask
 of those that already know, this being the
 natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence
 we may call the *Interrogative*, **THE MODE**
OF PROFICIENCY.

Inter cuncta leges, & PERCONTABERE
doctos,

Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c. Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most ex-
 cellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is le-
 gislative

(*m*) *Ob nobilitatem prævit INDICATIVUS, solus*
Modus aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis. Scal. de
Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.

C. VIII legislative Command, we may stile it for this reason THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says Cicero in the character of a Roman lawgiver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the Laws of England; and in the same Mode speak the Laws of every other nation. 'Tis also in this Mode that the Geometrician, with the authority of a Legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that Science, which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* Affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their Essence, nor indeed are they the Essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the Properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant Languages are provided with certain Terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may know

know with more precision; in a complex C.VIII.
Sentence, each particular Substance, with
its attendant verbal Attributes. The same
may be said of *Sex*, with respect to Ad-
jectives. They have Terminations which
vary, as they respect Beings male or fe-
male; tho' Substances past dispute are alone
susceptible of sex (*n*). We therefore pass
over

(*n*) 'Tis somewhat extraordinary, that so acute
and rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, should
justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of Sex to
Adjectives, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to
Substantives, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Peri-
zonius* is much more consistent, who says — *At
vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pro-
nominibus vel maximè, immo unicè inest ipsa Persona ;
& Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina
Planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substan-
tiva, quibus solis autor (Sanctius scil. L. I. c. 7.) &
rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* Sanct. *Min-
nerv.* L. I. c. 12. There is indeed an exact Ana-
logy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*.
There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male
and the Female ; and but two *Persons* (or Charac-
ters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker,
and the Party address. The third Sex and third
Person are improperly so called, being in fact but
Negations of the other two.

C.VIII. over these matters, and all of like kind,
as being rather among the Elegancies, than
the Essentials of Language, which Essentials
are the Subject of our present Inquiry.
The principal of these now remaining is
THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO
THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we en-
deavour to explain in the following man-
ner.

C H A P. —

C H A P. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their
other remaining Properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called, C. IX.
denote (a) Energies. Now as all *Energies* are *Attributes*, they have reference
of course to certain *energizing Substances*.
Thus 'tis impossible there should be such
Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.*
if there were not such Beings as *Men,*
Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Ener-
gy doth not only require an Energizer,
but is necessarily conversant about some
Subject. For example, if we say, *Brutus*
loves—we must needs supply—*loves Cato,*
Cassius,

(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehensive meaning ; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 94, 95.

C. IX. *Cassius, Portia, or some one. The Sword wounds* — i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one.* And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the Sentence, the Energy follows its Character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE. — Thus we say *Brutus amat, Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the Character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE. — Thus we say, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved.* 'Tis in like manner that the same Road between the Summit and Foot of the same Mountain, with respect to the Summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the Foot is *Descent*. Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in Language a necessary Reference

ference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative* C. IX.
Case (b).

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus* loved *Portia*. — Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; loved, the *Energy*, and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been, *Brutus* loved *Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the *Energy* is referable to *Subjects* infinite. Now among these infinite *Subjects*, when that happens to occur, which is the *Energizer* also, as when we say *Brutus* loved *himself*, slew *himself*, &c. in such *Case* the *Energy* hath to the *same* Being a *double Relation*, both *Active* and *Passive*. And this 'tis which gave rise
among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both ancient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub fin. In all which places they will see a proper *Nominative* supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

C. IX. among the *Greeks* to that Species of Verb called VERBS MIDDLE (c), and such w their true and original Use, however many instances they may have since ha pened to deviate. In other Language the Verb still retains its active Form, as the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is e prest like other Accusatives.

AGEN, in some Verbs it happens th the Energy *always keeps within* the Ene gizer, and *never passes out* to any foreig extraneous Subject. Thus when we sa *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, 'tis impos

b

(c) Τὰ γὰρ καλόμενα μεσότητος ᾠήματα σ ἐμπῶσιν ἀνιδέξατο ἐνεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθήσει
The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Co-inciden of the active and passive Character. Apollon. L. II c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine co cerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB e plained and confirmed with great Ingenuity a Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that at Critic Kuster, entitled, *De vero Ufu Verborum M diorum*. Mr. Leeds, the Master of Bury School, h lately favoured the Publick with a neat edition of this scarce piece.

ble the Energy should pass out (as in the C. IX. case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE) because both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Subject* are united in the same Person. For what is the Cause of this walking or sitting? — 'Tis the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to sit? — 'Tis the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also to the same *Cæsar*. 'Tis this then forms that Species of Verbs, which Grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of *Action* and *Passion*, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to imply both. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their *Energizer* always discover their *passive Subject* (c), which other

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, 'Αυτοπάθεια and Ίδιοπάθεια, which Priscian renders, *quæ ex se in se ipsa fit intrinsecus Passio*. L. VIII. 790.

C. IX. other Verbs cannot, their passive Subjunctives being infinite; hence the reason why

f

It may be here observed, that even those called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside transitive Character; that is to say, can drop subsequent Accusative, and *assume the Form of Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy of Action* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it thing or that. Thus we say, *ὁὗτος οὐδὲν ἀνὰ γράμματα*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them. *ὁὗτος οὐδὲν ἀνὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου*, *He knows not how to read Homer*, *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c. Thus *Horace*,

*Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum scire
aut res,
Ut lippum pietæ tabulæ—*

He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this particular nor that, but in general he within breast these affections prevail) has the same judgment of House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has of Pictures. So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic* of, *VENI, VIDI, VICI*, where two *Actives* follow one *Neuter* in the same detached Form, that *Neuter* it self. The *Glory* it seems is the rapid *Sequel of the Events*. *Conquest* c

superfluous in these Neuters to have the **C. IX.**
 Subject exprest, as in other Verbs it is
 necessary, and cannot be omitted. And
 thus 'tis that we are taught in common
 Grammars that *Verbs Active require an*
Accusative, while *Neuters require none*.

Of the above Species of Verbs, the
Middle cannot be called necessary, because
 most Languages have done without it.
 THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore re-
 maining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and
 the NEUTER, and those seem essential to
 all Languages whatever. (d)

N 2

THERE

quick, as he could come himself, and look about
 him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was
 not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apoll.*
 L. III. C. 31. P. 279.

(d) The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs,
 as making a part in Propositions, considered them
 under the four following Sorts.

When

IX. THERE remains a Remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs.

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative* of some *Noun*, made without further help a perfect assertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, *Socrates walketh*; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγορήμα, a *Predicable*; or else, from its readiness συμβαίνειν, to co-incide with its *Noun* in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβαμα, a *Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such *Noun*, but under some *oblique Case*, as Σωκράτης μεταμέλει, *Socratem pœnitet*: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Παρασύμβαμα or Παρακατηγορήμα.

When a Verb, tho' regularly co-inciding with a *Noun* in its *Nominative*, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other *Noun* under an *oblique Case*, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, *Plato loveth Dio*, (where without *Dio* or some other, the Verb *Loveth* would rest indefinite :) Such Verb, from this Defect they called ἧττον ἢ σύμβαμα, or ἡ κατηγορημα, something less than a *Co-incider*, or less than a *Predicable*.

Lastly,

Verbs. 'Tis true in general that the greater C. IX.
 Part of them denote Attributes of *Emer-*
gy and *Motion*. But there are some
 which appear to denote nothing more,
 than a mere *simple Adjective*, joined to an
 Assertion. Thus ἰσάζει in *Greek*, and
isqualeth in *English*, mean nothing more
 N 3 than

Lastly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique*
cases, to render the Sentiment complete; as when
 we say Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδης μέλει, *Tadet me Vitæ*,
 & the like: Such Verb they called ἥτιον, or ἔλαττον
 παρασύμβαμα, or ἡ παρακατηγόρημα, *Something*
less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Pre-
cable.

These were the *Apellations* which they gave to
 Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the
 forming of Propositions. As to the Name of
 ῥήμα, or VERB, they denied it to them all,
 giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn
 ready. See page 164. See also *Ammon. in Lib.*
Interpret. p. 37. Apollon. de Syntaxi L. I. c. 8.
.. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaz.
Gram. L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all
 Verbs Neuter are Συμβάματα; Verbs Active, ἥτιονα
 συμβάματα.

THE same may
tumet, i. e. *tumid*
press the Energy
must have recourse

Fluctus uti prin
Vento.

Incipiunt agitat

THERE are Verbs
which are formed
as in *Abstract Nouns*
from *White, Good*
in the *Infinitive Mode*
butive is converted
the Substantive on t

Cynic; Φιλippiζειν from Φίλιππος, to *Philip*-C. IX.
pize, or *favour Philip*; Syllaturire from
Sylla, to *meditate acting the same part as*
Sylla did. Thus too the wise and vir-
 tuous Emperour, by way of counsel to
 himself — ὄρα μὴ ἀποκαίωται, *beware*
thou beest not BECÆSAR'D; as though he
 said, *Beware, that by being Emperor, thou*
loft not dwindle into A MERE CÆSAR (e).
 In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

STERNHOLD *himself* be OUT-STERN-
 HOLDED.

AND so much for that Species of AT-
 TRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICT-
 EST SENSE.

(e) *Marc. Antonin. L. VI. §. 30.*

Ch. X. **T**HE Nature
 stood, that
 way difficult. Eve
 expressive of an *Att*
 of an *Assertion*. N
 the *Assertion*, and th
 there will remain t
Time, which make t
 TICIPLE. Thus tal
 tion from the Verb, I
 there remains the
Writing, which (wi
 denotes the same *Att*
Time. After the sam
 drawing, the *Assertion*.

we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being Ch. X.
 of all languages the most complete, as
 well in this respect, as in others.

AND so much for PARTICIPLES (a).

THE

(a) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens*, and *Scripturus*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus*, and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for *γράφας* they say, ~~scripsisset~~ *scripsisset*—for *γραφόμενος*, *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The *English* Grammar lays down a good Rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps

have said) both an
and an *Affertion*; a
an *Attribute*, and
TIVE only implies a
say, in other Words
no Affertion, and on
tribute, as bath no
Motion or its Privat

haps liable to as few Ex
dering therefore how little
have in our Language, it
the few Traces, that n
be well therefore, if al
vour to be accurate, w
Corruption, at present sc
was wrote, for, it was wr
he was driven: I have ...

the Attributes of Quantity, Quality, and Ch. X.
Relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*, *black* and *white*, *good* and *bad*, *double*, *treble*, *quadruple*, &c.) are all denoted by
ADJECTIVES.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the Idea of *Motion*, assume an Assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo*, *turneo*, *ισαζω*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. 'Tis in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *Doctus* in *Latin*, and *Learned* in *English* lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not *a man now speaking*, but a man, *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether

whose mind is a
portion of those po
wonder, as all A
geneous, that at ti
should appear to in
ence between them
Even in *natural* Sp
genial and of kin,
is not always to be
pearance at least t
each other.

WE have shewn
stances of Φιλίππιζευσ
σαρωθήναι, and othe
may be transformed

ives. We shall now shew, how they Ch. X.
may be converted into *Adjectives*. When
we say the Party of *Pompey*, the Stile of
Cicero, the Philosophy of *Socrates*, in these
cases the Party, the Stile, and the Philoso-
phy spoken of, receive a Stamp and Cha-
racter from the Persons, whom they re-
spect. Those Persons therefore perform
the part of Attributes, that is, to stamp
and characterize their respective Subjects.
Hence then *they actually pass into Attri-*
butes, and assume, as such, the Form of
Adjectives. And thus 'tis we say, the
Pompeian Party, the *Ciceronian* Stile, and
the *Socratic* Philosophy. 'Tis in like
manner for a Trumpet of *Brass*, we say a
Brazen Trumpet; for a Crown of *Gold*,
a *Golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal*
Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus
instead of saying, the Book of *Me*, of *Thee*,
and of *Him*, we say *My* Book, *Thy* Book,
and *His* Book; instead of saying the Coun-
try

Ch. X. try of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country; which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no Sex (c). And yet their having Terminations conformable to the Sex, Number, and Case of their Substantive, seems to have led Grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both Sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*.

stances. But of this we have spoken before (d). Ch. X.

THE Attributives hitherto treated, that is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The reason of this Name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following Chapter.

(d) Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.

C H A P. XI.

Concerning Attributives of the Second Order.

Ch. XI. **A**S the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote the Attributes of Substances, so there is an inferior Class of them, which denote the Attributes only of Attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind—when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in these instances the Attributives, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*, are immediately referable to the Substantives, *Cicero, Virgil, &c.* As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably*;

in these instances, the *Attributives*, *Mod- Ch. XI.*
erately, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Ad-*
mirably, are not referable to *Substantives*,
 but to *other Attributives*, that is, to the
 words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As there-
 fore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we
 call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SE-**
COND ORDER.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the
 Name of *Ἐμπρόμματα*, **ADVERBIA**, **AD-**
VERBS. And indeed if we take the word
Ῥῆμα, or, *Verb*, in its most *comprehen-*
sive Signification, as including not only
Verbs properly so called, but also *Participles*
 and *Adjectives* [an usage, which may be
 justified by the best authorities (a)] we
 shall

(a) Thus *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*,
 instances *ἄνθρωπος* as a *Noun*, and *λεῖκος* as a *Verb*.
 So *Ammonius*—κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸ σημαίνον, τὸ μὲν
 ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ῬΗΜΑΤΑ
 λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκ' ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this *Sig-*
nification (that is of denoting the *Attributes of Sub-*
stance,

dependence in g
an *Adverb* can no
Verb, than a *Veri*
Substantive. 'Tis
certain natural S
for its existence as
ficies, as the Sup
requires a solid Bc

stance, and the Predic
FAIR, JUST, and the
not NOUNS. *Am. in*
Arist. de Interpr. L. I. c
Chap. 6. Note (a). p.

In the same manner
ticiples. *Nam PARTI*
PARTICIPIALE VERI
Priscian. L. I. p. 574.

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are Ch. XI.
reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus
we say, *a white Garment, a high Mountain.*
Now some of these Quantities and Quali-
ties are capable of Intension, and Remis-
sion. Thus we say, *a Garment EXCEED-
INGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY*
O 2 *high,*

butive) is conformable to the best authorities.
Theodore Gaza defines an ADVERB, as follows—
μέρος λόγου ἀπ' ὧτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπι-
λεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπίθετον ῥήματος. *A Part of*
Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or sub-
joined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective.
L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how
properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, since its
Principal sometimes *has cases*, as in *Valdè Sapiens*;
sometimes *has none*, as in *Valdè amat*). *Priscian's*
definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVER-
BIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio
Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis
additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus
adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix
Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before,
speaking of the *Stoics*, he says—Etiam ADVERBIA
Nominibus vel VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, et quasi
ADJECTIVA VERBORUM nominabant. L. I. p. 574.
See also *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. *sub fin.*

these two, that is, 1
The *Greeks* have the
πάνυ, ἥκιστα; the 1
bementer, *maximè*, *for*
English their *greatly*
sufficiently, *moderately*,
ently, &c.

FARTHER than th
different Intensions of
they may be *compared*
the Garment A be EX
and the Garment B
White, we may say,
MORE *white than the G*

Intension. Nay we stop not here. We Ch. XI.
 not only denote Intension *merely relative,*
but relative Intension, than which there is
none greater. Thus we not only say *the*
Mountain A is MORE high than the Moun-
tain B, but that *'tis the MOST high of all*
Mountains. Even *Verbs, properly so called,*
 as they admit *simple* Intensions, so they
 admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus
 in the following Example — *Fame he*
 LOVETH MORE *than Riches, but Virtue of all*
things he LOVETH MOST — the Words MORE
 and MOST denote the different *compara-*
tive Intensions of the Verbal Attributive,
Loveth.

AND hence the rise of COMPARISON,
 and of its different *Degrees*; which can-
 not well be more, than the two Species
 above mentioned, one to denote *Simple*
Excess, and one to denote *Superlative.*
 Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees
 than these, we ought perhaps to introduce

C. XI. *infinite*, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited number, when in all subjects, susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* it self. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS*
Qui fuit in Teucris— Virg.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, sometimes

sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, et lacrumis oculos suffusa nittentes.

Vir.

Rusticior paullo est—

Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man*,—that is to say, *not* the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, *that* ever existed, but a Man possessing *those* Qualities in an *eminent* Degree.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER ; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*,

As there are some
admit of Compari-
which admit of no
are those, which
Bodies arising from
we say, a *Circular*
Court, a *Conical Piece*
reason is, that a m-
ticipating the same
equally, if they partic-
therefore that while
quadrangular, A is m-
lar than B, is absur-
true in all Attributi-
Quantities, whether
whether *absolute* or

Twenty Lions cannot be *more twenty*, than Ch. XI.
Twenty Flies. If A and B be both *triple*,
 Or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more*
triple, or *more quadruple*, one than the
 Other. The reason of all this is, there
 can be no *Comparison* without *Intension* and
Remission; there can be no *Intension* and
Remission in things *always definite*; and
 Such are the *Attributives*, which we have
 Last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause,
 why no *Substantive* is *susceptible of these*
Comparative Degrees. A *Mountain* cannot
 be said *MORE TO BE*, or *TO EXIST*, than
 a *Mole-bill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be
 sought for in their *Quantities*. In like
 manner, when we refer many *Individuals*
 to one *Species*, the *Lion A* cannot be
 called *more a Lion*, than the *Lion B*, but
 if more any thing, he is *more fierce*, *more*
speedy, or exceeding in some such *Attribute*.

So again, in referring many *Species* to
 one

cess, as before, b
Attributes. So t
acute *Stagirite* —
susceptible of Mc
this by way of dig
subject of Adverb

OF the Adverbs
tives already men
Intension or Remin
verbs of *Quantity* co
Thrice, are Advert
More and *Most*, *L*
may be added *Equa*

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are others C. XI. of *Quality*, as when we say, *HONESTLY industrious*, *PRUDENTLY brave*, *they fought BRAVELY*, *he painted FINELY*, *a Portico form'd CIRCULARLY*, *a Plain cut TRIANGULARLY*, &c.

AND here 'tis worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same Essence, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *Honest*, *Honestly*, and *Honesty*. The Answer is, they are in Essence the same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive of a Substantive*; *Honestly*, of a *Verb*; and *Honesty*, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the *Power of a Substantive*, so as to stand by its self.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to *Verbs of every Species*; but there

Ch. XI. there are some, which are peculiar to *Verbs* properly so called, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Participations*. All *MOTION* and *REST* imply *TIME* and *PLACE*, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper *Adverbs*; of *Place*, as when we say, *He stood THERE*; *he went HENCE*; *he travelled FAR*, &c. of *Time*, as when we say, *He stood THEN*; *he went AFTERWARD*; *he travelled FORMERLY*, &c. Should it be asked — why *Adverbs of Time*, when *Verbs have Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' *Tenses* may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of *Time*, yet to denote them all by *Tenses* would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of *Forms*, to denote *Yesterday*, *To day*, *To morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c? 'Twas this then that made

made the *Temporal* Adverbs necessary, over Ch. XI.
and above the *Tenses*. }

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion*, such as *speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.* as also *Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions*, such as ἀνω and κάτω from ἀνά and κατά, in *English upward and downward, from up and down*. In some instances the *Preposition* suffers no change, but becomes an *Adverb* by nothing more than its *Application*, as when we say, CIRCA equitat, *he rides ABOUT*; PROPE' cecidit, *he was NEAR falling*; Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, *But do not AFTER lay the blame on me (d)*.

THERE

(d) *Sosp. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. Act. II. Sc. 3.*

C. XI. *THERE* are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where, Whence, Whither, How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative* or *Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus *Virgil*,

Et Seges est, UBI Troja fuit —

translated in our old *English Ballad*,

And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town stood.

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO*, &c. *Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH*, &c. the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus *Terence*,

Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscer,
UBI me excarnufices — Heaut. IV. 6.

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands *for* *quibus rebus*.

'TIS

'Tis in like manner that the *Relative* C. XI.
Pronoun upon occasion becomes an *Inter-*
rogative, at least in *Latin* and *English*.
 Thus *Horace*,

QUEM Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri
 Tibid fumes celebrare, Clio?

So *Milton*,

WHO first seduc'd them to that foul re-
 volt?

THE reason of all this is as follows.
 The *Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned
 are all alike, in their original character,
 RELATIVES. Even when they become
 Interrogatives, they lose not this character,
 but are still Relatives, as much as ever.
 The difference is, that *without* an Interro-
 gation, they have reference to a Subject,
 which is *antecedent*, *definite* and *known* ;
 with an *Interrogation*, to a Subject which is
subsequent, *indefinite*, and *unknown*, and
 which

Ch. XI. which 'tis expected that *the Answer* should
 { express and ascertain.

WHO *first seduc'd them?* —

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, WHO, has a *reference*.

Tb' infernal Serpent —

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject*, which was *indefinite*, *ascertained*; so that the WHO in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any *Interrogation* at all, 'Twas the *Infernal SERPENT*, WHO *first seduced them*.

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for ADVERBS, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all Attributives. We have likewise a tempted

tempted to explain *their general Nature*, Ch. XI. which we have found to consist in being *the Attributes of Attributes*. There remains only to add, that ADVERBS may be derived from almost every Part of Speech. From PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through these from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio*, *Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from *Virtuous* and *Vituous*, we derive *Virtuously* and *Vitiously*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as when from Πιθήκη, an *Ape*, we derive Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, to look *Apishly*; from Λέων, a *Lion*, Λεοντώδως, *Leoninely*—nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. 'Twas *Socratically* reasoned, we say; 'twas *Demosthenically* spoken. Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such

Ch. XI. as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Sisenniter* f
Sisenna, *Tullianè* from *Tullius*, &c. (

NOR are they thus extensive in *Der*
tion, but in *Signification* also. *Theo*
Gaza in his Grammar informs us (that ADVERBS may be found in e
one of the Predicaments, and that
readiest way to reduce their Infinit
was to refer them by classes to those
universal Genera. The *Stoics* too ca
the ADVERB by the name of Πανδέ
and that from a view to the same m
form Nature. *Omnia in se capit quasi*
lata per satiram, concessâ sibi rerum v.
potestate. 'Tis thus that *Sophpater* expl
the Word (g), from whose authc

(e) See *Prisc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Sof. Charis.*
Edit. *Putschii*.

(f) — διὸ δὴ καὶ ἀμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐν
μάτων γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, ὑσίαν, πωδόν, ποσόν,
τι, κ. τ. λ. *Gram. Introd.* L. II.

(g) *Sofip. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putschii*.

BOOK THE FIRST.

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we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this Ch. XI.
enough.

AND now having finished those PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARLY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

P 2

HER-



HERMES:

OR, A

Philosophical Inquiry

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitives.

WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I.
 is a matter of less difficulty,
 it being the same here, as in
 some Historical Picture; when the prin-
 cipal Figures are once formed, 'tis an easy
 labour to design the rest.

Ch. I. DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, *ἄρθρα*. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pronominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if
the

he Species be unknown, then at least to Ch. I. some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horse*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or *unknown*? Seen now *for the first time*, or *seen before*, and now remembered? —Tis here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (THE.) (A) respects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) respects our *secondary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *known*. To explain by an ex-

Ch. I. ample — I see an object pass by, which I never saw till then. What do I say? — *There goes A Beggar, with A long Beard.* The Man departs, and returns a week after. What do I say then? — *There goes THE Beggar with THE long Beard.* The Article only is changed, the rest remains un-altered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, once vague, is now recognized as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past (a).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species,

(a) See B. I. C. 5. p. 63, 64.

cies, by reducing them for the most part **Ch. I.**
to denote Individuals. The difference
however between them is this; the Ar-
ticle (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

'Tis perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'Ο. 'Ο ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, THE man fell — ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, A Man fell, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (*b*). Even in *English*, where the

Article

(*b*) Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστῶς ποτε νοούμενα, ἢ τῷ ἄρθρῳ παράθεσις ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τῷ προσώπῳ ἄγει. *Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person.*

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express'd by the same Negation. *Those are THE Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*,
in

Person. Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ποιῇ (τὸ Ἀέθρον ἱε.) ὁ ἀνὰ πόλυσιν προεγνωσμένον τῷ ἐν τῇ συντάξει ὅσον ἐν μὲν λέγει τῆς, ἈΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ἦκε, ἄδηλον τίνα ἀνθρώπου λέγει· ἐν δὲ ὁ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, ἔλπει, προεγνωσμένου γὰρ τίνα ἀνθρώπου λέγει. Τὸτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐύλονται καὶ οἱ Φάσκοντες τ' Ἀέθρου σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. *The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before in the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says Ἀνθρωπος ἦκε, MAN IS COME (which is the same, as when we say in English A man is come) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἦκε, THE MAN IS COME, then 'tis evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together.* Theod. Gaza, L. IV.

in the singular, implies one of the same Ch. I.
number. }

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be nearer related, than their 'O, to the Article, THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

Ἔστι ὡ καθ' ἃ ἐν ἄλλαις ἀπεφνησμένα,
των ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἀναφορὰ, ἣ ἐστὶ προκαταλεγ-
μένη προσωπικὴ παραστατική.—Now the pecu-
-liar Attribute of the Article, as we have
seen elsewhere, is that Reference, which
implies some certain Person already men-
tioned. Agen — 'Ου γὰρ δέηγε τὰ ὀνόματα
ἐκ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσσειν, εἰ μὴ συμ-
παραλάβοιεν

1. I. παραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ὃ ἐξαίρετός ἐστιν ἡ ἀναφορά. *For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference.* Αἰεν — Τὸ ἄρθρον προϋφεισῶσαν γνώσιν δηλοῖ — *The Article indicates a pre-established Acquaintance (c).*

HIS reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. *Proper Names* (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian Chiefs*, who bore the name of *Ajax*. 'Twas not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses

(c) *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of REFERENCE is as follows — Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατειλεγμένον προσώπων δευτέρων γνώσιν. *The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.*

uses Epithets, when his intent was to di-Ch. I.
stinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἀλλὰ περ οἷοι Τελαμώνιοι ἄλκιμοι
Ajax. Hom.

*If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,
— at least alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.*

Apollonius proceeds — Even Epithets
themselves are diffused thro' various Sub-
jects, in as much as the same Adjective may
be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts
of Speech equally definite, that is to say
the Adjective as well as the Substantive,
the Adjective itself assumes *an Article* be-
fore it, that it may indicate *a Reference to*
some single Person only, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορὰ,
according to the Author's own Phrase. And
thus 'tis we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικός,
Trypho THE Grammarian; Ἀπολλόδωρος
ὁ Κυρηναῖος, *Apollodorus THE Cyrenean*, &c.
The

Ch. I. The Author's Conclusion of this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῦτων ἡ πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρθρῳ, συνιδιύναται τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι—'Tis with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise, as the proper Name (*d*).

WE may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the Article even common Appellatives come to have the force of proper Names, and that un-assisted by epithets of any kind. Among the Athenians Πλοῖον meant Ship; Ἑνδεκά, Eleven; and Ἄνθρωπος, Man. Yet add but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP, meant that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos; Οἱ Ἑνδεκά, THE ELEVEN, meant, certain Officers of Justice; and Ὁ Ἄνθρωπος, THE MAN, meant their public

(*d*) See *Apoll.* L. I. c. 12. where by mistake Menelaus is put for Menestheus.

lic Executioner. So in *English, City*, is a **Ch. I.**
 Name common to many places; and
Speaker, a Name common to many Men.
 Yet if we prefix the Article, **THE CITY**
 means our Metropolis; and **THE SPEAKER**,
 a high Officer in the *British* Parliament.

AND thus 'tis by an easy transition, that
 the Article from denoting *Reference*, comes
 to denote *Eminence* also; that is to say,
 from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquain-
 ance, to presume a kind of *general and*
universal Notoriety. Thus among the
Greeks 'Ο Ποιητής, **THE POET**, meant *Ho-*
mer (e); and 'Ο Σταγίριτης, **THE STAGI-**
RITE, meant *Aristotle*; not that there were
 not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many
 Stagirites,

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observa-
 tion, that we may fairly admit it to be generally
 true. Yet *Aristotle* twice denotes *Euripides* by the
 Phrase δ ποιητής, once at the end of the seventh
 Book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, and again in his
Physics, L. II. 2.

Ch. I. Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none equal—
ly illustrious for their Poetry and Philo-
sophy.

'TIS on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, 'tis by no means the same thing to assert—(f) τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, or, Τὸ ἀγαθόν — that, *Pleasure is A Good*, or, *THE GOOD*. The first only makes it a *common Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining*,
for

(f) Analyt. Prior. L. I. C. 40.

for it is by nature a *Definitive*. — And Ch. I. *What Words are these?* — Not those which already are as definite, as may be. Nor yet those, which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those, which though indefinite, are yet capable thro' the Article, of becoming definite.

UPON these Principles we see the reason, why 'tis absurd to say, 'O' ΕΓΩ', 'THE I, or 'O' ΣΥ', 'THE THOU, because nothing can make those Pronouns more definite, than they are (g). The same may be asserted of

(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition to refuse co-alescence with the Article. Επειδὴ δὲ ἡ Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δεξιῶς ἢ ἀναφορῆς ἐπὶ τῷ ἄρτικῳ, ὃ ἢ συνῆναι τὸ ἄρτικον. That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with which the Article doth not associate. L. H. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns — Ἡ δὲ ἄντι-κρίσις ἀρτικῶν. L. IV. Priscian says the same. *Præter igitur apud Græcos prima & secunda personæ pronomi-*

Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* say ὁ Σοκράτης, ἡ Εὐδοκία, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek* 'ΟΙ 'ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in *English*, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυὸς ἐγνωμένα, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read*

Two

num, quæ sine dubio demonstrativæ sunt, articulis coniungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

(b) Apollon. L. I. c. 16.

Two *Poets*, this may mean *any Pair* out Ch. I.
 of all that ever existed. And hence this
 Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as
 indeed are all others, as well as it self) is
 forced to *assume the Article*, whenever it
 would become *definite*. And thus 'tis, THE
 Two in *English*, and 'ΟΙ ΔΥ'Ο in *Greek*,
 mean nearly the same thing, as BOTH or
 'ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it is, that
 as Two, when taken alone, has reference
 to some *primary* and *indefinite* Perception,
 while the Article, THE, has reference to
 some *secondary* and *definite* *; hence I say
 the Reason, why 'tis bad *Greek* to say
 ΔΥ'Ο 'ΟΙ 'ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad *Eng-*
lish, to say TWO THE MEN. Such Syntax
 is in fact a *Blending of Incompatibles*, that
 is to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *un-*
defined Attributive. On the contrary to say
 in *Greek* 'ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ 'ΟΙ 'ΑΝΘΡΩ-
 ΠΟΙ, or in *English*, BOTH THE MEN, is
 good and allowable, because the Substan-
 tive cannot possibly be less apt, by being
 Q 2 defined,

* Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as it self. So likewise, 'tis correct to say 'ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ἄΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends it's Power* as well thro' Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say 'Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (i) The same is to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. — We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΤΟΣ, ΣΟΙ, —

(i) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἄρῳ, a Part of Speech, most contrary, most averse to Articles. L. IV. c. 1.

ΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT Ch. I.
 SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The
 Reason is, that the Articles 'Ο, and THE
 respect Beings *already known*; Interroga-
 tives respect Beings, *about which we are*
ignorant; for as to what we know, Inter-
 rogation is superfluous.

IN a word *the natural Associators with*
Articles are all those *common Appellatives*,
 which denote the several Genera and Spe-
 cies of Beings. 'Tis these, which by
 assuming a different *Article*, serve either
 to explain an Individual upon its first being
 perceived, or else to indicate, upon it's
 return, a Recognition, or repeated Know-
 ledge (k).

WE shall here subjoin a few Instances
 of the peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

Q 3

EVERY

(k) What is here said respects the *two Articles*,
 which we have in *English*. In *Greek*, the Article
 does no more, than imply a *Recognition*. See before
 p. 216, 217, 218.

Ch. I. **EVERY** Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness*, is the Subject; *Pleasure*, the Predicate. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then, *Pleasure*, becomes the Subject, and *Happiness*, the Predicate. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλὰ.

In *Greek* 'tis worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same *Article*, being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes

changes the whole meaning. For ex-Ch. I. ample—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιάρχῃσας ἐτιμήθη—*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιάρχῃσας has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games.* But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the Article, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιάρχῃσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured.* The Participle in this case, being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (1).

IN *English* likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every

Q 4

other

(1) *Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.*

Ch. I. other Word of the sentence untouched.—

And Natban said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN *. In that single, THE, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reasoning is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. 'Tis possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Natban said unto David, THOU ART A MAN.* Might-not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putide tendant ?

BUT enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make, is this; that “ minute Change in PRINCIPLES “ leads to mighty Change in EFFECTS; so “ that well are PRINCIPLES intitled to our “ regard,

* ΣΤ' ΕΓ' Ο 'ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεφ. ιβ'.

regard, however in appearance they Ch. I.
may be trivial and low."

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are those *strictly* so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c.* Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (m), where we have shewn, when

(m) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—*Noster sermo Articulus non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur.* Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Staliger. *His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἐλεξεν ὁ δὲλος) completur a Latinis per Is. aut Ille; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam revocandam, cuius antea non meminimus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ Latinis patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græci Καὶσαρ ὁ αὐτοκρατορ.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

Ch. I. when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article is *to define and ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THAT Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative, to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*. So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this ALL and SOME, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as—*SOME substances have sensation; OTHERS want it—Choose ANY way acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.* For here SOME, OTHER, and ANY, serve all of them to *define* different Parts of
give

given Whole ; SOME, to denote a *definite* Ch. I.
 Part ; ANY, to denote an *indefinite* ; and
 OTHER, to denote the *remaining* Part, when
 a Part has been assumed already. Some-
 times this last Word denotes a *large*
indefinite Portion, set in opposition to
 some *single, definite, and remaining Part*,
 which receives from such opposition
 no small degree of heightening. Thus
Homer exalts the Character of *Jove*, by
 telling us, that while OTHER Gods and
 Men were sleeping, JOVE alone remain'd
 awake.

ἌΛΛΟΙ μὲν ῥα θεοὶ π' ἀνδρες ἱπποκορυταὶ
 εὖδον παννύχιοι· Δι' Ἀ δ' οὐκ ἔχε νύδυμος
 ὕπνος, Iλ. B.

So *Virgil*,

Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra ;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore
vultus ;
Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus

Descri-

Ch. I. *Describent radia, et surgentia fœdera*
dicent :

Tu regere imperio populos, ROMANE,
memento, &c. Æ. VI.

NOTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis ; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men* ; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of *ALLI* to *Tu*.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

C H A P. II.

*Concerning Connectives, and first those
called Conjunctions.*


CONNECTIVES are the subject of what Ch. II.
follows; which, according as they
connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are
called by the different Names of CON-
JUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these
Names, that of the *Preposition* is taken
from a *mere accident*, as it commonly stands
in connection before the Part, which
it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*,
as is evident, has reference to its *essential*
character.

Of these two we shall consider the CON-
JUNCTION first, because it connects, not
Words, but *Sentences*. This is conform-
able to the Analysis, with which we be-
gan this inquiry *, and which led us, by
parity

* Sup. p. 11, 12.

TWO or more significant
significant Sentence (a,

(a) Grammarians have ul
junction as connecting rath
than *whole Sentences*, and tl
of like with like, Tense w
Number, Case with Case, l
explodes. *Conjunctio nequ*
orationis (ut imperiti doce
partes inter se conjunguntur
inter se conjungit. Miner.
establishes his doctrine by
He had already said as m
this he appears to have foll
asserted the same before. l
notionem veteres paullo incon
enim, quod aiunt, partes a
partes per se inter se conjungu
que conjungit Orationes plure
c. 165.

THIS therefore being the general Idea **Ch. II.**
 of CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species 
 in

the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting *Sentences*, and *not* Words, tho' in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction according to him, is *φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μίας, σημασιχῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκῆα μίας φωνῆς σημασιχῆς*. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. XX. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men are by nature social, tis their Interest to be just, tho' it were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country.

Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS,
 while they connect sentences, either connect
 also

Country. Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *'Tis Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *'Tis not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Men should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, *Ir*; these, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *Τηο'*; and the three, thus united, make that *φωνή μία σημαίνικη*, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. *'Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά· ὥς-ε ἰὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ὅλλου ὅτι πλεονεξῆσαι τὸ ἐν πολλά.* The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, 'tis then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, *ἄλλω, ἀπάντησα, ἰδιόμω, νεπὶ, οὐκ ἐγγί, παλαι,* where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for *ἄλλω*, *ἀπάντησα*, and *ἰδιόμω*, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius

also their meanings, or not. For ex-Ch. II.
 Example: let us take these two Sentences—
Rome was enslaved—Caesar was ambitious—
 and connect them together by the Con-
 junction, BECAUSE. *Rome was enslaved, BE-*
CAUSE Caesar was ambitious. Here the
Meanings, as well as the *Sentences*, appear
 to be connected. But if I say,—*Manners*
must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost—
 where the Conjunction, OR, tho' it join the
Sentences,

Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of
 Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπαρξιν
 μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἰς, ἀνάλογος αὖ ἐστὶ τῇ μη-
 τέρω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τῆτο ἐνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ
 δὲ πλείους ὑπάρχεις δηλῶν, ἵνα (lege διὰ) τινα δὲ
 σύνδεσμον ἡνωσθῆαι πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ καὶ τῇ ἐκ
 πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλῳ, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινο-
 μένῃ ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἑνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which de-*
notes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE,
may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not
yet sever'd, and called on this account One. That, which
denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made
ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship
made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means
of the nails has an apparent Unity. Am. in Lib. de
 Interpret. p. 54. 6.

Ch. II. *Sentences*, yet as to their respective *Meanings*, is a perfect *Disjunctive*. And thus it appears, that tho' all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with respect to the *Sense*, some are **CONJUNCTIVE**, and some **DISJUNCTIVE**; and hence (b) 'tis that we derive their different Species.

THE Conjunctions, which conjoin both *Sentences and their Meanings*, are either **COPULATIVES**, or **CONTINUATIVES**. The principal Copulative in *English* is, **AND**. The Continuatives are, **IF**, **BECAUSE**, **THEREFORE**, **THAT**, &c. The Difference between these is this—The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate Sentences in

(b) Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum disjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

one continuous Whole, and are therefore ap- Ch. II.
 plicable only to Subjects, which have an
 essential Co-incidence.

To explain by Examples—'Tis no way improper to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But 'twould be absurd to say, *Lyfippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, *the Co-incidence* is merely accidental; with respect to the last, 'tis essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (c).

As

(c) *Copulativa est, quae copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum*. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit—*si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones*

Ch. II. As to *Continuatives*, they are either
 SUPPOSITIVE, such as, IF; or POSITIVE,
 such as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, AS, &c.
 Take Examples of each—you will live
 happily, IF you live honestly—you live hap-
 pily, BECAUSE you live honestly. The Differ-
 ence between these Continuatives is this—
 The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but
 assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives*
 imply both the one and the other (d).

FARTHER

sc.) aut necessariò, aut non necessariò: &c., si non ne-
 cessario, tum sunt Copulativæ, &c. De C. Ling. Lat.
 c. 167. Priscian's account of Continuatives is as
 follows. Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem &
 consequentiam rerum significant—ibid. Scaliger's ac-
 count is—causam aut præstituunt, aut subdunt. Ibid.
 c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was
 Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the Continuative, συν-
 απλικός; the Etymologies of which words justly
 distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the
 name Συναπτικοί, and the Latins that of *Continua-*
tivæ to those Conjunctions, which we have called
Suppositive or *Conditional*, while the Positive they
 called

FARTHER than this, the Positives above Ch. II. mentioned are either CAUSAL, such as, BECAUSE,

called παρατηρητικοί, or *Subcontinuativæ*. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to Gaza are, οἱ ὑπαρξιν μὲν ὑποκολουθίαν δὲ τινὰ καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦντες—L. IV. Priscian says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquid essentia rerum*—p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin *sine subsistentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or παρασυντητικοί (to use his own name) Gaza tells us, οἷ καὶ ὑπαρξιν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνουσιν ἵτοιχε—And Priscian says, *causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum*—And Scaliger, *non ex hypothesis, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Positive Conjunctions should have been considered as Sub-ordinate to the Suppositive, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus 'tis false to affirm, *As it is*

Ch. II. BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. OF COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between these is this—the *Causals* subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun is in Eclipse, BECAUSE the Moon intervenes*—*The Collectives* subjoin *Effects to Causes*—*The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse*. Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*,
where

Day, it is Light, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *If*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossible. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion — *amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit*. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

where the Cause being known first, by Ch. II. its help we discern consequences (e). }

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, BECAUSE it is Day, it is light, we may say, It is Day, AND it is Light. Instead of, If it be Day, it is Light, we may say, 'Tis at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light, and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and something more, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4

As

(e) The *Latins* called the *Causals*, *Causales* or *Causativas*; the *Collectives*, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The *Greeks* called the former *Αιτιολογικοί*, and the latter *Συλλογιστικοί*.

(f) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causæ cum Effectu sub præ natura conjunctionis est.* Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

Ch. II. As to *Causal* Conjunctions (of which ~~in~~ we have spoken already) there is no one ~~of~~ of the four Species of Causes, which they ~~very~~ are not capable of denoting. For example, ~~the~~ THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis made of Metal*—THE ~~Formal~~ FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage*. Where 'tis worth observing, that the three first Causes are ~~are~~ exprest by the strong affirmation of the ~~the~~ Indicative Mode, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' ~~it~~ may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power

Power to obtain, and which like other **Ch. II.**
 Contingents, may either happen, or not (g). ~

Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions
 of a peculiar kind, such as, **THAT, IN,**
UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS,
which connect both Sentences and their Mean-
ings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTI-
 NUATIVE; the Continuatives are either
Conditional, or *Positive*; and the Positives
 are either *Causal* or *Collective*.

AND now we come to the DISJUNC-
 TIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words
 which bear this contradictory Name, be-
 cause while they *disjoin the Sense,* they
conjoin the Sentences (b).

WITH

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I.
 Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes see Vol. I.
 Note XVII. p. 280.

(b) Ὅτι δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασιν,
 ὡς ἡ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πρᾶγματος, ἡ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ
 προσώπου

Ch. II. WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Diffipation ; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i). Now

προσῶπον διαζευγνύσας, τῶν φράσεων ἐπισυνδίδωσι. *Gaza*
 Gram. L. IV. *Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent.*
 Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a *simple negative Truth*. For tho' this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, 'tis as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (b). p. 3.

(i) The DIVERSITY which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction. Such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but

as

Now 'tis to express in some degree the Ch. II.
 Modifications of this Diversity, that Dis-

JUNCTIVE

to Genus are the same. Such are *Man* and *Lion*.
 here are others again, which differ as to Genus, and
 coincide only in those transcendental Comprehensions
 Ens, Being, Existence, and the like. Such are
 Quantities and Qualities, as for example an Ounce,
 and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING what-
 ever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate
 their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOS-
 I-TION with respect to each other, in as much as each
 thing is *it self*, and *not any* of the rest. But yet in
 Subjects this Opposition is not *the same*. In
 RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double
 and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in
 these 'tis more striking, than in ordinary Subjects,
 because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring
 each other. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and
 White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous
 and Vitious, in these the Opposition goes still
 farther, because these not only differ, but are even
 destructive of each other. But the most potent Op-
 position is that of *Ἀντίφασις*, or CONTRADICTION,
 when we oppose Proposition to Proposition, Truth to
 falsehood, asserting of any Subject, either it is, or is
 not. This indeed is an Opposition, which extends

it

Ch. II. JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first ~~to~~
 have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE—*Simple*, as when we say, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it is Night*—*Adversative*, as when we say, *It is not Day*, BUT *it is Night*. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than *merely disjoin*; the *Adversative* disjoin, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the Adversative are *definite*; the Simple, *indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number Three is not*

an

it self to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, tho' multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice; such for instance, as the Diversity between the *Name* of a thing, and its *Definition*; between the *various Names* which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

ven Number, BUT *an odd*, we not only Ch. II.
 in two opposite Attributes, but we de-
 ly affirm one, and deny the other.
 when we say, *The Number of the*
is EITHER even OR odd, tho' we assert
 Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to*
 et the Alternative notwithstanding is
 indefinite. And so much for *simple*
unctives (*k*).

As

The simple Disjunctive η , or *Vel*, is mostly
indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative.
 when it is used *definitely*, so as to leave no
 native, 'tis then a perfect Disjunctive of the
 quent from the Previous, and has the same
 with κ ϵ , or, *Et non*. 'Tis thus *Gaza ex-*
that Verse of Homer.

λομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σῶον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι,

Ιλ. Α.

is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND*
be destroyed, the Conjunction η being ἀναιρετικὸς,
blative. It must however be confessed, that this
 is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of
 ον, or αὐτῆς, concerning which see the Com-
 ators.

Ch. II. As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply **OPPOSITION**. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of *the same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot*, BUT *Cæsar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in *the same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist*, BUT *not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher*, BUT *Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called **ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES**.

BUT there are other *Adversatives*, besides these, as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful*, THAN *Achilles*—*Virgil was* AS GREAT

great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II.

The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence 'tis they may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON.

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are UNLESS and ALTHO'. For example—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it.* The Nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally *allied* to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason 'tis *opposed* to its *Preventive*. And as every *Cause* is either *adequate* (1) or *in-adequate* (in-adequate,

(1) This Distinction has reference to *common Opinion*, and the *form of Language*, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, *No Cause*, that is not *adequate*, is any *Cause* at all.

Ch. II. adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are express'd by such Adversatives, as *UNLESS*—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved, that this, This alone is sufficient to prevent it.* The *In-adequate* are express'd by such Adversatives, as *ALTHO'*—*Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it, that is, Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.*

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (*m*). They may be better perhaps called *ADVERSATIVES, ADEQUATE, and IN-ADEQUATE.*

AND thus it is that all *DISJUNCTIVES* that is *CONJUNCTIONS, which conjoin Sentences,*

(*m*) They called them for the most part without sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversative*, or *Εναντιωματικοί*.

tences, but not their Meanings, are either Ch. II.
SIMPLE OR ADVERSATIVE; and that all
ADVERSATIVES are either *Absolute* or *Com-*
parative; or else *Adequate* or *In-adequate*.


WE shall finish this Chapter with a few
miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed,
through all the Species of Dis-junctives,
that the *same* Dis-junctive appears to have
greater or *less* force, according as the sub-
jects, which it dis-joins, are more or less
dis-joined by Nature. For example, if
we say, *Every Number is even, OR odd—*
Every Proposition is true, OR false—nothing
seems to dis-join *more strongly* than the
Dis-junctive, because no things are in Na-
ture more *incompatible* than the Subjects.
But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle,*
OR Figure contained under three right lines
—the (OR) in this case hardly seems to dis-
join, or indeed to do more, than *distinctly*

Ch. II. to express the Thing, first by its *Name*,
 and then by its *Definition*. So if we say,
That Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, OR a
Ball—the Dis-junctive in this case, tends
 no farther to dis-join, than as it distin-
 guishes the *several Names*, which belong
 to the *same Thing* (n).

AGEN—the Words, *When* and *Where*,
 and all others of the same nature, such as,
Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c.
 may be properly called ADVERBIAL CON-
 JUNCTIONS, because they participate the
 nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions
 — of *Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin* Sen-
 tences;

(n) The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this
 occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdis-*
junctive; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris;*
Mars sive Mavors. The Greek *ἢ* seems to
 answer the same end. Of these Particles, *Scaliger*
 thus speaks—*Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivaram recte*
acceptum est, neque enim tam plane disjungit, quam Dis-
junctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Sub-
disjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis
tam; ut, Alexander sive Paris. De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

tences; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the CH. II.
Attributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*. 

AGEN — these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure* Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of *Time* and *Place*. And hence 'tis, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature; a *kind of middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (o).

AND

(o) 'Tis somewhat surprizing that the politest and most elegant of the *Attic* Writers, and *Plato* above all the rest, should have their Works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite Works, as well of our selves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found.

Ch. II. AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their
Genus, and their Species.

Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.

C H A P. III.

*Concerning those Connectives, called
Prepositions.*

PREPOSITIONS by their name express Ch. III.
their *Place*, but not their *Character*.
Their Definition will distinguish them from
the former Connectives. A PREPOSITION
*is a Part of Speech, devoid it self of Signifi-
cation, but so formed as to unite two Words
that are significant, and that refuse to co-
alesce or unite of themselves (a).* This con-
nective

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition, was
Προθετικός Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, *A Pre-
positive Conjunction*. Ὡς μὲν ἔν κ' κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως γίνονται
παρεμφατικά, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ ὧν κ' ἀφορμὴ ἔρη-
ται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τῷ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὸς
Συνδέσμος. Now in what manner even in other applica-
tions (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of
their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already;
whence too the Stoics took occasion to call them PRE-

Ch. III. negative Power, (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so *without help*, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In Nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus 'tis we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from *this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident*, arises the *Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective*. In like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions

POSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. *Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313.* Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gæz. L. IV. de Præposit. Prisc. L. XIV. p. 283.*

Passions with their Patients. Thus 'tis we Ch. III.
say, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered.*

Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius*. And hence, from *these Modes of natural Co-alescence*, arises *the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb*. Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized, as when we say of such Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned*, he *ran swiftly*, she was *very beautiful*, he was *moderately learned*, &c. And hence the *Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives*.

THE general Conclusion appears to be this. "THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE
" OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE
" ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF

Ch. III. "THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that *the great Objects of Natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.* Now tho' *Substances* naturally co-incide with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, *one with another (b).* And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies cannot possess the same place*; that *the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances*, &c.

FROM these Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive* without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Substance* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the *Energy* with the *Subject*, on
which

(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas, CÆSAR CATO PUGNAT. Scil. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.*

which it operates — WARMETH THE Ch. III.

EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*. —

THE SPLENDID SUN, — GENIALLY WARM-

ETH — THE FERTILE EARTH. But sup-

pose we were desirous to add other Sub-

stantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS.

How would these co-incide, or under what

Character could they be introduced? Not

as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both

those places are already filled; the Nomi-

native by the Substance, SUN; the Accusa-

tive by the Substance, EARTH. Not as

Attributes to these last, or to any other

thing; for *Attributes by nature they nei-*

ther are, nor can be made. Here then we

perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSI-

TIONS. By these we connect those Sub-

stantives to Sentences, which at the time

are unable to co-alesce *of themselves*. Let

us assume for instance a pair of these Con-

nectives, THRO', and, WITH, and mark

their Effect upon the Substances here men-

tioned,

Ch. III. mentioned. *The splendid Sun* WITH *his Beams genially warmeth* THRO' *the Air the fertile Earth*. The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Substantives* required, are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

IT must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of PLACE* (c). The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion, or at rest.

IT may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE

OR

(c) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ TO' ΠΟΤ' significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. d. Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.*

OF VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as Ch. III.
 much ONE by that general Comprehension,
 as is consistent with their several Natures,
 and specific Distinctions. Thus 'tis we
 have Prepositions, to denote the *contiguous*
Relation of Body, as when we say, *Caius*
walked WITH a Staff; *the Statue stood UPON*
a Pedestal; *the River ran OVER a Sand*;
 others for the *detached* Relation, as when
 we say, *He is going TO Italy*; *the Sun is*
risen ABOVE the Hills; *these Figs came*
FROM Turkey. So as to *Motion* and *Rest*,
 only with this difference, that *here* the Pre-
 position varies its character with the Verb.
 Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM*
the Ceiling, the Preposition, FROM, assumes
 a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say,
that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling, the
 Preposition in such case assumes a Charac-
 ter of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

— *To support uneasy Steps*

OVER the burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here OVER denotes *Motion*,

Agen

Ch. III. Agen —

—*He—with looks of cordial Love*
Hung OVER her enamour'd—Par. L. IV.

Here OVER denotes *Rest*.

BUT tho' the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual*, as *local*. Thus because in Place, he who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled OVER his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served UNDER such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought*; *without Attention*; *thinking over a Subject*; *under Anxiety*; *from Fear*; *out of Love*; *through Jealousy*, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind,

kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, Ch. III. like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in after Days, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual* Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (*d*).

IN

(*d*) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to *Anaxagoras*, Ὁμοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, Qualitas; to *Aristotle*, Ἐντελέχεια; to the *Stoics*, Οὐλὶς, κεράτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to special Meanings, to the *Platonics* we may ascribe Ἰδέα; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορεῖν; to the *Stoics*, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the *Pyrrhonists*, Ἐξεσι, ἰνδέχεται, ἐπίχω, &c.

And

Ch. III. In the foregoing use of Prepositions,
 we have seen how they are applied *κατά*
τάθεσιν, by way of *Juxta-position*, that is

to

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek* Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Style of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He, I say, that without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and tho' he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the Wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods, but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps 'tis impossible he should attain.

to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, Ch. III. without becoming a Part of it. But they may be used also *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, by way of *Composition*, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (*e*). Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐντιγινώσκω*, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Understand*. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other Instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of PLACE, (*f*) as used either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptance.

LASTLY,

(*e*) See *Gæz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpositione*.

(*f*) For example, let us suppose some given Space: E & EX, signify *out of* that Space; PER, *thro' it*, from beginning to end; IN, *within it*; SUB, *under it*.

Ch. III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature, being

it. Hence then E and PER, in composition *augment*, *Enormis*, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; *Dico*, to speak, *Edico*, to speak out, whence *Edictum*, an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence,

Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an Ἀνξήσις. *Fari*, to speak, *Effari*, to speak out—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all Men, and calling for universal Assent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. *Per magnus, Perutilis*, great throughout, useful thro' every part.

On the contrary, IN and SUB, diminish and lessen. *Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable*, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *Subniger, blackish, Subrubicundus, reddish*; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo, originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away

being converted into Adverbs, and used Ch. III.
in Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασε ὃ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

—*And Earth smil'd all around.*

Il. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power

away his purchase. INTER, *Between*, implies *Discontinuance*, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a *Discontinuance* of his vital Energy. So also *Perimo*, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, *Ἀναίρειν*, and the English Verb, *To take off*, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus 'tis that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before p. 205.

T

Ch. III. power is exprest by two Methods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; the *Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; the rest, by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Cases.

AS CASES, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present. Ch. IV.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a Case is, the *Periphrasis*, which sup-

Ch. IV. plies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analyzed into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*; *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.


WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted

adopted *to associate with their Prepositions*, Ch. IV. as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves 'tis frequently undistinguished.

THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no Case, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line A B.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or A D. Hence then they only called these Variations, Π Τ Ω' Σ Ε Ι Σ, CASUS, CASES, or

Ch. IV. FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) *to fall from the Mind, or discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ 'ΟΡΘΗ', CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, OR UPRIGHT CASE OF FALLING, such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the *Nominative*. When *it fell from the Mind under any of its variations*, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variation they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-
LONG FALLINGS (such as A C, or A D) in opposition to the other (that is A B) which was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, ΚΛΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, it
being

(a) See *Ammon*. in *Libr. de Interpr.* p. 35.

being a sort of *progressive Descent from the* Ch. IV.
Noun's upright Form thro' its various de-
clining Forms, that is, a Descent from
A B, to A C, A D, &c.

OF these CASES we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the NOMINATIVE, the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and the DATIVE.

IT has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural Concord* arises the *Logical Concord* of SUBJECT and PREDICATE, and the *Grammatical Concord* of SUBSTANTIVE and ATTRIBUTIVE (*b*). These CONCORDS in SPEECH produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being admitted,

(*b*) See before, p. 264.

Ch. IV. admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammarian's Substantive* are all denoted by that Case, which we call the **NOMINATIVE**. For example, *CÆSAR pugnāt*, *Æs fingitur*, *Domus ædificatur*. We may remark too by the way, that the *Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The *Action* implied in *pugnāt*, shews its *Nominative CÆSAR* to be an *Active efficient Cause*; the *Passion* implied in *fingitur*, shews its *Nominative Æs* to be a *Passive Subject*, as does the *Passion* in *ædificatur* prove *Domus* to be an *Effect*.

As therefore every *Attributive* would as far as possible conform itself to its *Substantive*, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its *Substantive*, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as — *CICERO est ELOQUENS*;

QUENS; VITIUM *est* TURPE; HOMO *est* Ch. IV.
 ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases, }
 (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to
 content itself with such assimilations as it
 has, those of Number and Person *; as
 when we say, CICERO LOQUITUR; NOS
 LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR.

FROM what has been said, we may
 make the following observations—that as
 there can be *no Sentence without a Sub-*
stantive, so that Substantive, if the Sen-
 tence be *regular*, is always denoted by a
Nominative—that on this occasion *all the*
Attributives, that have Cases, appear as
Nominatives also—that there may be a re-
 gular and perfect Sentence *without any of*
the other Cases, but that *without one Nomi-*
native at least, this is utterly impossible.
 Hence therefore we form its Character and
 Description—THE NOMINATIVE *is that*
Case, without which there can be no regu-
lar

What sort of Number and Person Verbs have,
 see before p. 170, 171.

Ch. IV. *lar (c) and perfect Sentence.* We are now
to search after another Case.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lyfippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit, Lyfippus fecit*. But tho' this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspense*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. 'Tis then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Lan—
guage

(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect* without a *Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Παρασυμβάματα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτει μετάρμελει, *Socratem pœnitet*, &c. — See before, p. 180.

guage have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch. IV.

Achilles vulneravit HECTOREM—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lysippus fecit* STATUAS—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

It has been said in the preceding Chapter (d), that when the Places of the Nominative

(d) See before, p. 265.

Ch. IV. *minative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends TO. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by *peculiar Terminations of their own*, which express their force, *without the help of a Preposition*. Now 'tis here we behold the Rise of the ancient Genitive, and Dative, the GENI-

FIVE *being formed to express all Relations* Ch. IV.
commencing FROM itself; THE DATIVE,
all Relations tending TO itself. Of this
 there can be no stronger proof, than the
 Analysis of these Cases in the modern
 Languages, which we have mentioned
 already (e).

'Tis on these principles that they say in
Greek—Δεομαι ΣΟΥ, διδωμι ΣΟΙ, *OF*
thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason
 is, in requests the person requested is one
 whom something is expected *from*; in
 donations, the person presented, is one
 whom something passes *to*. So again—
 Περσινται λιθου, *'tis made of Stone.* Stone
 was the passive Subject, and thus it appears
 in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from,*
or out of which. Even in *Latin*, where
 the Syntax is more formal and strict, we
 read—

Implentur

(e) See before, p. 275, 276.

Ch. IV. *Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferrina.* Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τὸ ὕδατος, is a Phrase in Greek; and, *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM OR OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. these are all of them RELATIVES, each of them being reciprocally a *Term* or *Point* to the other, from which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection* (*f*).

THE

(*f*) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often exprest by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφουσι

THE *Dative*, as it implies *tendency to*, Ch. IV. is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause to which all events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. 'Tis thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

———TIBI *suaveis dædala tellus*
Submittit flores——— Lucret.

———TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpios——— Virg. G. I.

———TIBI *serviat ultima Thule*
Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

Φοῦλα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δῦλός δεσπότι δῦλός, καὶ ὁ
δεσπότης δῦλός δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον
ἡμίσεός διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλάσιον ἥμισυ.
Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea,
quæ recipiuntur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus;
et dominus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii dup-
lum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. C. VII.

Ch. IV. tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

CHAP. V.

*Learning Interjections—Recapitulation—
Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech above Ch. V. mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the *Græks* are *Ω, Φεῦ, *Αι, &c. among the *Latins*, *Ab! Heu! Hei! &c.* among the *Greeks*, *Ab! Alas! Fie! &c.* These *Greeks* have ranged among their *Adjectives*; improperly, if we consider the *Adverbial* Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of *Attributive*. NOW INTERJECTIONS *co-exist with no Part of Speech, but are either used alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification.* The *Latins* seem there-

U

fore

Ch. V. fore to have done better in separating them
 by themselves, and giving them a name
 by way of distinction from the rest.

SHOULD it be ask't, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (*a*).

“ AND

(*a*) INTERJECTIONES a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum verum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. I. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complet. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis.

Nam

“ AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V.
 “ WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY
 “ THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT,
 U 2 “ WHEN

Nam cum hæc dicatur Conjunctio, quia conjungat; Interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ὁρίᾳ ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed gemitus & signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturæ, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per se—Papæ!—etiamsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores sepe separatim banc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motûs animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σκετλιασµὸν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsû per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

Ch. V. “ WHEN ASSOCIATED—*that those, significant by themselves, denote either SUBSTANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are called for that reason SUBSTANTIVES and ATTRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS—that the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or SECONDARY—that the Primary Attributives are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, ADVERBS—Agen, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES—that the Definitives are either ARTICULAR, or PRONOMINAL—and that the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS or CONJUNCTIONS.*”

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE, AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS, which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry^(b).
BUT

(b) See before p. 7.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V. hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—" *Is there*
" *no speaking then without all this trouble?*
" *Do we not talk every one of us, as well*
" *unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-*
" *sants, as profound Philosophers?*" We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peasants use the Levar and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation

Ch. V. tion—of our very Senses and Intellect,
 by which we perceive every thing else—
 THAT they are, we all know, and are
 perfectly satisfied—WHAT they are, is
 a Subject of much obscurity and doubt.
 Were we to reject this last Question, be-
 cause we are certain of the first, we should
 banish all Philosophy at once out of the
 world (c).

BUT a graver Objecter now accosts us.
 “ *What* (says he) *is the UTILITY?*
 “ *Whence the Profit, where the Gain?*”
 Every Science whatever (we may an-
 fwer)

(c) Ἄλλ' ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν οὕτων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὑπερὶν
 ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν ὑσίαν· ὥστε
 ἢ κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος.
 Ἐκαστὴ γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνωρίμον καὶ ἀναμφί-
 λεκτον· τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑσία, τῶν χαλεπωτά-
 των ὁραθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχή·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμωτάτον καὶ φανε-
 ρώτατον· τί δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, καὶ ῥᾶδιον καταμαθεῖν
 Ἀλεξανδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β'. p. 142.

swer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent Ch. V.
for gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for
measuring of Estates; Astronomy, for
making of Almanacks; and Grammar
perhaps, for drawing of Bonds and Con-
veyances.

THUS much to the *Sordid*—If the
Liberal ask for something better than this,
we may answer and assure them from the
best authorities, that every Exercise of the
Mind upon Theorems of Science, like
generous and manly Exercise of the
Body, tends to call forth and strengthen
Nature's original Vigour. Be the Sub-
ject it self immediately lucrative or not,
the Nerves of Reason are braced by the
mere Employ, and we become abler
Actors in the Drama of Life, whether
our Part be of the buſier, or of the
ſedater kind.

Ch. V, *PERHAPS too there is a Pleasure even in Science it self, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of Body desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? And have not Health and Strength of Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of fordid Emolument? Why should there not be a Good (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere Energy of our Intellect, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, why they pursue such things; but if they answer, they pursue them, because they are Good, 'twould be folly to ask them farther, WHY they PURSUE what is Good.*

It might well in such case be replied on Ch. their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) *that if there was not something GOOD, which was in no respect USEFUL, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence.* For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and that if there were NO ENDS, there could be of course NO MEANS.


It should seem then the Grand Question was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say, *what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for it self*; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

IN the mean time 'tis plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures,

A m m m

Ch. V. Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the *subordinate* kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublimest* of all Objects? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures
in

in its Energy, when we allow them to the Ch. V.
grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? 
Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods
were to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Sort be defended, as rationally as
any of them? Whatever may be urged in
behalf of the rest (for we are not now
arraigning them) we may safely affirm of
INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that 'tis " the
" Good of that Part, which is most ex-
" cellent within us; that 'tis a Good ac-
" comodated to all Places and Times;
" which neither depends on the will of
" others, nor on the affluence of external
" Fortune; that 'tis a Good, which de-
" cays not with decaying Appetites, but
" often rises in vigour, when those are no
" more (*d*)."

THERE is a Difference, we must own,
between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral*
Virtue.

(*d*) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

Ch. V. Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more HUMAN, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, 'twould be impious to suppose THE DEITY to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So we are assured from Scripture it self. What then may we suppose the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a be-

6 coming

coming reverence, what more likely, than Ch. V.
A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST
INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-
COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELLEC-
TION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO OTHER
THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? For
 in pure INTELLECTION it holds the reverse
 of all Sensation, that THE PERCEIVER AND
 THING PERCEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND
 THE SAME (e).

'Twas

(e) 'Εἰ ὅν ὅτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς
 αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον·
 ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νῦ ἐνέρ-
 γεια, ζωή· Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ'
 αὐτήν, ἐκείνη ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. Φαμέν δὲ τὸν
 Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδῖον, ἄριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνε-
 χῆς καὶ αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ· ΤΟῦΤΟ γὰρ Ὁ
 ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ Φυσ' Α'. Ζ'. 'Tis re-
 markable in Scripture that God is peculiarly cha-
 racterized as A LIVING GOD, in opposition to all
 false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no
 pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than
 that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were no-
 thing better than illustrious Men, whose existence
 was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.

To

Ch. V. **T**WAS Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—" That the Man, " who could live in the pure enjoyment " of his *Mind*, and who properly cultivated that *divine* Principle, was *happiest* " in himself, and *most beloved by the Gods*. " For if the Gods had any regard to " what past among Men (as it appeared " they had) 'twas probable they should " rejoice in *that which was most excellent*, " and by nature *the most nearly allied to* " *themselves* ; and, as this was MIND, " that they should requite the Man, who " most loved and honoured *This*, both " from

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Ἀπὸ τοῦ δὲ νοῦ ὁ νῦν κατὰ μετάληψιν τῷ νοητῷ νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, θεογένειαν καὶ νοῦν ὥστε ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΝΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.

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“ from his regard to that which was Ch. V.
“ *dear* to themselves, and from his act-
“ ing a Part, which was laudable and
“ right (*f*).”

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is some-
thing *valuable for itself*, because it con-
tains within it something which is *divine*.

(*f*) Ἡθικ· Νικομαχ· τὸ Κ'. κεφ. η'.

End of the SECOND BOOK.

H E R-



HERMES:

OR, A

Philosophical Inquiry

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I.
thro' the BODY; as for example, {
the various Works and Energies of
Art. Others it performs *without such Me-*
diūm; as for example, when it thinks,
and reasons, and concludes. Now tho'
X the

Ch. I. the Mind, in either case, may be called
 { the Principle or Source, yet are these last
 more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as
 being immediately referable to its own in-
 nate Powers. And thus is MIND *ulti-*
mately the Cause of all; of every thing at
 least that is *Fair* and *Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more im-
 mediately its own, that of *mental Separation*
 may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal*
 Separations, however accurate otherwise,
 are in one respect incomplete, as they may
 be repeated without end. The smallest
 Limb, severed from the smallest Animal-
 cule (if we could suppose any instrument
 equal to such dissection) has still a triple
Extension of length, breadth, and thick-
 ness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps
 many other qualities; and so will continue
 to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But
 the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concre-*
tion, and can place in the simplest manner
 every

BOOK THE THIRD.

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every Attribute by itself; convex without Ch. I.
concave; colour without superficies; su-
perficies without Body; and Body without
its Accidents, as distinctly each one, as
tho' they had never been united.

AND thus 'tis that it penetrates into the
recesses of all things, not only dividing
them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous*
Parts, but persisting, till it even separate
those *Elementary Principles*, which, being
blended together after a more mysterious
manner, are united in the *minutest Part*,
as much as in the *mightiest Whole* (a).

NOW if MATTER and FORM are among
these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be
esteemed as the *principal* among them, it
may not be foreign to the Design of this
Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any*
things analogous to them, may be found in

X 2

SPEECH

(a) See below p. 312.

Ch. I. SPEECH OR LANGUAGE (*b*). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(*b*) See before p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek "ΥΛΗ and ΕΪΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their Beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible, corporeal or concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Procefs.

The original meaning of the Word "ΥΛΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus *Homer*,

——Τρέμε δ' ἔρεε μακρὰ τῇ "ΥΛΗ,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the WOOD
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "ΥΛΗ, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the "ΥΛΗ or *Matter* of a Statue; Stone, the "ΥΛΗ or *Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other

EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I.
natural or artificial, is in its constitution

com-

other Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the vulgar MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptance. With these, every thing was called "ΤΛΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else*; or of *being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brass* the "ΤΛΗ of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "ΤΛΑΙ of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "ΤΛΑΙ of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "ΤΛΑΙ of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power, (τὰ ἔκ τῆς φύσεως) such as Wealth and Poverty, Ho-

Ch. I. compounded of something COMMON, and
 something PECULIAR; of something Com-
 mon,

nour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the *ἡλαι*, or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these. (Vid. *Arr. Epict.* L. I. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII, 29. VII, 29. X, 18, 19. where the *ἡλικόν* and *Ἀλιώδες* are opposed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be *ἀσώματος*, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a *Νῦς ἡλικός*, a *material Mind or Intellect*. This to modern Ears may possibly sound something harsh. Yet if we translate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original and native Power of Intellection*, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of *ἡλη*, or *MATTER*. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144. b. 145.

As to *Εἶδος*, its original meaning was that of FORM or FIGURE, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from *Εἶδω* to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

Now

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mon, and belonging to many other things; Ch. I.
and of something *Peculiar*, by which it
is

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)* was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its $\Upsilon\lambda\eta$ or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or *FORM*. Thus not only *the Shape* given to the Brass was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine; *the orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance; *the just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner *the rational and accurate Conduct* of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—*FORMAM quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitares sapientiæ, &c.* De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to

Ch. I. is distinguished, and made to be its true
and proper self.

HENCE

our Eyes, this supreme Intelligence has been called Εἶδος Εἰδῶν, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth ; and as imparting to every Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing* else.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, 'tis in the *uniting* of these, that every thing, which is generable, may be said to *commence* ; as on the contrary, in their *Separation*, to *perish* and *be at an end*—that while they co-exist, 'tis not by *mere juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Coincidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute ; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large ; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans*—

Even

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of

a

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed subjunctam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. — HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ

Ch. I. a Fountain, or the dailings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is* a SOUND. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language a MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is *essential*. Agen, Language, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from* NATURE, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from* COMPACT (c).

FROM

intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam formam generis Formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

(c) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences made it a part of their character to be significant

FROM hence it becomes evident, that **Ch. I.**
LANGUAGE, taken in the most compre-
 hensive view, *implies certain Sounds, having*
certain Meanings; and that of these two
 Principles, the **SOUND** is as the **MATTER**,
 common (like other Matter) to many dif-
 ferent things; the **MEANING** as that pecu-
 liar and characteristic **FORM**, by which
 the Nature or Essence of Language be-
 comes complete.

κατὰ συνθήκην, by Compact. See *Aristot. de Interpret.*
 c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the Words *κατὰ συνθήκην*,
ad placitum, or *secundum placitum*, and thus explains
 them in his comment—**SECUNDUM PLACITUM**
vero est; quod secundum quandam positionem, placitum-
que ponentis aptatur: nullum enim nomen naturaliter
constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subiecta res à na-
turâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncu-
patur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione
vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis sylla-
bisque conjungens, singulis subiectarum rerum substantiis
dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

CHAP. II.

*Upon the Matter, or common Subject of
Language.*

Ch. II. **T**HE *ΥΛΗ* OR MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this *ΥΛΗ* or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect (a).*

As

(a) This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis,

As the Causes of this Percussion are Ch. II. various, so from hence *Sound* derives the Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand Species of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or *Inanimate*.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But that,

Hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δὲ, τῷ μείζονι τῷ τε Φωνούνῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκρόνῳ αἶρος πληττομένῳ σφαιροειδῶς, ἴσα κυμαλουμένα, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτουσι, ὡς κυμαίνεται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τῷ ἐμβληθέντι λίθῳ.—*Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitated auribus insuit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitur lapide.* Diog. Laert. VII.

Ch. II. that, *which they make by proper Organs,*
in consequence of some Sensation or inward
Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a
VOICE.

As Language therefore implies that
Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may
perceive that *to know the Nature and*
Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact *to*
know THE MATTER or common Subject of
Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should
seem of all other Animals, is formed by
certain Organs between the Mouth and the
Lungs, and which Organs maintain the
intercourse between these two. The
Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice
is formed; and the Mouth, when the
Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are,
is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers
and

and Anatomists. Be this as it will, 'tis **Ch. II.** certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple VOICE* being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. For **ARTICULATION** is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires to these Characters
certain

Ch. II. certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned, not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. L. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. §. 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as 'tis modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the Preference to *themselves*.

The following Account from *Ammonius* will shew whence the Notions in this Chapter are taken, and what

THE *simplest* of these new Characters Ch. II.
are those acquired thro' the mere Openings
of

what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from
mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from
SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστὶ, πληγὴ αἵρος αἰσθητὴ
ἀκοῇ· ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμφύχου γινόμενος,
ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τῷ θώρακι ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ
τῷ πνεύμονι ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς αἷρ προσπίπῃ ἀθρώως τῇ
καλυμένη τραχείᾳ ἀρήρῃα, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώα, ἥτοι τῷ
γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀπολείῃ τινα ἤχον
αἰσθητὸν, καὶά τινα ὁρμήν τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλυμένων ὀργάνων
συμβαίνει, ὅισι αὐλῶν καὶ σφύγγων τῆς γλώττης,
καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑ-
ΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκάων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠ-
ΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἢ πάντως συμβαλλομένων. —

*Estque Sonus, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox
autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis
compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus
in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut
gargulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensi-
bilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in
instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ ἢ μουσικῶν
dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit,*


Ch. II. *of the Mouth*, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. 'Tis the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and 'tis from hence they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal (c)*, and *easy to be founded of themselves alone*.

THERE

cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sunt: ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant. Animum in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b.

It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of the *Peripatetics*) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be — Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by *Priscian*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be — Ἀπὸ ὧν ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, *Air struck* (and so made audible) *by some animal impulse*; and HUMAN OR RATIONAL SOUND they defined — Ἐναρθρὸς καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἰκπεμπομένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty*. *Diog. Laert. VII. 55.*

(c) ΦΩΝΗΝΤΑ.

THERE are *other articulate Forms*, which Ch. II.
 the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, 
 but by *different Contacts of its different*
parts; such for instance, as by the Junction
 of the two Lips, of the Tongue with the
 Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate,
 and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, un-
 less some Opening of the Mouth either
 immediately precede, or immediately fol-
 low, would rather lead to Silence, than
 to produce a Voice; hence 'tis, that with
 some such Opening, either previous or
 subsequent, they are always connected.
 Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so*
produced are called CONSONANTS, because
 they sound not of themselves, and from
 their own powers, but *at all times in*
company with some auxiliary Vowel (d).

Y 2

THERE

(d) ΣΤΜΦΩΝΑ.

Ch. II. **THERE** are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

'Tis enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELEMENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived.

(*e*) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἐστὶ δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἰσχαλὸν ἀναλύεσθαι. *An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176.* What Aristotle says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγχεσθαι ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαφεύται ἰσχαλὰ· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐτέρας τῇ γίδει αὐτῶν. *The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaphys. V. chap. 3.*

derived, and into them resolved. Under Ch. II. their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

AND thus is it that to Principles *apparently* so trivial (*f*), as about twenty plain elementary

(*f*) The *Egyptians* paid divine honours to the Inventor of *Letters*, whom they called ΤΗΕΥΤΗ; and *Socrates*, when he speaks of him, considers him either as a *God*, or as some *Godlike Man*. Plat. Phileb. T. 2. p. 18. Edit. Serran.

We shall here add a remarkable passage from *Aristotle*, which shews in what estimation he held PRINCIPLES, and what difficulty he imagined to attend their invention. ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ γὰρ ἴσως ἈΡΧΗ παύλος, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ ΧΑΛΕΠΩΤΑΤΟΝ· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράζουσιν τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτω μικρότατον ἐν τῷ μεγέθει, χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶν ἐφθῆναι· τάς τε δὲ ἐνρημένους, ῥᾶον τὸ προεῖναι καὶ συνάξειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστιν. *Nam Principium fortasse est maxima totius pars, ut dici solet: ideoque est difficillimum.* Cum

Ch. II. elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

It appears from what has been said, that THE MATTER OF COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds called VOICES ARTICULATE.*

WHAT remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM; that is to say, Language consider'd, not as a Sound, but as a Meaning.

enim quo potentiore est facultate, eo minore fit magnitudine, difficillimum est visu. Hoc autem reperto, facilius est adjungere et conferre quod reliquum est. De Sophist. Elench. c. 34.

C H A P. III.

*Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of
Language.*

WHEN to any articulate Voice there Ch. III.
accedes *by compact* a Meaning or
Signification, such Voice by such acces-
sion is then called A WORD; and many
Words, possessing their Significations (as
it were) *under the same Compact* (a), unite
in constituting a PARTICULAR LAN-
GUAGE.

Y 4

IT

(a) See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I.
Treatise II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Antoninus* is re-
markable—*Καθάπερ ἔν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι,*
φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θίσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν
ξόλοι, φύσει, καὶ δὲ θόρα, θέσει. Ἰτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν,
φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θίσει.—
καὶ ἴσκει τὴν μὲν Φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὁργανὸν ἵσταν τῶν
ψυχικῶν

Ch. III. *It appears from hence, that A Word may be defined a Voice articulate, and significant*

ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμειν γνωστικῶν, ἢ ὁρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν, (ἕκτι φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θίσει) ἰσχυρίζομαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνον τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτου μετέχει ψυχῆς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τεχνικῇ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλοῖται δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συνιστάμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρων. *In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the Power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the things thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul,*
which

significant by Compact — and that LAN-CH. III.
 GUAGE may be defined a *System of such*
Voices, so significant.

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars,

AND

which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. 2.

It must be observed, that *the operating artificially*, (*ἡγεῖν τεχνηῶς*) of which Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I, p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, &c.

Ch. III. AND yet it may be doubted, how far
 this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images*
 are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow,
 that whoever has natural faculties to know
 the Original, will by help of the same
 faculties know also its Imitations. But it
 by no means follows, that he who knows
 any Being, should know for that reason
 its *Greek* or *Latin* Name.

THE Truth is, that every Medium
 thro' which we exhibit any thing to
 another's Contemplation, is either derived
 from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is
 an IMITATION; or else from *Accidents*
quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYM-
 BOL (*b*).

Now,

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜ-
 ΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τῇ φύσει αὐτῆς
 τῷ πράγματι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεται βέλτε-
 ρος ἢ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἧμιν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
 ἰσότητι

Now, if it be allowed that in far the Ch. III.
greater part of things, not any of their
natural

εἰκόνι γεγραμμένῳ τῷ Σωκράτους ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ Φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ Σωκράτους, ἔκείτ' ἂν αὐτῷ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἥτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ὁ Φιλόσοφος αὐτῷ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ἔλκει ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφισταμένου τῆς ἡμέτερας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τῷ πότῃ δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς πολεμῦντας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι καὶ σάλπιγξ ἀπήχησις, καὶ λαμπάδος ῥίψις, καθάπερ Φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείδη πυρὸς, ὡς τυρσηκῆς
Σάλπιγξ ἦχος, σῆμα Φοινῖου μάχης.

Δύναται δὲ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόρατος ἀνάσσειν, καὶ βέλους ἀφίπειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION or RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for Socrates in a Picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the projecting Eyes, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our own imagination. Thus for example, as to the time
when

Ch. III. *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and yet thro' such Voices are things of every kind exhibited, it will follow that WORDS *must of necessity be* SYMBOLS, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

But here occurs a Question which deserves attention—" Why in the common
 " intercourse of men with men have
 " Imitations been neglected, and Symbols
 " preferred, altho' Symbols are only
 " known by Habit or Institution, while
 " Imitations are recognized by a kind of
 " natural Intuition ?" — To this it may be answered, that if the Sentiments of the
 Mind,

when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

*But when the flaming Torch was bur'd, the sign
 Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)*

or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.

Mind, like the Features of the Face, were Ch. III.
 immediately visible to every beholder, the
 Art of Speech or Discourse would have
 been perfectly superfluous. But now,
 while our Minds lie inveloped and hid,
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
 thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled,
 when we communicate our Thoughts,
 to pass them to each other *thro' a Medium*
which is corporeal (c). And hence it is
 that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and
 Symbols must needs be *sensible*, and ad-
 dressed *as such* to the Senses. Now THE
 SENSES, we know, never exceed their
 natural Limits ; the Eye perceives no
 Sounds ;

(c) Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ἵσται τῶν
 σωμάτων, ἡδυνάτω δὲ αὐτῶν τῶν νεημάτων σημαίνειν
 ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα· Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέσθαι,
 δίκην ἑφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερόν, ἐδεήθησαν
 τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα.
Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi
conceptionibus significare possent : cum autem corporibus
involuti sint, perinde ac nebula, ipsorum intelligendi vis
obtegitur : quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res in-
ter se significarent. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18. a.

Ch. III. Sounds ; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by *Symbols* but by *Imitations*, as far as things are characterized by Figure and Colour, our Imitation would be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason, be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

IF we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in opposition to *such Imitation* ; if we consider the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other ; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue ; and a Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length

length of Imitations; if we remember Ch. III.
 that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed “ Why, in the common
 “ intercourse of men with men, Imita-
 “ tions have been rejected, and Symbols
 “ preferred.”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirror exhibits their Figures and their Colours.* For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant;* if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—

'tis

Ch. III. 'tis impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium* and *themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL (*d*).

'Tis true indeed, when *Primitives* were once established, 'twas easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, 'twas certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watry*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the *Primitives* themselves might not be commuted, 'twill be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others.

(*d*) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

others. We may here also see the Reason, Ch. III. why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature ; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—If it be answered, OF THINGS, the Question returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us*—to this, 'tis replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGEN, if all Words are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to

Z

more

Ch. III. more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which Missionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the *Chinese*.

AGEN, *if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.*

AGEN,

AGEN, *if all Words are proper Names*, Ch. III.

Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow

t in Language there can be no *General*

Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis

Terms are particular; nor any *Affirma-*

e Proposition, because *no one Individual*

nature is another. It remains, there can

no Propositions, but *Particular Nega-*

es. But if so, then is Language in-

able of communicating *General Affirma-*

e Truths—If so, then of communicating

demonstration—If so, then of communi-

ing *Sciences*, which are so many Systems

Demonstrations—If so, then of com-

municating *Arts*, which are the Theorems

Science applied practically—If so, we

ll be little the better for it either in

eculation or in Practice (*e*). And so

much

(*e*) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may
called the basis of Mathematical Science) is
nded upon *general Terms*, and *general Proposi-*

Ch.III. much for this Hypothesis; let us now try
 another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then OF WHAT IDEAS?—OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several *Ideas*,
 which

tions, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
 Neve Negativis, rectè concludere si vis.*

which *Particulars* imprint, must be needs Ch. III.
as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are them-
selves.

If then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains. —And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS? —We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas — belonging to the Words, *Man, Lion, Cedar*. —Admit it, and what follows? —It follows, that if *Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, tho' they meddle not with *proper Names*.

It follows that *one Word* may be, not homonymously, but *truly and essentially com-*

Ch. III. *mon to many Particulars*, past present and future ; so that however these Particulars may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithstanding may be *definite* and *steady*. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chinese* Absurdity *.

AGEN, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands *for the same general Ideas*, may be as intelligible *now*, as it was *then*. The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Objects.

AGEN, it follows that Language may be expressive of *general Truths* ; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and
Arts ;

* See p. 338.

Arts; and if so, become subservient to Ch. III.
 purposes of every kind (*f*).

Now if it be true “that none of these
 “things could be asserted of Language,
 “were not Words the Symbols of *general*
 “*Ideas*—and it be further true, that these
 “things may be all undeniably asserted of
 “Language”—it will follow (and that
 necessarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYM-
 BOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

AND yet perhaps even here may be
 an Objection. It may be urged, if Words
 are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language
 may answer well enough the purpose of
 Philosophers, who reason about *general*,
 and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes
 of the business of ordinary Life? Life we
 know is merged in a multitude of *Parti-*
culars, where an Explanation by Language

Z 4

is

(*f*) See before Note (*e*).

Ch. III. is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems.

~~~~~ The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End.

How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas* ?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life ; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationaly* explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first thro' *general Terms* learnt those *general Theorems*, that respect the doctrine and practice of Measurement ?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector — suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which 'twas not possible*  
*far*

*for mere Generals to be susceptible—sup-Ch. III.*  
pose, I say, such an Objection, what should  
we answer? — *That the Objection was*  
*just; that 'twas necessary to the Perfec-*  
*tion and Completion of LANGUAGE, that*  
*it should be expressive of PARTICULARS,*  
*as well as of GENERALS.* We must how-  
ever add, that its *general* Terms are by  
far its most *excellent* and *essential* Part,  
since from these it derives “ that com-  
“ prehensive *Universality*, that just pro-  
“ portion of *Precision* and *Permanence*,  
“ without which it could not possibly  
“ be either learnt, or understood, or ap-  
“ plied to the purposes of Reasoning  
“ and Science;”— that *particular* Terms  
have their Utility and End, and that  
therefore care too has been taken for a  
supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars,  
is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the  
least artificial, because *proper Names* be-  
ing

Ch. III. ing in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (*g*), whether we assume the *pro-nominal*, or those *more strictly* so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude*, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say, in other Words, which by the small Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general Terms*, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number *finite* to the accurate expression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term

to

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(*g*) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

to the denoting of some Particular. Let **Ch. III.** it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, A *Man—known*; I say, *THE Man—indefinite*; ANY *Man—definite*; A CERTAIN *Man—present and near*; THIS *Man—present and distant*; THAT *Man—like to some other*; SUCH A *Man—an indefinite Multitude*; MANY *Men—a definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND *Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY *Man—the same ones, taken with distinction*; EACH *Man—taken in order*; FIRST *Man, SECOND Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively*; ALL *Men—the Negation of this Multitude*; NO *Man*. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE SUM OF ALL IS, THAT WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY



“ guage this *double* (not ask, by way of re of reciprocal Comme *our Ideas*? Should framed, so as to expr Perception? Now ca ception intire and w either INTELECTION or SENSATION without how should Language our Perception, had it pres the Objects, prop two Faculties?

To conclude — As Chapter we considered view to its MATTER, considered it with a view

BOOK THE THIRD.

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dered as a *Voice* ; its FORM, as 'tis *signifi-* Ch. III.  
*cant of our several Ideas* ; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF  
ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF  
OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY,  
WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

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C H A P.

## C H A P. IV.

*Concerning general or universal Ideas.*

Ch. IV. **M**UCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged *in Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or *touched*.

*touched.* THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these Ch. IV.  
matters being of much the same Opinion, {  
in Philosophy looks no higher, than to  
*experimental Amusements*, deeming nothing  
*Demonstration*, if it be not made *ocular*.  
Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to  
*Intellect* (the natural progress of all true  
Learning) he hurries on the contrary into  
the midst of Sense, where he wanders at  
random without any end, and is lost in a  
Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence  
then the reason why the sublimer parts of  
*Science*, the Studies of MIND, INTELLEC-  
TION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES,  
are in a manner neglected; and, as if the  
Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or  
an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by  
*Experiment*, is deemed no better than  
*mere Hypothesis*.

AND yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, amid  
the prevalence of such Notions, that there  
should still remain two Sciences in fashion,  
and

Ch. IV, and these having their Certainty of all the *least controverted, which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment.* By these I mean ARITHMETIC, and GEOMETRY (a). But to come to our Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

## MAN'S

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(a) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these TWO SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther — I hold *all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of many repeated EXPERIMENTS.* But I must add withal, that the man who acts *from Experience alone*, tho' he act ever so well, is but an *Empiric* or *Quack*, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. 'Tis then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those Ch. IV.  
of the SENSES, in as much as they com-  
mence from his earliest Infancy. These  
Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least  
*indefinite*, and more *fleeting* and *transient*,  
than the very Objects, which they exhibit,  
because

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HENCE he adds SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to  
tell us, not only, *WHAT is to be done*, but *WHY 'tis*  
*to be done*; for ART is a composite of *Experience* and  
*Science*, Experience providing it *Materials*, and  
Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus  
necessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect  
to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have  
hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who  
ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being  
proved *experimentally*? 'Tis indeed by the applica-  
tion of *these* that *Experiments* are render'd useful;  
that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some  
degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing  
better than puerile amusements. But that these  
Sciences themselves should depend upon the Sub-  
jects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble  
were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle  
the Marble.

Ch. IV. because they not only depend upon the *existence* of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their *immediate Presence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of TIME (*b*).

BUT happy for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. THIS 'tis which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themselves are gone, and *all Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may  
be

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(*b*) See before p. 105. See also p. 112. Note (*f*).

be seen from hence. We have an *Imagi-Ch.IV.*  
*ation* of things, that are gone and ex-  
 inct; but no such things can be made ob-  
 jects of *Sensation*. We have an easy com-  
 mand, over the Objects of our *Imagina-*  
*tion*, and can call them forth in almost  
 what manner we please; but our *Sensa-*  
*tions* are necessary, when their Objects are  
 present, nor can we controul them, but  
 by removing either the Objects, or our-  
 selves (c).

As

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(c) Besides the distinguishing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are ΑΝΗΜΗ, and ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΙΣ, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view some such *relict*, and refer it *viz* to that *sensible Object*, which in time past was its cause and original, this is MEMORY.

A a 2

Lastly



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Lastly *the Road*,  
*series of Ideas*, however  
*casually*, this is *Re*  
*casually*, as well as *ra*  
nection is often suffici  
ment, I think of its  
tation; thence of *V*  
thence of *Ships*, *Sea-*

If the Distinction b  
not sufficiently underf  
being compared to th  
we contemplate a Port  
*it is the Portrait*, such  
to PHANSY. When  
*Original*, whom it repre  
analogous to MEMOR

We may go farther.  
may exhibit (after a m  
*come*. 'Tis here that  
pleasant, and all their

holds of the SOUL, with respect to *Sense* Ch. IV. and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptive* Power; IMAGINATION, its *retentive*. Had it Sense without Imagination, 'twould not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

THUS then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call SENSE (if we please) *a kind of transient Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the contrary *a kind of permanent Sense* (d).

A a 3

Now

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What we have said, may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot. de Animâ*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his *Treatise de Mem. et Reminisce.*

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ὃδε αὖ γνωρίζαιμεν· δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οἷον τύπου (lege τύπου) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ αἰσθητῷ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῷ αἰσθητῷ παρόντος, ὑπομένει τὸ καὶ σώζεσθαι, ὅν ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τις αὐτῷ, ὃ καὶ τῆς

Ch. IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

## AFTER

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τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι· τὸ τοῦτο ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοῦτου ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσιν. Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a reliet of that motion caused within us by the external object; a reliet, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of reliet and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. Alex. Aphrod. de Animâ, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch. IV.  
 Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures  
 subordinate made subservient to the higher.  
 Were there *no Things external, the Senses*  
 could not operate; were there *no Sensa-*  
*tions, the Imagination* could not operate;  
 and were there *no Imagination*, there could  
 be *neither Reasoning nor Intellection*, such  
 at least as they are found in *Man*, where  
 they have their Intensions and Remissions  
 in alternate succession,<sup>3</sup> and are at first no-  
 thing better, than *a mere CAPACITY or*  
*POWER*. Whether every Intellect begins  
 thus, may be perhaps a question; espe-  
 cially if there be any one of a nature *more*  
*divine*, to which "Intension and Remission  
 " and mere Capacity are unknown (*e*)."  
 But not to digress.

"TIS

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(*e*) See p. 162. The *Life, Energy*, or Manner of  
 MAN's Existence is not a little different from that of  
 the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in

Ch. IV. 'Tis then on these *permanent Phantasms*  
 that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and  
 by

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MOTION. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but 'tis likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourselves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the *LIFE or EXISTENCE* of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

'Tis to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσεως· καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστίν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μετὰβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκὺ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μετὰβολῆς· ἡ γὰρ ἀπλῆ, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those

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by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar Ch. IV.  
to its Nature, as the seeing of Colours is  
familiar

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*those who beligue so. For in the same manner as the  
bad man is one, fickle, and changeable, so is that Nature  
bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is  
neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14.*

'Tis to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE  
DEITY that Boethius refers, when he says in those  
elegant verses,

—*Tempus ubi Ævo*

*Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta  
moveri.*

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may  
be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine*  
*Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUP-  
TIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot. Physic.*  
VIII. *Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du-Val.*  
See also V. I. of these Treatises, p. 262. to 266—  
also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted  
at length.

It must be remembred however, that tho' we are  
not Gods, yet as *rational* Beings we have within  
us something *Divine*, and that the more we can  
become superior to our mutable, variable, and  
irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good,  
which is immutable, permanent, and rational, the  
higher

Ch. IV. familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once  
 what in MANY is ONE; what in things  
 DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR  
 and the SAME (f). By this it comes to  
 behold

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higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—*Ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power.* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς πᾶς ἡ βίη μακάριος τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. *For to THE GODS (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to MEN, 'tis so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy.* See *Plat. in Theætet. Arist. Eth. X. 8.*

(f) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. 'Tis this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. 'Tis certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but 'tis made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED; not an unknown Constitution of insensible Parts, but

behold a kind of *superior* Objects; a new Ch. IV.  
Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive  
than

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a *known* Constitution of *sensible* Parts, unless we  
chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or  
UNION?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one  
of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own  
province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of  
the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be  
Smell, but it would be Sight also. 'Tis the same  
in other instances. We must necessarily therefore  
recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to  
give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her *sub-*  
*ordinate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehensive*  
*Whole*, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which  
these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be  
allowed the expression) this *unifying* Power more  
conspicuous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH.  
By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general*  
*Idea in many Individuals*; *One Proposition in many*  
*general Ideas*; *One Syllogism in many Propositions*; till  
at length by properly repeating and connecting Syl-  
logism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright  
and *steady regions of SCIENCE*,

*Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis*  
*Adspargunt, &c.* Lucr.

Even



Ch. IV. than those of Sense ; a Race of Perceptions, *each one of which may be found intire and*

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Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so *necessary* is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *understood* by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as *hear* the sounds, without *knowing* the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both *hear* and *understand* the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.* That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION ?—The Answer is obvious ; 'tis by successive Portions of little and little at a time. When the first Word is *present*, all the subsequent are *absent* ; when the last Word is *present*, all the previous are *absent* ; when any of the middle Words are *present*, then are there some *absent*, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is *not*, (to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had

*and whole in the separate individuals of an* Ch. IV.  
*infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de-*  
*parting*

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had been, or never was to be. And so much for the Perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dissipated, fleeting, and detached*. — And is that of the MIND, similar? — Admit it, and what follows? — It follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *successively* and *apart*, than *many* distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true *by parts at a time*, but 'tis true of necessity *at once, and in an instant*. — What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY? — Where even does it reside, or what makes it? — Shall we answer with the Stagirite, Τὸ δὲ "ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΤ' ἢ τῶ ο' ΝΟΤ' ἔκαστον — If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible and successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible, and at once*.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the *Circumference*, Mind at the *Center*;

Ch. IV. *parting from the unity and permanence of  
its own nature.*

AND

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*Center* ; and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned ; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book ; that Resolution or Analysis, which enables us to *investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. 'Tis by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist ; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour consoated with Figure*, two Attributes, which the *Eye* can never view, but associated ? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any *coloured Body*.

Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no basis to stand on,  
were

AND thus we see the *Process by which* Ch. IV.  
 we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS; for the {  
 Perceptions

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were it not for this *separative* Power. They are both  
 conversant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about  
 CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic* about DIS-  
 CRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous*  
 Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By  
 separating from the infinite Individuals, with which  
 we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by  
 which they are all *diversified*, we leave nothing but  
 those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS,  
 which being combined make NUMBER, and are the  
 Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by separating  
 from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and  
 leaving it nothing but its *triple Extension of Length,*  
*Breadth, and Thickness*, (of which were it to be de-  
 prived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at  
 that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contem-  
 plation of whose properties makes the Science of  
*Geometry*.

By the same *analytical* or *separative* Power, we in-  
 vestigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of  
 which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an  
*enveloped Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION  
 CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSI-  
 TION

Ch. IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no  
 other. In these too we perceive the ob-  
 jects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE,  
 which can by no means be, but of *that*  
*which is general, and definite, and fixt (g).*  
 Here

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TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND  
 SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARI-  
 TIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING  
 NEGATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM  
 TO US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND  
 DIVERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.  
 —If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business  
 of Science as well to *compound* as to *separate*, may  
 we not say that those Philosophers took *Half* of  
 Wisdom for the *Whole*, who distinguished it from  
 Wit, as if WISDOM only *separated*, and WIT only  
*brought together*?—Yet so held the Philosopher of  
*Malmesbury*, and the Author of the *Essay on the*  
*Human Understanding*.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words 'ΕΠΙ-  
 ΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING,  
 may serve in some degree to shew the nature of  
 these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their  
 true and proper Objects. 'ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ νόμα-  
 ραι, διὰ τὸ 'ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ καὶ ὅρον τῶν πραγμάτων  
 εἶναι

Here too even *Individuals*, however of Ch. IV. themselves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge,

ἄγειν ἡμᾶς, τῆς ἀορισίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος ἀπάγουσα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμετέπτοια καταγίνεται. SCIENCE ('ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us ('ΕΠΙ' ΣΤΑ΄ΕΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (according to the Heracleitean Philosophy, which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that Flow and unceasing Mutation, supposed by Heracitus to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds—Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς 'ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ, ὡς ἀμφύβελόν ἐστι, καὶ μάλλον ἵστικε σημαῖν τι ὅτι 'ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν 'ΕΠΙ' τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ψυχρὰ, ἢ ὅτε συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very Words

B b already

Ch. IV. Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any Particular be

*already examined; and in the first place, the Word SCIENCE; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.*

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the *flowing* System of *Heraclitus* there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived 'ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐπιδας and μένειν, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See *Plato* as before p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to *Scaliger* for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, motus quidam est; SCIENTIA, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ 'ΕΠΙ' ἸΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, 'ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Siftitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ὄντος. Nam Latini quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis iidem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὤν. Sciens, ᾔσων ὤν. *Scal.* in *Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib I. p. 17.*

The

be said to be known, when by asserting it Ch. IV.  
to be a *Man*, or an *Animal*, or the like, {

we

The *English* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly *Knowledge*, as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where *Knowledge* resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm *Basis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support ?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting* powers of Perception, like the *Sense*, but rather as *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* COMPREHENSIONS. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* OBJECTS; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive strait as crooked, or crooked as strait; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonist* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—

Εἰ ἐστὶ γνώσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἔτι αὖ καὶ γνωστὰ ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν. *If there be a*



Ch. IV. we refer it to some such *comprehensive*, or  
 { *general Idea*.

Now 'tis of these COMPREHENSIVE and  
 PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PER-  
 CEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS  
 of all Languages, however different, are  
 the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as*  
*the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their*  
 SYMBOLS

KNOWLEDGE *more accurate than* SENSATION ; *there*  
*must be certain OBJECTS of such knowledge MORE*  
 TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth consider-  
 ing,—*What* these Objects are?—*Where* they reside?  
 —And *how* they are to be discovered?—Not by *ex-*  
*perimental Philosophy* 'tis plain ; for that meddles  
 with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and  
 mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational  
 speculation of *Mathematics* ; for this, at its very  
 commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We  
 can only add, that *if they reside in our own MINDS*,  
 (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm  
 they do not?) then will the advice of the *Satirist* be  
 no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

*Perf.*

SYMBOLS *express, not this or that set of* Ch. IV.

*Particulars only, but all indifferently, as* }  
*they happen to occur.* Were therefore the

Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred  
 to *York*, tho' new particular objects would  
 appear on every side, they would still no

more want a new Language to explain  
 themselves, than they would want new  
 Minds to comprehend what they beheld.

All indeed that they would want, would  
 be the *local proper Names*; which Names,  
 as we have said already \*, are hardly a part  
 of Language, but must equally be learnt  
 both by learned and unlearned, as often  
 as they change the place of their abode.

'Tis upon the same principles we may  
 perceive the reason, why the dead Lan-  
 guages (as we call them) are *now* in-  
 telligible; and why the Language of  
*modern England* is able to describe *antient*

B b 3

*Rome;*

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\* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch. IV. *Rome*; and that of *ancient Rome* to describe *modern England* (b). But of ~~these~~ matters we have spoken before.

§. 2. AND now having viewed *the process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence 'tis that these Ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET

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(b) As far as *Human Nature*, and *the primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are *the same* in all places, and have been so thro' all ages; so far all *Languages* share one common *IDENTITY*. As far as *peculiar Species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as *the positive Institutions of religious and civil Policies* are *every where different*; so far each *Language* has its peculiar *DIVERSITY*. To the *Causes of Diversity* here mentioned, may be added *the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for Ch. IV.  
the first time upon *some Work of Art*, as  
for example upon a Clock, and having  
sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart.  
Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea  
of what he had seen?—And what is it, *to*  
*retain such Idea?*—'Tis to have A FORM  
INTERNAL correspondent to THE EXTER-  
NAL; only with this difference, that the  
*Internal Form is devoid of the Matter;*  
*the External is united with it*, being seen  
in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to  
view *many such Machines*, and not simply  
to view, but to consider every part of them,  
so as to comprehend how these parts all  
operate to one End; he might be then  
said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE  
FORM, by which he would not only un-  
derstand, and know the Clocks, which he  
had seen *already*, but every Work also of  
B b 4 like

Ch.IV. like sort, which he might see *hereafter*.—

Should it be ask'd "*which of these Forms is prior, the External and Sensible; or the Internal and Intelligible;*" the Answer is obvious, that *the prior is the Sensible.*

THUS then we see, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther still.—If these Machines be allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of *an Artist*, they must be the Work of one, who *knew what he was about*. And what is it, to work, and know what one is about? —'Tis to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess A FORM INTERNAL, correspondent to the EXTERNAL, to which external it serves for an EXEMPLAR or ARCHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGIBLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE SENSIBLE

BLE FORM; *which, being truly prior as* Ch. IV. *well in dignity as in time, can no more* *become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.*

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; *one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second Order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent.* After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to *work*; thro' the second, the Works themselves *exist*, and are what they are; and in the third they become *recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation.* To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; *the first* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; *the second*, that of THE SUBJECT; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves view-  
1 ing

Ch. IV. ing some diversified Prospect; “ a Plain,  
 “ for example, spacious and fertile; a  
 “ river winding thro’ it; by the banks  
 “ of that river, men walking and cattle  
 “ grazing; the view terminated with  
 “ distant hills, some craggy, and some  
 “ covered with wood.” Here ’tis plain  
 we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL.  
 And could any one quit so fair a Sight,  
 and retain no traces of what he had be-  
 held?—And what it is, *to retain traces*  
*of what one has beheld?*—’Tis to have cer-  
 tain FORMS INTERNAL correspondent to  
 the EXTERNAL, and resembling them in  
 every thing, *except the being merged in*  
*Matter.* And thus, thro’ the same *reten-*  
*tive and collective* Powers, the Mind be-  
 comes fraught with *Forms natural*, as be-  
 fore with *Forms artificial*.—Should it be  
 asked, “ *which of these natural Forms are*  
*prior, the External ones view’d by the*  
*Senses, or the Internal existing in the*  
*Mind;*” the Answer is obvious, that  
*the prior are the External.*

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as **Ch. IV.**  
in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE  
FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE  
SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the  
meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil  
est in INTELLECTU, quod non prius fuit in  
SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own  
to be so far allowable, as it respects the  
*Ideas of a mere Contemplator.*

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—Are  
*natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or  
BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*,  
not to lengthen our inquiry. They are  
certainly more exquisite than *any* Works  
of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring  
ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—  
Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of  
necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN  
implies MIND, wherever 'tis to be found.*  
—Allowing therefore this, what do we  
mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean  
*something*



Ch. IV. *something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.*

THAT such EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather, MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances, which are but their Copies or Pictures.

*tures.* That they are *mental* is plain, as Ch. IV. *they are of the Essence of MIND*, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time* or *Place*.

HERE then, on this System, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT (i).

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THAT

(i) *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the *Predicaments*, calls the *first Order* of these intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, *those previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐξηρημένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Universality or Sameness*; the *second Order* he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ κατὰ ἐξαρτάμενη κοινότης, *the subordinate Universality or Sameness*; lastly, of the *third Order* he says, that they have no independent

Ch. IV. *THAT the Previous may be justly so*  
*called is plain, because they are essentially*  
*prior*

pendent existence of their own, but that—*ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐνοαῖαις, καὶ ἑαυτὰ ὑπεστήσαμεν, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. Simp. in Prædic. p. 17.* In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—*Μήποτε οὐ τρίτῳ ληπτέον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηγούμενον τῶν καὶ ἑκάστα, καὶ αἰτίον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτῶ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ πρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆ αἰτίας τοῖς διαφόροις ἔδωκεν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐνοαῖαις ἐκ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφίσταμενον, ὑπερογενὲς οὐ—*  
*Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two, Ibid. p. 21.*

To

prior to all things else. The whole visible world exhibits nothing more, than

so

To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easily to be procured.

Ἐποσιδῶ τοῖνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκτύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγιζέτω τοὺς κηρὸς πάντας· ὕστερον δὲ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπιστήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰσὶν ἐκτύπωματος, ἔχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκτύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοῖνυν σφραγὶς ἢ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ' ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ἘΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἢ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀπομαξαμένῳ, ἘΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ ὕστερογενής. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐποσιδῶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργός, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πρὸς δ' ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιῇ. Εἰ δέ τις ἐνσαΐη λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη, ἀκούετω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῷ δημιουργούμενα, ἢ οὐκ εἰδὼς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, οὐκ ἂν δημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ποιῆσαι

τι,

Ch. IV. so many *passing* Pictures of these *immutable*  
*Archetypes*. Nay thro' these it attains even


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τι, ἀγνοῖ δὲ μέλλει ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ· (ἔθελ καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐκ ἐπιστάουσα γνωστικῶς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) ἐν δέ τι καὶ ἔξω λογικῶν ποιεῖ, ὁδῶν τε πάντας τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτῷ. Ἐν τοῖς μὴ χθίρσιν, ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον· ἐν δὲ δίδει ὁ παῖς, αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὡς ἔστι ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἴδια. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλῷ τύπος· καὶ λέγεται τὸτο τὸ ἴδιον ΠΡΟ' ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, καὶ χωριστοῦ τῆς ὕλης. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· καὶ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ἘΝ ΤΟΓΣ ΠΟΛΛΟῖΣ ἱσχυαί, καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεωροῦμενοι δὲ τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπου, ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχουσιν, (ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ὕδατι ἰσχυαί, καὶ θεωροῦμεν τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαρξάμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ θανάτῳ· καὶ λέγεται τὸτο ἘΝ ΤΟΓΣ ΠΟΛΛΟῖΣ, ἔχουσιν μὲν τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ ὑπερογενῆς. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem inscriptam habeat: multae insuper cerae sunt, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quispiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum annulo inscriptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat, intelligentiâ remanserit, POST MULTA, et posterius genitum dicetur. Idem*  
*in*

*in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nescit, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quâdam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura. Ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat, non advertat: si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcumque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IM MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciamus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in monte nostrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicitur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphy. Introduct. p. 29. b.*

Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIFICALLY

Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ' ΤΩ'Ν ΠΟΛΛΩ'Ν, 'ΕΝ ΤΟΙ'Σ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ'Σ, 'ΕΠΙ' ΤΟΙ'Σ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ'Σ· οἷον ἰννοεῖδω τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχου καὶ ἐκλύπωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ οὗ κηρία πολλὰ μετὰ λαβέτω τῷ ἐκλύπωμαίῳ, καὶ τις ὑπ' ὧν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκαλιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον· ἰσχυρῶς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκλύπωμα, καὶ ἐπιστάσας ὅτι πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ μετέχουσιν ἐκλύπωμαίῳ, καὶ τὰ δοκῦντα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἔχελω τῆτο κατὰ διάταξιν. Τὸ μὲν ἔν σφραγιστήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ' ΤΩ'Ν ΠΟΛΛΩ'Ν· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, 'ΕΝ ΤΟΙ'Σ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ'Σ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν κατὰ λαβὴν, καὶ κατὰ διάταξιν αὐτῶς ὑποστάν, 'ΕΠΙ' ΤΟΙ'Σ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ'Σ. Οὕτως ἔν καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ΠΡΟ' ΤΩ'Ν ΠΟΛΛΩ'Ν μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν λόγον· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ οὐσιοποιοὶ λόγοι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναικίως προῦφεισθήκασιν, καθ' οὓς λόγος ὁ ὑπερέστι· τὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ προῦφεισται καὶ παρήγαγεν. Ὑπερέκειναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη 'ΕΝ ΤΟΙ'Σ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ'Σ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδος ἐστίν, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τῷ ἵππῳ εἶδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ, καὶ ἵπποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένος εὐρίσκειται τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὁμοῦ καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολικώτερον γένος, τὸ αἰδηλικόν, ἐξελάττειται· συναχθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, θεωρεῖται τὸ ἐμψύχον· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ἐθέλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν

CALLY ONE, amid those infinite particular Ch. IV.  
changes, 

ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν καλῶφεται·  
συνδραμνῶν δὲ τοῖς ἱερημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων ὑσιῶν, τὸ  
πρῶτον γένεσθαι φαίνεται καὶ γενικώτατον· καὶ οὕτω μὲν  
ἘΝ ΤΟῖΣ ΠΟΛΛΟῖΣ ὑφέστηκε τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ  
γένη. Καταλαβὼν δὲ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων  
τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος  
ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἱππότητα, καὶ ἴτω τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπου,  
καὶ τὸν καθόλου ἵππου ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλου ζῶον ἐκ  
τῶν καθέκαστα τῶ λόγῳ συναγαγὼν· καὶ τὸ καθόλου  
αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἔμψυχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου  
σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ὑσίαν ἐξ ἀπάντων συλλο-  
γισάμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη  
καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτῶς, ὑπέστησεν ἘΠὶ ΤΟῖΣ ΠΟΛΛΟῖΣ,  
τελείς, μεία τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. Genera  
verò et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MUL-  
TIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum,  
quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejus-  
dem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis has  
proferat, nequaquam præviso sigillo. Cum autem  
vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et ani-  
madvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ  
videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegisset, hoc in  
mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE  
MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero  
ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit,  
POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE  
MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes.  
In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter



Ch. IV. changes, that befall it every moment (*k*).

MAY

*præ-existunt ; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam bahamam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maximè universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in sua mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introduct. C. IX. X.*

(*k*) THE following elegant lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

*Ergo*

MAY we be allowed then to credit those Ch. IV.  
speculative men, who tell us, " 'tis in  
" these

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi  
Excipiat: (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)*  
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET — G. IV.

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind* may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *Individuals* perish, the *several Kinds* still remain. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the Philosopher describes *TIME* to be — μένῳ δ' αἰῶν ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἴσταν αἰῶνος ἑκόντα. *Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem.* Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*. — *ÆTERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vitâ non amplius vivitis, quam*

Ch. IV. " *these permanent and comprehensive Forms*  
 " *that THE DEITY views at once, without*  
 " *looking*

*in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec cæperit unquam esse, nec desinat, vitæque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut æternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitæ licet vitæ spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxerit, id ÆTERNUM esse jure perhibetur : idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiunt visum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinæ Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitatæ, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STATUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque eum effingere, atque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentie decrescit*

“ looking abroad, all possible productions Ch. IV.

“ both present, past, and future—that this

“ great and stupendous View is but a View

“ of himself, where all things lie enveloped in

“ their Principles and Exemplars, as being

“ essential to the fulness of his universal In-

“ tellection?”—If so, 'twill be proper, that

we invert the Axiom before mentioned.

We must now say—*Nil est in SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLECTU.* For tho'

the contrary may be true with respect to

Knowlege merely human, yet never can

it be true with respect to Knowlege uni-

C c 4

versally,

---

*decrefcit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem nequeat poffidere, hoc ipfo, quòd aliquo modo nunquam effe definit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non poteft, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans fe ad qualemcumque præfentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quoniam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præftat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum eft, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cujus plenitudinem completi non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque, &c. De Confolat. Philofoph. L. V.*

Ch. IV. *versally, unless we give Precedence to ATOMS and LIFELESS BODY, making MIND, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.*

§. 3. 'Tis far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our later Metaphysicians. But yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence*.

FOR mark the Order of things, according to *their* account of them. First comes that huge Body, *the sensible World*. Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas*. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general*. Thus, should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till BODY gave it Ideas*, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more, *than,*

than a sort of dead Capacity; for *INNATE* Ch. IV.  
*IDEAS* it could not possibly have any. }

AT another time we hear of *Bodies* so exceedingly fine, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge*; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be *Bodies* any longer.

'Tis to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

BUT the *intellectual* Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing *corporeal* to the *primary mental Cause*. 'Tis here it looks for the origin of *intelligible Ideas*, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible Objects* may be the destined

Ch.IV. medium, to awaken the dormant Energies of *Man's* Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (1).

IN

(1) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before p. 371.) upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; which tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χεῖρα καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι  
 ἐπὶ τῶν κρείττονων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίσις ἐξηγή-  
 σαι πεῖθεσθαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰδησιν τῆς ἐπι-  
 στήμης, λέγομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ὅχι ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς  
 ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλου·  
 —κατὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ,  
 ὅτι δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορίσα-  
 μεθα γίνεσθαι, ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν αἰδητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν  
 ἀφικνούμεθα. *Those things, which are inferior and se-*  
*cundary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of*  
*the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common*  
*interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle*  
*of SCIENCE, we must however call it a Principle,*  
*not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it rouses our*  
*Soul*

IN short ALL MINDS, that are, are SI-CH. IV.  
MILAR and CONGENIAL ; and so too are  
*their*

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*Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas.—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.*

And in another passage he observes——'Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἄγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριδιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκειται ὧν ἑαυτὸν ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τούτους προβάλλει. *For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR ; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.*

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἶδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ὅγε ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὸς ἔχουσαν καὶ τελειώτερον ἐν ἐαυτῇ ἔχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ δὲ τελειώτερον τούτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον οὐκ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οἱ δ' αὖ μὴδαμὶ ἀλλόθι ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς φανερῶσαι· οὐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μὴδαμὶ οὕτως.



οὐκ οὐκ μὲν, ἄλλων  
 τινος, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ὁρεῖ  
 ἑτέρας τινος φύσεως πολλὰ  
 ἀφῆκεν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελε  
 λόγων. Those who suffer  
 the Soul, when she assumes  
 those Proportions, which e  
 them with a superior accu  
 to which they attain in the  
 superior Perfection or At  
 from sensible objects, as i  
 yet can she conceive it her  
 its having existence any wh  
 formed so as to conceive t  
 where, since even such opin  
 them compositions irregul  
 Non-Beings, but of variou  
 ther. It remains therefore  
 is superior to the Proportion  
 must descend to the Soul from  
 WHICH IS BY MANY DEG  
 AND PERFECT. Pleth.  
 Philosoph. Diff. Ed. 1. 1.

between Man and Man, or (what is more Ch. IV.  
important) between Man and God. }

FOR

Proportions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines, Angles, Figures, &c.* of all which *Λόγος* or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible* World.

To these two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hæc est efficiens magis  
Longè caussa potentior,  
Quam quæ materiæ modo  
Impressas patitur notas.  
Præcedit tamen excitans,  
Ac vires animi movens,  
Vivo in corpore passivæ.  
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,  
Vel vox auribus instrepit.,  
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,  
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,  
Ad motus simileis vocans,  
Notis applicat exteris,  
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS  
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. FOR what is Conversation between Mast  
 ~~~~~ and Man?—'Tis a mutual intercourse of  
Speaking and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker,
 'tis *to teach*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to learn*.—
 To the Speaker, 'tis *to descend* from *Ideas*
 to *Words*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to ascend*
 from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in
 this ascent, can arrive at *no* *Ideas*, then is
 he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to
Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is
 he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is
 requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?
 —That he should ascend to certain *Ideas*,
 treasured up *within himself*, correspondent
 and similar to those *within the Speaker*.
 The same may be said of a *Writer* and a
Reader; as when any one reads to day or to
 morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid*
 wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should
 be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they
 were

were only generated from *sensible* Objects, Ch. IV.
 infinite in number, ever changing, distant
 in Time, distant in Place, and no one
 Particular the same with any other ?

AGEN, do we allow it possible for GOD to signify his *will* to Men ; or for MEN to signify their *wants* to GOD ?—In both these cases there must be *an Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come ?—Those of *Men*, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come *God's Ideas* ?—Not surely from *Sensation* too ; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that notable *Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them then be *original* ; let them be *connate*, and *essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct) should*

I so

Ch. IV. *so happily co-incide in the same wonderful*
 Identity?

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *some have them original, and some derived*. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them original, *then are all Minds divine*, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one Mind* (at least) have *original* Ideas, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them? —From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *heterogeneous*? From MIND, such as (from the Hypothesis) has
original

original Ideas ; or from BODY, which we Ch. IV.
cannot discover to have any Ideas at all?—

An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. 'Tis thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum constare,*
animamque ;

or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings in divine numbers,

Ignæus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus.———

BUT 'tis now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them

D d prospects

Ch.IV. prospects both interesting and pleasant.
We have at present said as much as was
requisite to our Subject, and shall there-
fore pass from hence to our concluding
chapter.

C H A P. V.

Sub-ordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

ORIGINAL TRUTH (*a*), having the Ch. V.
 most intimate connection with *the*
supreme Intelligence, may be said (as it were)
 to

(*a*) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. 'Tis a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as 'tis remembred and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible* Objects, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have

Ch. V. to shine with unchangeable splendour; enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its

not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent*; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself*; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for ought we know) of *natural* materials, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If *Milton* by his URANIA intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

—————*Heav'nly*

its benign influence. Passions and other Ch. V. obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that *Subordination of Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

WE have daily experience in the works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much

D d 3

more

Heav'nly born!
 Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
 Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
 Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
 In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
 With thy celestial Song.— P. L. VII.

See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10. Marc.
 Automin. IX. 1.

Ch. V. more is this true, with respect to NATURE; and well for mankind is it found to be true, else never could we attain any *natural* Knowledge at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions of a Clock* are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every *natural Subject*?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνηο' ἀπίσιν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα
τῶν φρενῶν.

AND

AND thus by a connection perhaps little Ch. V. expected, the Cause of LETTERS, and that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it being the business of both *to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth (b).*

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must of course correspond to its *Archetype (c)*; how

(b) How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epict.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(c) ἩΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἵσ' τ' ἀνθρώπων
ΛΟΓΟΣ.


Ch. V. how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best* Ideas, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious* Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countrys different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Musick* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*.
Yet

Yet we have this advantage to compensate Ch. V.
the defect, that what we want in *Elegance*,
we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect
few Languages will be found superior to
our own.

LET us pass from ourselves to the
REGIONS OF THE EAST. The Eastern
World, from the earliest days, has been
at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy.
On them fair Liberty never shed its genial
influence. If at any time civil Discords
arose among them (and arise there did in-
numerable) the contest was never about
the Form of their Government; (for this
was an object, of which the Combatants
had no conception;) 'twas all from the
poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*,
whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a
Mahomet or a *Mustapha*.

SUCH was their Condition, and what
was the consequence? — Their Ideas be-
came



and the most f
empty exaggerat
of Kings as God
the meanest and
Nothing was eithe
ration, but every S
by incredible Hyp
sometimes ascend
Magnificent (d), tl
nerated into the *Ti*
Greeks too of Asia t
neighbours, who
not only their neigl

(d) The truest Sublim

sters; and hence that Luxuriance of the Ch. V. *Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philosophy*? — As a Nation, 'twas none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to this Subject; a defect, which even *Cicero* is compelled to confess, and more fully

Ch. V. fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of Terms, which he is obliged to invent (e). *Virgil* seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority

(e) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular *Tusc. Diss.* I. 3. where he says, PHILOSOPHIA *jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c.* See also *Tusc. Diss.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till CICERO applied himself to the writing of *Philosophy*, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of *Amasanius the Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to *Cicero* for *Philosophy*, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones, still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean* Poet LUCRETIVS, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the *Latin* writers of his own Sect; deriving all his *Philosophy*, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing *Philosophy in Latin*, both from the Po-

erty

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inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he Ch. V.
concludes at last with his usual majesty, }

Tu

erty of the Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject.

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus præsertim quom fit agendum,)
Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NO-*
VITATEM:

*Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet———* Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, VARRO, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatise concerning *Virtue*, much applauded by *Cicero*; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the Writers above mentioned came HORACE, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked among the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the Purity of their Style, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After *Horace*, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Augustus* to those of *Nero*, came the Satirist PERSIUS, the friend and disciple of the
Stoic

Ch. V.

*Tu REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Ro-
mane, memento,*

*(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere
morem,*

Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

FROM

Stoic *Cornutus*; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life, so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the *Latin Classics*, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also *SENECA*; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of *Hadrian* and the *Antonines*, lived *AULUS GELLIUS*, or (as some call him) *AGELLIUS*, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range *MACROBIUS*, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us Ch. V.
 pass to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN
 COMMON-

lived under *Honorius* and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer: His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Semnum Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the *philosophical* kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished APULEIUS of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

The

Ch. V. COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained
 { their Liberty, were the most heroic Con-
 federacy, that ever existed. They were
 the

The last *Latin* Philosopher was BOETHIUS, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethical* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Style; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabb'd *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theodoric* king of the *Goths*, 'twas the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the *Latin* Tongue, and the last remains of *Roman* Dignity, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philosophical* Writings; such as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN; but as these preferred the use of the *Greek* Tongue to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of *Latin* Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for THE *LATIN* AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of Ch. V.
 men. In the short space of little more
 than a Century, they became such States-
 men, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Phy-
 sicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors,
 Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers,
 that one can hardly help considering THAT
 GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event
 in honour of human Nature, to shew
 to what perfection the Species might as-
 cend (*f*):

Now

(*f*) If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric*
 Poets, we hear of few *Grecian* writers before the ex-
 pedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been
 defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* Power was at
 an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS
 (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone
 till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom
 it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that
Golden Period spoken of above. I do not mean that
Greece had not many writers of great merit subse-
 quent to that period, and especially of the philo-
 sophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sub-
 lime* (call it as you please) attained at that time to a
 height, to which it never could ascend in any
 after age.

Ch. V. NOW THE LANGUAGE OF THESE
 GREEKS was truly like themselves; 'twas
 con-

The same kind of fortune befel the People of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. 'Twas soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Cæsar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRA-TIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as sol-licitude for the common welfare engaged men's at-tentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they be-gan to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were in-sensibly dissolved. Hence then among the *Greeks* that

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conformable to their transcendent and uni-Ch. V.
versal Genius. Where Matter so abounded,
Words

that fatal *Peloponnesian* War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like Luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans*; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; 'till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Antony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subjects to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Æneid*, and with *Horace*, *Varius*,

Greek.

HERE W
the Humou

and many oth
tection and roy
remembered, th
in the principle
hence they der
which made th
The Successors
Alexander and C
any thing farther
saying of *Longin*
Φρονήματα τῶν μ
καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ
ἀλλήλους ἐριδος, κα
TIS LIBERTY

native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Me-* Ch. V.
nander; for the amorous Strains of a *Mim-*
nermus or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a
Theocritus or *Bion*; and for the sublime
Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The
same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled
to display his Art, in all the accuracy of
Periods, and the nice counterpoise of
Diction, Here *Demosthenes* found mate-
rials for that nervous Composition, that
manly force of unaffected Eloquence,
which rushed, like a torrent, too im-
petuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting
their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and
his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in
their character of *Composition*; for as to
their *Philosophy itself*, 'twas in reality *the*
same. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and or-
derly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Or-
nament; with little address to the Passions
or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole

Ch. V. with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed *in Greek*? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and strict *order* appears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, 'tis without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet tho' these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—*Plato*, copious, figurative, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric;

satiric; enriching his Works with Tales Ch. V.
and Fables, and the mystic Theology
of ancient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern
of perfect simplicity; every where smooth,
harmonious, and pure; declining the figu-
rative, the marvelous, and the mystic;
ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor
then so much trusting to the colours of
Stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the
Sentiment itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in
which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit
so accurately with the Stile of both, that
when we read either of the two, we can-
not help thinking, that 'tis he alone, who
has hit its character, and that it could not
have appeared so elegant in any other
manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,
from its Propriety and Universality, made

Ch. V. *for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.*

GRAIIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore
rotunda
Musa loqui.

'TWERE to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) 'twere to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *English* Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where 'tis to be feared, they rarely find
any

any rational pleasure, and more rarely Ch. V.
still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey thro' some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. 'Tis certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *'tis Men*, and *not Books* we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked from repeated experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities,

*

CH. V. lities, without the common helps, have
 been sufficient of *themselves* to great and
 important Ends. But alas !

Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile—

In truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of *natural Capacity*, and of *super-induced Habit*. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess *the best Capacities*, cultivated with *the best Habits*. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, *they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.*

AND so much at present as to GENERAL
 IDEAS ; *how we acquire them ; whence they*
are

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are derived; what is their Nature; and Ch. V.
what their connection with Language. So
much likewise as to the Subject of LAN-
GUAGE, and UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

End of the THIRD BOOK.



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F I N I S.

ERRATA.

Page 4. for διαμειν, read, διαμειν; for περιβουλα, read, περιβουλας. P. 28. for ἀνν, read, ἀνν; for Vertum, Verbum. P. 29. for Prisc. L. IX. read, Prisc. L. XI. P. 67. for Ch. III. read, Ch. V. P. 78. for ἰν, read, ἰν. P. 87. for κατηρημένον, read, κατηρημένον. P. 96. for προσημαῖον, read, προσημαῖον; for Proposition, Preposition. P. 155. for γαγυόειν, read, γαγυόειν. P. 220. for προποστῶσαι, read, προποστῶσαι. P. 262. for Mortar, read, Morter. P. 374. for Policies, read, Politics. *There are moreover a few errors in the accenting, which the critical reader is desired to correct, as they occur.*


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
Under the word Both, for page 237, read, 227. Under Grammarians, for 178, read, 198. Under Heraclitus, for 360, 361, read, 369, 370. Under Matter, for 300, read, 308; and in the next line, for 216, read, 316. Under Peripatetic Philosophy, for 143, read, 144. Under Priscian, for 255, 256, read, 225, 226. Under Sanctius, for 391, read, 291. Under Science, for 3, read, 5.

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The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published by himself, in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745.







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